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Abstract
This thesis consists of three studies, which explore topics related to labor economics. Chapters
2 and 3 examine the returns on student loans and student loan repayment policy, respectively.
Chapter 4 examines the returns to skill and the evolution of skills at older ages.
In Chapter 2 (co-authored with Lance Lochner), we study rates of return on government
student loans in Canada using novel administrative data from the Canada Student Loans Pro-
gram. We exploit rich information on personal characteristics, loan amounts, field of study,
and institution of attendance to explain differences in rates of return across different types of
borrowers. We find that field of study is a particularly important determinant of rates of return,
explaining 60-70% of the variation in predicted returns across borrowers, while institution dif-
ferences explain only about 10% of the variation. We also show that if private lenders were to
cream-skim borrowers with predicted returns above 10% (5%), the average return would fall
from the current -5% to -6.4% (-9.4%), raising the cost of the government student loan program
and adverse selection concerns.
In Chapter 3, I study the effects of introducing an income-based student loan repayment
(IBR) plan when considering labor market risks and the insurance provided by parents. I de-
velop a dynamic life-cycle model with endogenous parents-to-children transfers, together with
children’s education, borrowing, repayment, and labor supply decisions. After estimating the
model using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, I quantify the impacts of in-
troducing an IBR while keeping the government budget constant. IBR crowds out savings
and parental transfers as it provides more insurance to borrowers. Interestingly, a weak labor
supply response to IBR suggests that moral hazard is not a concern. Further, the college enroll-
ment rate increases, and the largest gains are for low-income and low-ability families. Finally,
aggregate welfare increases with relatively low-income families benefiting the most.
In Chapter 4 (co-authored with Lance Lochner, Youngmin Park, and Youngki Shin), we
show that repeated cross-section data with multiple skill measures (one continuous and re-
peated) available each period are sufficient to nonparametrically identify the evolution of skill
returns and cross-sectional skill distributions. With panel data and the same available mea-
surements, the dynamics of skills can also be identified. Our identification strategy motivates
a multi-step nonparametric estimation strategy. We further show that if any continuous re-
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peated measurement is shown to be linear in skills, a much simpler GMM estimator can be
used. Using Health and Retirement Survey data on men ages 52+ from 1996-2016, we show
that one of the available (continuous and repeated) skill measures (word recall) is linear in
skills and implement our GMM estimation approach. Our estimates suggest that the returns to
skill were fairly stable from the mid-1990s to the Great Recession and rising thereafter. We
document considerable differences in skills and lifecycle skill profiles over ages 52–70 across
cohorts, with more recent cohorts possessing lower skills in their mid-50s but experiencing
much weaker skill declines with age. We also document skill differences by education and
race, which are stable across ages and explain roughly one-third and one-half, respectively, of
the corresponding differences in wages.
Keywords: Student loans, return on student loans, income-based repayment, parental
transfers, postsecondary education, returns to skill, skill dynamics.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This thesis consists of three studies, which explore topics related to labor economics. Chapters
2 and 3 examine the returns on student loans and student loan repayment policy, respectively.
Chapter 4 examines the returns to skill and the evolution of skills at older ages.
In Chapter 2 (co-authored with Lance Lochner), we calculate the net revenue the govern-
ment receives by lending to undergraduate students in Canada. We also look at what types of
borrowers are the most “profitable” to the government. We find that, on average, the govern-
ment has lost 5 cents for every dollar it lent out. We also find that field of study is the most
important predictor for repayment. The government gets more revenue by lending to students
studying in law, education, health-related, and engineering-related majors compared to other
majors. We also quantify the government revenue losses if private lenders were to siphon away
the more profitable borrowers.
In Chapter 3, I study the impacts of introducing an income-based student loan repayment
(IBR) plan for university graduates. There have been concerns among policy makers that
increasing debt levels and uncertainty around finding a well paying job has made it increasingly
difficult for current graduates to repay their student loans. This has led to policy proposals that
the student loan repayment program should be income-based, i.e., repayment should be based
on borrowers’ income instead of their debt. However, IBR may reduce the revenue that the
government can collect, and even encourage some people to work less. In this chapter, I study
the effects of introducing an IBR while keeping the government budget fixed. My analysis
considers one of the most important aspects of college financing — parental transfers, and
examines how parental transfers and students with different levels of parental transfers respond
to the new policy. I find that IBR leads to less savings and fewer parental transfers. Two
important behavioural responses to IBR are that (i) very few borrowers work less because of
IBR and (ii) IBR encourages more youth from low-income families to go to college. Social
welfare increases because of the introduction of IBR.
In Chapter 4 (co-authored with Lance Lochner, Youngmin Park, and Youngki Shin), we
study the returns to skill and the evolution of skills for older men in the U.S. The literature is
not yet settled on whether the rising wage inequality in the U.S. is due to higher returns to skill
or greater dispersion of skills across workers. Because skill is not directly observed, previous
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literature has had to make strong assumptions to differentiate between these two channels.
In this paper, we develop a novel strategy to separate the returns to skill from the evolution
of skills, without making any strong assumptions. Using data that repeatedly measures the
cognitive abilities of men ages 52+, we show that one of the measures (word recall) is linear
in skills. This finding is critical for us to separate the returns to skill from the evolution of
skills. Our estimates suggest that the returns to skill were fairly stable from the mid-1990s to
the Great Recession and rising thereafter. We also find that more recent cohorts possess lower
skills in their mid-50s, but they experience much weaker skill declines with age. We observe
substantial skill differences by education and race. These differences are stable across ages
and explain roughly one-third and one-half, respectively, of the corresponding differences in
wages.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three studies which explore topics related to student loans and returns to
skill. Chapters 2 and 3 contribute to the literature by examining topics related to student loans,
and Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on wage inequality by studying returns to skill and
the evolution of skills.
In Chapter 2 (co-authored with Lance Lochner), we quantify the returns on government
student loans in Canada (purely from the government lender’s perspective) and empirically
examine the determinants of those returns. Both governments and private lenders are concerned
about the expected returns on the loans they disburse and whether the amounts they collect in
repayments will cover the amounts they lend out. In addition, the potential heterogeneity in
the expected return across different types of borrowers raises an adverse selection concern. For
example, private creditors may undercut the government loan program by cream skimming, i.e.
poaching profitable borrower types and leaving the government with unprofitable ones, raising
the cost of the government student loan program.
Using novel administrative data from the Canada Student Loans Program, we exploit rich
information on personal characteristics, loan amounts, field of study, and institution of atten-
dance to explain differences in rates of return across different types of borrowers. We find that
field of study is a particularly important determinant of rates of return, explaining 60-70% of
the variation in predicted returns across borrowers, while institution differences explain only
about 10% of the variation. We also show that if private lenders were to cream-skim borrowers
with predicted returns above 10% (5%), the average return would fall from the current -5% to
-6.4% (-9.4%), raising the cost of the government student loan program and adverse selection
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2 Chapter 1. Introduction
concerns.
In Chapter 3, I study the effects of introducing an income-based student loan repayment
(IBR) plan on college enrollment, student loan repayment, parental transfers, labor supply,
government budget, and aggregate welfare. Increasing borrowing for post-secondary educa-
tion, along with high student loan default rates, increasing labor market risk, and the need for
parental assistance, indicates that youth may be inadequately insured through the current stu-
dent loan repayment scheme. Some researchers and policy makers suggested that student loan
repayment schemes should provide more insurance against labor market risk through more ac-
cessible IBR plans. However, there is concern that the provision of more insurance for student
loan repayment could lead to large revenue losses for the student loan program. To make the
program self-sustaining, interest rates may need to increase, raising the costs of post-secondary
education for many who are currently paying their loans in full. This, in turn, may discourage
some youth from attending college altogether.
To study the effects of student loan repayment policy when considering labor market risks
and the insurance provided by parents, this paper develops a dynamic life-cycle model with en-
dogenous parents-to-children transfers, together with children’s education, borrowing, repay-
ment, and labor supply decisions. After estimating the model using the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1997, I quantify the impacts of introducing an IBR plan while keeping the gov-
ernment budget constant. IBR crowds out savings and parental transfers as it provides more
insurance to borrowers. Interestingly, a weak labor supply response to IBR suggests that moral
hazard is not a concern. The college enrollment rate increases, and the largest gains are for
low-income and low-ability families. Aggregate welfare increases with relatively low-income
families benefiting the most.
Chapter 4 (co-authored with Lance Lochner, Youngmin Park, and Youngki Shin) studies
the returns to skill and the evolution of skills for older men in the U.S. To explain the growing
wage inequality in the U.S., researchers are typically forced to make strong assumptions to
separate the rising returns to skill from the growth in the variance of skills across workers, due
to a lack of direct measures of skill.
This paper shows that repeated cross-section data with multiple skill measures (one con-
tinuous and repeated) available each period are sufficient to nonparametrically identify the
3
evolution of skill returns and the cross-sectional skill distributions. With panel data and the
same available measurements, the dynamics of skills can also be identified. Our identifica-
tion strategy motivates a multi-step nonparametric estimation strategy. We further show that
if any continuous repeated measurement is shown to be linear in skills, a much simpler GMM
estimator can be used.
Using Health and Retirement Study data on men ages 52+ from 1996-2016, we show that
one of the available (continuous and repeated) skill measures is linear in skills and implement
our GMM estimation approach. Our estimates suggest that the returns to skill were fairly stable
from the mid-1990s to the Great Recession and rising thereafter. We document considerable
differences in skills and lifecycle skill profiles over ages 52–70 across cohorts, with more recent
cohorts possessing lower skills in their mid-50s but experiencing much weaker skill declines
with age. We also document skill differences by education and race, which are stable across
ages and explain roughly one-third and one-half, respectively, of the corresponding differences
in wages. We observe substantial differences in skills for men in their mid-50s choosing to
retire at different ages, but no clear evidence of sharp declines in skills surrounding retirement
ages.
Chapter 2
Return on Student Loans in Canada
2.1 Introduction
As an increasing number of students borrow to finance their higher education, and many of
them delay payments or even default, both governments and private lenders are concerned
about the expected returns on the loans they disburse and whether the amounts they collect in
repayments will cover the amounts they lend out. This is particularly important when consid-
ering adjustments to loan programs or shifts in the underlying pool of students that borrow. In
this paper, we quantify the returns on government student loans in Canada (purely from the
government lender’s perspective) and empirically examine the determinants of those returns.
Under government student loan schemes, borrowers are generally offered the same contract
with the same interest rates and repayment plans. While there are some exceptions, contracts do
not depend on other aspects of borrowers like their field of study or institution of attendance.1
Given that post-school earnings and, therefore, the potential to repay is closely related to these
factors (Rumberger and Thomas, 1993; Loury and Garman, 1995; Altonji et al., 2012), the
expected return on student loans is likely to depend on these characteristics as well and would
be heterogeneous across individuals.
Heterogeneity in predictable returns across students raises concerns about the efficiency
of student loan programs and implies ex ante cross-subsidization, where borrowers with high
expected returns effectively subsidize those with low expected returns. Moreover, there is an
1For example, the U.S. offers subsidized and unsubsidized loans with different interest terms depending on the
financial need of borrowers. Loan limits tend to vary more across borrowers based on factors like dependency
status or financial need, year in school, and educational costs.
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adverse selection concern that private creditors may undercut the government loan program by
cream skimming, i.e. poaching profitable borrower types and leaving the government with un-
profitable ones (Bachas, 2019).2 This can raise the cost of the program, forcing the government
to raise the interest rate on student loans or subsidize the remaining pool. A higher interest rate
would likely drive additional high-return borrowers away, leading to an even more negatively
selected pool.
A major challenge to estimating returns on student loans is a lack of publicly available data
on repayment records over the full repayment period. Most data provide very limited snapshots
of repayment status (e.g., the National Graduates Survey (NGS) in Canada and the Baccalau-
reate and Beyond Longitudinal Studies in the U.S.). As a result, previous studies generally
examine student loan repayment status, such as default rates or the proportion of loan repaid,
typically a few years after students leave school (Gross et al., 2009). Schwartz and Finnie
(2002) use Canadian NGS data for the class of 1990 to study student loan repayment by char-
acteristics such as gender and field of study. However, the NGS only reports the amount owed
two years after graduation and self-identified problems with loan repayment. As discussed in
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2015), knowing whether borrowers had ever defaulted or are
currently in default as of some arbitrary date (especially early in the repayment process) does
not necessarily provide an accurate picture of returns on student loans and how those returns
differ across borrowers.
Using novel administrative data, this paper is the first to quantify the realized returns on
government student loans, link them to the characteristics of borrowers, and estimate predicted
returns for different borrowers based on characteristics (and choices) observed by the govern-
ment at the time loans are disbursed. We use data from the new Education and Labor Market
Longitudinal Platform (ELMLP) provided by Statistics Canada. Our main data source comes
from the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) administrative records on student loan dis-
bursements, needs determination, and repayments. These data provide extensive information
on the repayment and characteristics of each borrower and are available from 2003-2004 to
2This practice is already underway in the U.S. by companies such as SoFi (Kosir et al., 2015). Using data from
a student loan refinancing firm, Bachas (2019) provides a careful analysis of these issues in the U.S., including
the impact of offering risk-based interest rates in the student loan market on borrower welfare and government
revenue.
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2015-2016, allowing us to observe nearly complete repayment streams for borrowers entering
repayment in the mid-2000s. The ELMLP also allows us to link the CSLP data to admin-
istrative records from the Postsecondary Student Information System (PSIS), which includes
additional institutional and individual characteristics.
For reasons discussed below, we use these data to study rates of return on student loans
for the cohort of undergraduate borrowers that attended public post-secondary schools in the
Atlantic provinces of Canada and received their last undergraduate loan disbursement in 2005.
We use eleven years of data to calculate the realized rate of return for each borrower in our
sample. With these individual-specific realized returns, we estimate average returns to CSLP
for the full cohort of borrowers, as well as for different observable groups based on their de-
mographic characteristics, field of study, and post-secondary institution — all factors known
by the CSLP at the time loans are disbursed. We then regress individual-specific returns on all
of these characteristics, as well as the amount borrowed, to estimate the importance of each
of these factors when taking into account the influence of others. These results demonstrate
that field of study is a particularly important determinant of rates of return, with differences
in returns between fields as high as 35 percentage points. Differences between ranked and
unranked universities are more modest, generally less than 10 percentage points. While differ-
ences across demographic groups are generally modest, we do estimate a 10 percentage point
lower return for permanent residents compared to Canadian citizens.
Finally, our estimates enable us to calculate predicted rates of return for borrowers based
on the amount borrowed, demographic characteristics, field of study, and institution of at-
tendance. Altogether, the predictors we include explain as much as 14% of the variation in
realized returns, so even the very simple specification we consider predicts a sizeable amount
of the variation in returns on student loans. Most interestingly, differences in field of study ex-
plain 60-70% of the variation in predicted returns across borrowers, while institution indicators
(for each of the 12 ranked universities in the Atlantic provinces and an indicator for two-year
college attendance) explain only about 10% of the variation in predicted returns. Using the full
distribution of predicted returns, we also explore the extent to which average rates of return to
the CSLP would change if private lenders were to cream-skim different high-end borrowers.
These results suggest that losing all borrowers with predicted returns above 10% (5%) would
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reduce the rate of return on CSLP loans from the current -5% to -6.4% (-9.4%). Thus, concerns
about adverse selection are not unfounded.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the CSLP, while
Section 2.3 discusses our approach to quantifying the rate of return on student loans. Sec-
tion 2.4 describes the CSLP and PSIS data, as well as our sample selection criteria. Section 2.5
presents our empirical results on average rates of return on CSLP loans, the estimated impor-
tance of observable factors for rates of return, and the distribution of predicted rates of return.
We also discuss the potential impacts of cream-skimming by private lenders on CSLP returns.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Overview of CSLP
CSLP provides loans and grants to help Canadian students pay for their post-secondary educa-
tion based on their financial needs. The federal government works in collaboration with most
provincial/territorial governments to coordinate the delivery of student loans and grants.3
Loans are interest free while borrowers are in-study. After borrowers leave school, the loans
received during school are combined into a single repayment plan; this process is called loan
consolidation. Each loan is consolidated after a six month grace period following the study end
date. Borrowers begin to repay after consolidation. However, interest begins to accrue as of
the first day after the study end date, and interest accumulated during the grace period is added
to the principal balance at the time of loan consolidation.
Consolidation establishes the repayment agreement, including amortization period and in-
terest rate. The default repayment plan is a standard debt-based payment plan with an amor-
tization period of 9.5 years. Borrowers can extend their amortization period to a maximum
of 14.5 years. Borrowers have the choice of a floating interest rate (default option) or a fixed
interest rate.4 According to Office of the Chief Actuary (2019), 99% of borrowers choose the
3All provinces and territories participate in the CSLP, except Quebec, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut,
which operate their own financial assistance programs and receive alternative funding from the federal govern-
ment.
4Prior to 2019, the floating interest rate was the prime rate plus 2.5 percentage points and the fixed rate was
prime plus 5 percentage points. Effective on 1 November 2019, the floating interest rate was lowered to prime and
the fixed rate was lowered to prime plus 2 percentage points.
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floating rate.
The CSLP also provides repayment assistance to borrowers who have difficulty repaying
their student loans. In 1983, the CSLP introduced an Interest Relief (IR) program to provide
short-term relief to borrowers in financial difficulty while repaying the loan. Borrowers receiv-
ing IR were not required to make any payments for 3 months (extended to 6 months in 1998)
at a time. Interest did not accrue on the loans while a borrower was on IR.5
In 2009, the federal government introduced the Repayment Assistance Plan (RAP) to re-
place the previous IR. Students experiencing financial difficulty and needing assistance must
apply for RAP, as enrollment is not automatic. If approved, borrowers receive repayment assis-
tance for a period of six months. If assistance is needed after the six-month period, borrowers
must reapply. Under RAP, financial difficulty is determined by comparing a calculated “afford-
able” monthly payment to a calculated required monthly payment. The affordable payment is
determined as a fraction (ranging from zero to 20%) of income above a pre-defined threshold
based on family size, while the required payment is calculated based on the outstanding loan
amount. If the affordable payment is less than the required monthly payment, the borrower
qualifies for RAP and need only make the lower affordable payment. In most cases, borrowers
enrolled in RAP make no payment at all.
There are two stages in RAP: Interest Relief (Stage 1) and Debt Reduction (Stage 2).
Stage 1 is similar to the older IR: the Government covers all interest that is not covered by
the reduced borrower’s payment. A borrower eligible for RAP could receive this benefit for up
to 60 months. In Stage 2, the Government covers all interest and principal amounts not covered
by the borrower’s payment, so that student debt is eliminated within a maximum of 15 years
from leaving school (or 10 years for borrowers with permanent disabilities).
A loan is considered in default when the borrower has missed 9 months of payments, and
the loan is sent to the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) for collection. Once in collection,
borrowers cannot receive any form of repayment assistance and must rehabilitate their loans in
order to have access to repayment assistance. Actuarial reports on the CSLP show a recovery
rate (i.e. the fraction of the loan recuperated after a default) of roughly 30% in recent years
(Office of the Chief Actuary, 2019).
5See Situ (2006) for more details about IR.
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Some borrowers enter bankruptcy during their repayment period. In principle, borrowers
filing for bankruptcy are not shielded from student loan payments if they file within seven years
of leaving school; however, student loans can be discharged beyond the seven year point.
2.3 Measuring Rates of Return on Student Loans
This section describes our measure of rates of return and our use of CSLP data to calculate
individual-specific returns. We also discuss our method for estimating predicted return based
on characteristics observed by the government at the time loans are disbursed.
2.3.1 Realized Returns
We define the net rate of return on a loan to borrower i, Ri, as follows:
Ri =
T i∑
t=1
Pi,t
(1 + d)t
Li,0
− 1, (2.1)
where T i is the number of years over which repayment takes place, {Pi,t}
T i
t=1 is the sequence of
payments, Li,0 is the initial loan amount, and d is the constant discount rate used to calculate
the return from the lender’s perspective.
In practice, the discount rate d would typically reflect the government’s cost of funds, po-
tentially with an adjustment factor to account for aggregate risk as discussed in Lucas and
Phaup (2010) and Lucas and Moore (2010a). It may differ from the nominal interest rate, r,
charged on the loan and used to determine payment amounts.6 Note that if d = r and the bor-
rower repays the loan in full, then Ri = 0 and the lender breaks even as the discounted flow of
payments equals the initial loan amount. Furthermore, the timing of payments is irrelevant for
the rate of return when d = r.
If there is any chance that some borrowers will not repay in full, one would expect the
6The standard debt-based payment is based on traditional annuity formula based on the current balance Li,t,
remaining years on the loan τ, and interest rate r: Li,t
[
r(1+r)τ
(1+r)τ−1
]
. The Office of the Chief Actuary publishes annual
actuarial reports on the CSLP, which report the Government’s cost of borrowing and nominal interest rates. For
example, see Office of the Chief Actuary (2019).
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lender to set r > d to cover its losses on those who do not repay. When r > d, the return
Ri > 0 for borrowers that fully repay their loan (assuming they do not repay before any interest
is accumulated). The higher the nominal rate relative to the discount rate, the higher the rate
of return, keeping all else constant. When r , d, the timing of repayments also affects the
rate of return to the lender. For r > d (r < d), the return is higher when payments are shifted
later (earlier) as interest accumulates on the loan at a higher (lower) rate than the discount
rate. Of course, the return is reduced when the borrower does not repay in full, as is often
the case with default or bankruptcy. The earlier a borrower enters default or bankruptcy, the
lower the return if the borrower never makes another payment. By contrast, if r > d, then
borrowers that default for a period of time before returning to their standard payments (and
eventually repaying their loans in full) will generate a higher return than borrowers who make
the standard payments, since delayed payments lead to higher returns when r > d. These cases
make clear that standard measures of default at some point in time (or whether someone had
ever defaulted up until some point) are not necessarily informative about the rate of return from
that borrower, especially when r > d as is commonly the case. Someone who defaulted in year
two of repayment may yield a very low return if they never make another payment, but they
could also yield a high return if their default is temporary and they eventually pay off their loan
in full. From the lender’s perspective, the rate of return Ri appropriately captures all of these
possibilities and provides an accurate reflection of a borrower’s creditworthiness. Of course,
calculating Ri requires observing borrowers over their entire repayment periods.
In practice, we may not observe borrowers for their entire repayment history, making equa-
tion (2.1) impossible to implement. While we observe repayments for up to 11 years in our
sample, many borrowers have not repaid their loans in full by that time (despite a “standard”
repayment period of 10 years). We, therefore, make several informed assumptions about pay-
ments after the observed period of repayment based on what we know about the CSLP.
Suppose we only observe payments for Ti ≤ T i. Letting P̃i,Ti+1 reflect the discounted
present value of all remaining payments after Ti, the empirical rate of return can be calculated
as follows:
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Rei =
Ti∑
t=1
Pi,t
(1 + d)t
+ P̃i,Ti+1
Li,0
− 1. (2.2)
We make different assumptions about P̃i,Ti+1 depending on the loan status in period Ti and, in
some cases, the last observed loan amount Li,Ti and payment Pi,Ti . We consider five possible
loan statuses at the end of period Ti: (1) the loan is fully repaid; (2) the loan is not fully repaid
but in good standing and standard repayment; (3) the loan is not fully repaid and the borrower
is in income-contingent repayment (i.e. RAP); (4) the loan is in default; (5) the borrower has
declared bankruptcy. We discuss our assumptions about P̃i,Ti+1 in each of these cases.
First, if the borrower fully repays the loan by period Ti, the outstanding balance at Ti is
Li,Ti = 0 and, therefore, P̃i,Ti+1 = 0.
Second, if the loan is not fully repaid and the borrower is making standard debt-based
payments at the end of Ti, we assume that she will continue to make the same annual payments
as she made in year Ti until the loan is paid off, unless that would take more than 15 years from
the date of consolidation for their last loan.7 If that would require payments beyond 15 years
from consolidation, we assume that she makes a constant payment (determined by the standard
annuity formula) to repay the loan within that time frame.8
Third, if the loan is not fully repaid and the borrower is making income-based payments
(under RAP) at the end of Ti, we assume that they will continue to make the same annual
payment as they made in year Ti until their time on RAP is over or the loan is fully repaid,
whichever occurs sooner.9
Fourth, if the borrower has defaulted by Ti, we assume that 30% of the remaining balance
will be collected, i.e., P̃i,Ti+1 = 0.3Li,Ti/(1 + d)
Ti . This assumption is consistent with recovery
7Unfortunately, the nominal interest rate r is not directly available from our data. To calculate the accumulation
of interest after Ti, we assume r = 5.5%, which is the floating rate of student loans from year 2010 to 2014 (and
did not change much until 2018).
8We also consider an alternative assumption that full repayment is made in year Ti + 1: P̃i,Ti+1 =
Li,Ti
(1+d)Ti . For
r > d, this implies a slightly lower return than our baseline assumption. The main findings presented in Section 2.5
remain the same under this alternative assumption; although, the average rate of return is slightly lower.
9An alternative (extreme) assumption is that zero payments are collected beyond year Ti (i.e., P̃i,Ti+1 = 0). The
main data findings presented in Section 2.5 remain the same under this alternative assumption with slightly lower
average returns.
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rates in recent years (Office of the Chief Actuary, 2019).10
Fifth, if the borrower has declared bankruptcy by Ti, we assume that no additional payments
will be collected (i.e., P̃i,Ti+1 = 0). While information on collections among students entering
bankruptcy is scarce, conversations with officials at CSLP suggest that, in practice, little is
collected from those entering bankruptcy.
2.3.2 Average and Predicted Returns
To calculate average or predicted returns for borrowers, we assume that repayments after period
Ti do not systematically differ across subgroups of the population (conditional on remaining
debt and repayment status). Under this assumption, we can estimate ex ante expected returns
for any population subgroup by using the average realized return, Rei , for that subgroup.
We can also estimate the expected return for borrowers conditional on observed characteris-
tics Xi, E(Ri|Xi), using a regression approach. Consider a simple model of returns Ri = Xiβ+εi,
where the vector Xi includes observable characteristics such as the amount borrowed, demo-
graphic characteristics, field of study, and institution of attendance, while εi reflects idiosyn-
cratic variation in returns conditional on Xi (with E(εi|Xi) = 0). In this case, regressing Rei
on Xi yields the estimated coefficient vector β̂, which can be used to calculate predicted re-
turns R̂i ≡ Xiβ̂ for a borrower with characteristics Xi. In the absence of aggregate risk, these
predicted returns provide an estimate of ex ante expected returns for lenders with rational ex-
pectations, i.e., E(Ri|Xi).
2.4 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper uses administrative data from the CSLP and the PSIS. We
briefly discuss each of these sources and the sample we use for our analysis.
10Note that our data do not include any information about a loan after default, so we do not know whether any
specific loan has been rehabilitated or if any collections have been made after the default.
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Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) Administrative Data
The CSLP administrative data contain recipient-level longitudinal information from the 2003-
2004 loan year to the 2015-2016 loan year.11 The CSLP provides data on the loan application
process, loan disbursement, and annual repayment amounts for each individual. Using the
repayment records in these data, we calculate the rate of return Rei for each borrower based on
equation (2.2). The CSLP also provides information on borrowers’ institutions, fields of study,
and basic demographics. It, therefore, provides a unique opportunity to study the distribution
of realized returns conditional on the observable characteristics of borrowers to get ex ante
expected returns for different individuals.
Postsecondary Student Information System (PSIS)
In addition to the CSLP, we also use administrative data from the PSIS, which covers all stu-
dents who have enrolled in or graduated from any public college or university in Canada for
each reporting year.12 The available PSIS data cover from 2009-2010 to 2016-2017 for all
provinces and territories, and as far back as 2005-2006 for the four Atlantic provinces (New-
foundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Price Edward Island). Since the
reporting year in the PSIS largely overlaps with the loan year for the CSLP, these data can be
linked to provide more information on individual characteristics, including immigration status
and a richer classification for field of study.
Sample Selection
Since we are interested in the rate of return on student loans at the undergraduate level, we
limit the sample to individuals who have received student loans for undergraduate studies. To
ensure a relatively long period of observed payments, we focus on an early cohort that received
its last undergraduate loan disbursement in the 2005 loan year, which we refer to as the 2005
cohort.
11A loan year starts in August 1st and ends in July 31th of the following calendar year.
12A reporting year starts from the day after the end of the institution’s previous winter term, which is usually a
date in April, May or June, and ends in one year from this start date. The PSIS covers students registered at the
institution at any time during the reporting year.
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The longest repayment period we observe is 11 years (from 2005-2006 to 2015-2016),
which is one year longer than the duration of standard debt-based repayment in Canada. Some
borrowers are observed for shorter repayment periods, because they were enrolled in under-
graduate studies for another year or two after their last undergraduate loan disbursement or
continued on to other levels of study (e.g., non-degree or master/PhD), borrowing more. The
final loan consolidation year is later than 2005 for these borrowers, resulting in a shorter ob-
served repayment period.
Because we want to link to the PSIS records for some of our analysis, we limit our sample
to borrowers from the Atlantic provinces who attended public post-secondary institutions in
those provinces.13 We further limit our sample to individuals aged 18-30 when they received
their last undergraduate loan.
In the CSLP repayment data, the accounting identity that the amount repaid plus the amount
outstanding must equal the loan consolidation amount is not respected for many borrowers.
In many cases, there is an easy explanation (confirmed through conversations with CSLP offi-
cials), which we address as appropriate.14 In other cases, there is no easy explanation. Discrep-
ancies can result from coding errors or changes in the reporting system over time and across
service providers. Among those discrepancies that are not easily understood, we drop those
for which the absolute discrepancy is at least 5% of the consolidation loan amount, excluding
about 520 individuals. We include the other approximately 920 individuals with a positive ab-
solute discrepancy of less than 5% to maintain sample representativeness and size. The final
sample consists of around 5,690 individuals.15 About 90% of our sample can be linked to PSIS
records.
13The PSIS only covers public institutions and is only available for Atlantic provinces prior to 2009. We only
restrict the sample to those that can be linked to the PSIS when necessary.
14For example, sometimes a borrower may have multiple loan consolidations, because he leaves and then
returns to school. In principle, the loan consolidation amount should be cumulative, reflecting the total outstanding
balance at the time. However, there are cases where the later loan consolidation amount clearly does not include
outstanding amounts from previous consolidations. Yet, actual repayment is based on the total outstanding loan
amount, which leads to a discrepancy between the repayment record and the reported last consolidation amount.
In this case, we correct the inconsistency using the actual repayment record to calculate the loan amount.
15Numbers of observations are rounded to 10 as required by Statistics Canada due to confidentiality concerns.
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Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables in our sample. Our goal is to
predict student loan returns from the lender’s perspective at the time of last undergraduate loan
disbursement. Therefore, the variables discussed below reflect the state of the borrower at last
undergraduate loan disbursement, unless otherwise specified.
Nearly two-thirds of the sample is female. The average age when they received their last un-
dergraduate loan was 22 years-old, and most borrowers were either single independent (56%)
or dependent (38%), while only 4% were married/common law and 2% were single parents.
Permanent residents make up only 1% of our sample of borrowers, while the rest were Cana-
dian citizens.
In terms of geographic distribution, about 30% were from New Brunswick, 30% from
Newfoundland and Labrador, 40% from Nova Scotia, and 5% from Prince Edward Island.
The location of the institution attended has a similar distribution. 17% of our sample went to
other levels of study after undergraduate — 12% went to non-degree studies and 5% went to
master/PhD studies (this is unknown to the lender at last undergraduate loan disbursement).
Only 4% of borrowers in our sample had enrolled in a college (i.e. non-baccalaureate grant-
ing institutions), while the rest attended universities for undergraduate studies. The vast major-
ity of our sample (93%) attended a university ranked among the top 49 Canadian institutions
by their reputation.16
The average amount of undergraduate loans was $15,900.17 About one-third borrowed
less than $10,000 at the undergraduate level. Another one-third borrowed more than $10,000
but less than $20,000. About 30% borrowed more than $20,000 but less than $30,000. Only
about 6% borrowed more than $30,000. Since borrowers could attend other levels of study and
continue to borrow after their undergraduate studies, the amount of their last consolidated loan
could exceed the amount borrowed as an undergraduate. It is also possible that borrowers have
repaid some of their loans in between studies. The average amount of the last consolidated
loan is $17,600, roughly 10% more than the average undergraduate loan amount.
16See https://www.macleans.ca/education/canadas-top-school-by-reputation-2020/ for the
2020 ranking list.
17Dollar values are rounded to 100 if greater than 1,000 or 10 if less than 1,000 as required by Statistics Canada.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Standard deviation
Gender
Female 0.64
Male 0.36
Immigration status
Canadian citizen 0.99
Permanent resident 0.01
Dependency category
Married/Common law 0.04
Single parent 0.02
Single independent 0.56
Dependent 0.38
Issue province/Home province
New Brunswick 0.28
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.28
Nova Scotia 0.39
Prince Edward Island 0.05
Study province
New Brunswick 0.29
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.26
Nova Scotia 0.41
Prince Edward Island 0.04
Last study level
Non-degree 0.12
Undergraduate 0.83
Master/Phd 0.05
Institution type
College 0.04
Ranked University 0.93
Unranked University 0.03
Age at last undergraduate loan disbursement 22.4 2.6
Undergraduate loan amount 15,900 9,200
< $10,000 0.33
$10,000 - $19,999 0.32
$20,000 - $29,999 0.29
≥ $30,000 0.06
Last consolidated loan amount 17,600 9,900
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Both the CSLP and the PSIS provide information on borrowers’ field of study, using dif-
ferent classifications. Table 2.2 lists the detailed categories and the distribution of borrowers
across each classification.18 As one can see, the classification system in PSIS is more detailed
than that of the CSLP; although, there is considerable overlap. In CSLP, nearly half of all
borrowers studied in Arts/Science, a very broad category. The PSIS uses the Classification of
Instructional Programs (CIP) primary grouping, which distinguishes better between arts and
sciences majors.19 Based on this classification, we see that about 17% of borrowers had stud-
ied in humanities, 14% in social and behavioural sciences, and another 8% in physical and
life sciences; only 2% had majored in visual and performing arts and communication tech-
nologies. Both classifications show that roughly 15% of borrowers had majored in each of
business-related fields, education/community service fields, and health-related fields.
2.5 Returns on Student Loans in Canada
We calculate the rate of return for each borrower described in equation (2.2), using the discount
rate of d = 2.1% to discount payments to the period when the last undergraduate loan is
disbursed, 2005.20 Our data suggest that the average individual-level rate of return is -4.9%
across all borrowers. This does not distinguish between borrowers who borrowed $1,000 and
those who borrowed $30,000; however, this distinction is important for the CSLP in calculating
its total return on its loan portfolio. To assess the average return to the CSLP on the total amount
lent to this cohort, we weight each observed return by the undergraduate loan amount. This
weighted average return is -5.0%, indicating that, on average, the CSLP has lost 5 cents for
every dollar it lent out to this cohort of students (from the Atlantic provinces).
We next discuss rates of return based on the last repayment status. We then discuss av-
erage returns for different subgroups of students based on their demographic characteristics,
field of study, and post-secondary institution. Finally, we use multivariate regression methods
18Details on the areas of study included in each category can be found in Appendix A.1.
19In CIP, we separate the primary classification of law and social and behavioural sciences into (i) law and (ii)
social and behavioral sciences.
20The Government’s cost of borrowing is estimated to be 2.1% for the 2011-2012 loan year (Office of the Chief
Actuary, 2012). It has not changed much over the last few years (see, for example, Office of the Chief Actuary
(2019)).
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Table 2.2: Distribution of Field of Study
Field of Study Mean
CSLP categories
Administration/Business 0.13
Agriculture 0.01
Arts/Science 0.49
Community Services/Education 0.16
Dentistry 0.01
Engineering/Technology 0.05
Health Sciences 0.13
Law 0.01
Medicine 0.01
PSIS categories
Education 0.13
Visual and Performing Arts, and Communications Technologies 0.02
Humanities 0.17
Social and Behavioural Sciences 0.14
Business, Management and Public Administration 0.14
Physical and Life Sciences, and Technologies 0.08
Mathematics, Computer and Information Sciences 0.02
Architecture, Engineering and Related Technologies 0.05
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Conservation 0.02
Health and Related Fields 0.16
Law 0.01
Other 0.07
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to estimate the importance of individual and institutional factors in determining the returns.
These estimates are used to calculate predicted returns based on information observed by the
government at the time student loans were disbursed. These predicted returns are critical for
evaluating concerns about adverse selection and potential cream-skimming by private lenders.
2.5.1 Returns by Last Repayment Status
As discussed in Section 2.3, there are five terminal repayment statuses. Table 2.3 provides
information about borrowing and repayment by last repayment status.
Table 2.3: Borrowing and Repayment by Last Observed Repayment Status
Avg. Amt. Avg. Amt. Std. Dev. Avg. Avg. Months
Fraction Borrowed Owed Amt. owed
Li,Ti
(1+d)Ti Li,0
PTi in RAP
Paid in full 52% 15,300
In repayment 24% 21,100 10,500 8,000 38% 2,400
In RAP 6% 23,900 16,500 9,000 54% 870
IR/RAP stage 1 3% 23,700 17,500 10,100 58% 990 39
RAP stage 2 3% 23,800 16,000 7,600 53% 770 91
In default 16% 17,200 17,700 10,800 93% 110
Bankruptcy 2% 19,700 16,600 11,600 71% 540
By the end of the sample period, 52% of borrowers had fully repaid their loans, 24% were
in standard debt-based repayment, 6% were enrolled in RAP, (with half in stage 2), 16% had
defaulted, and another 2% had declared bankruptcy. On average, those in RAP borrowed the
most, while those who paid in full had borrowed the least. Those still in repayment owed, on
average, about $10,500 at the end of our sample period, while the average amount still owed
among those enrolled in RAP, in default, or in bankruptcy ranged from $16,500-17,700.
The share of debt still owed (in present value) at the end of our sample period, (1 +
d)−Ti Li,Ti/Li,0, varies considerably across loan statuses and is informative about the potential
losses in different cases. For example, those in default still owe 93% of their original loan
amount. Since only 30% of this remaining balance is typically repaid, average losses for those
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who default are quite high. Losses are even greater for those declaring bankruptcy, since these
borrowers still owed 71% when they entered bankruptcy and additional payments are the ex-
ception. Of course, bankruptcy itself is quite rare, so these losses (and our assumption of zero
collections from those entering bankruptcy) have little impact on average returns for the overall
population of borrowers.
Regarding the annual payment during the last sample year, PTi , those still in (standard)
repayment were paying, on average, $2,400. At that amount, it would take about five years to
repay the average amount owed ($10,500) among these borrowers. As noted earlier, we assume
that those enrolled in RAP will continue to pay PTi until their time on RAP expires or their
loan is fully repaid, whichever is earlier. Given the sizeable amounts still owed ($16,500 on
average), relatively low payment amounts ($870, on average), and number of months already
on RAP, the typical borrower on RAP 10–11 years after leaving school will see much of his
student debt forgiven.
Table 2.4 reports the mean and standard deviation of returns by last repayment status (under
our assumptions). The average return from those who paid in full is about 10%, much higher
than the overall average, as one might expect. Under our assumptions, those still in repayment
at the end of our sample period (11 years of repayment in most cases) generate the highest
return, because they pay interest accrued at a higher rate (5.5%) than the discount rate (2.1%)
for a longer period of time. Due to uncollected amounts, those in RAP, default, or bankruptcy
have very negative returns, on average. While most borrowers who enter default do so early (as
evidenced by the high share of debt still owed), there is much greater variation in the timing at
which borrowers enter bankruptcy, resulting in considerable variation in the returns from those
borrowers.21 Variation in the timing of entry into RAP and income-based payment amounts
lead to considerable variation in the returns for borrowers enrolled in RAP at the end of the
sample period.
21Given that the average share of debt still owed (in present value) is 93% for defaulters, the average return
would be about 30% lower for defaulters if we assume nothing is collected after default, compared to our baseline
assumption.
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Table 2.4: Return by Last Repayment Status
Mean Standard deviation
Paid in full 0.101 0.089
In repayment 0.166 0.111
In RAP -0.474 0.365
In default -0.597 0.154
Bankruptcy -0.652 0.318
2.5.2 Average Returns by Borrower and Institutional Characteristics
As noted earlier, average returns for our full sample are negative at -4.9%. Table 2.5 reports av-
erage returns (and their standard errors) by demographic characteristics, field of study, and type
of institution attended. On average, men provide a lower return than women, which is interest-
ing in light of the much-discussed disadvantage women face in the labor market (Fortin, 2019).
Borrowers who studied in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island have higher returns, on
average, than those who studied in Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia.
We observe large differences in returns depending on the year in study when borrowers
received their last undergraduate loan. Those whose last undergraduate loan was disbursed
in the first year of post-secondary school have a significantly lower average return (about 5
percentage points lower) than those who last borrowed in years 2 or 3, and 11 percentage
points lower than those who last borrowed in years 4 and above. This is not surprising given
that those who last borrowed in years 3 and lower are more likely to have dropped out without
a degree.
Those who studied in colleges have a slightly higher return than those who studied in uni-
versities, but the difference is not statistically significant. As we see below, this does not simply
reflect lower loan burdens. Borrowers who studied in unranked universities have a significantly
lower return than those who studied in colleges or ranked universities.
Average returns differ substantially across fields of study. Focusing on the more detailed
PSIS classification, we see that education majors (6.8%) and health majors (5.8%) generate
modest positive returns, while those majoring in arts (-23.4%) and humanities (-19.0%) are
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Table 2.5: Average Return by Individual Characteristics, Major, and Type of Institution At-
tended
Characteristics Mean Standard Error
Gender
Female -0.043 0.006
Male -0.060 0.007
Study province
New Brunswick -0.030 0.008
Newfoundland and Labrador -0.055 0.009
Nova Scotia -0.062 0.007
Prince Edward Island -0.012 0.021
Year in study
1 -0.118 0.010
2-3 -0.073 0.008
4-6 -0.009 0.006
Institution type
College -0.035 0.019
University -0.049 0.005
Ranked University -0.047 0.005
Unranked University -0.132 0.027
CSLP field of study
Administration/Business -0.005 0.011
Arts/Science -0.137 0.007
Community Services/Education 0.050 0.009
Engineering/Technology 0.037 0.015
Health Sciences 0.065 0.009
PSIS field of study
Education 0.068 0.010
Visual and Performing Arts, and Communications Technologies -0.234 0.040
Humanities -0.190 0.013
Social and Behavioural Sciences -0.122 0.014
Business, Management and Public Administration -0.027 0.012
Physical and Life Sciences, and Technologies -0.061 0.016
Mathematics, Computer and Information Sciences 0.018 0.027
Architecture, Engineering and Related Technologies 0.041 0.015
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Conservation -0.020 0.034
Health and Related Fields 0.058 0.009
Other -0.131 0.018
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25–30 percentage points lower, yielding sizeable losses. Conclusions are similar based on the
CSLP field of study classification.
2.5.3 Predicting Returns on Student Loans
Table 2.5 shows that rates of return on student loans vary considerably across many dimensions.
We now use standard multivariate regression models to identify which factors are most impor-
tant determinants of those returns and to estimate predicted returns based on factors observable
to the government at the time loans are disbursed.
Table 2.6 shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of realized returns
on (i) a linear spline function of undergraduate loan amount with knots at $10,000, $20,000,
and $30,000, (ii) individual characteristics, including gender, dependency status, age, year in
undergraduate study, and loan issue/home province, (iii) CSLP field of study indicators, and
(iv) institutional indicators for ranked universities as well as an indicator for attendance at
(two-year) colleges. (Schools are ordered by Maclean’s 2020 ranking in the table.) Column (1)
includes institution and college indicators only, while column (2) includes field of study indi-
cators only. Column (3) controls for loan amount, individual characteristics, and field of study.
Column (4) includes all variables. Since these specifications do not use any data from the PSIS,
this table is based on the full sample of borrowers.
Since column (1) only includes institution indicators, the regression coefficients simply re-
flect differences in average returns between each ranked university, as well as all (two-year)
colleges, and all unranked universities. By themselves, institution indicators explain about
2.5% of the variation in returns (see the R2 statistic at the bottom of the table). As noted in Ta-
ble 2.5, returns are generally higher for students attending ranked universities and (two-year)
colleges compared to unranked universities. Students from only 4/12 ranked universities pro-
duce returns that are not significantly higher than unranked universities (at 5% significance
level); however, students attending 7/12 ranked universities generate lower returns than stu-
dents attending colleges (though not all differences are significant).
By comparing the estimates in column (1) with those of column (4), which includes student
loan amounts, all demographic factors, and field of study indicators, we can examine whether
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Table 2.6: Regression of Rate of Return on Characteristics (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loan amt (in $10,000) -0.055** -0.053**
(Loan amt - 10,000) × 1(amt > $10,000) -0.002 -0.006
(Loan amt - 20,000) × 1(amt > $20,000) -0.011 -0.005
(Loan amt - 30,000) × 1(amt > $30,000) 0.053 0.051
Gender
Female (base) (base)
Male -0.010 -0.012
Dependency category
Married/Common law -0.035 -0.034
Single parent -0.219*** -0.211***
Single independent -0.006 -0.005
Dependent (base) (base)
Age
18 (base) (base)
19 -0.025 -0.021
20 -0.038 -0.035
21 -0.013 -0.012
22 0.019 0.020
23 0.016 0.016
24 0.003 0.002
25 0.006 0.003
26 -0.008 -0.012
27 0.039 0.036
28 -0.016 -0.017
29 0.003 0.005
30 0.021 0.014
Year in study
1 (base) (base)
2 0.040** 0.036**
3 0.058*** 0.058***
4 0.131*** 0.128***
5 0.120*** 0.120***
6 0.163*** 0.172***
Issue province
New Brunswick (base) (base)
Newfoundland and Labrador -0.016 -0.001
Nova Scotia -0.017 -0.032**
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Prince Edward Island 0.035* 0.002
Field of study (CSLP categories)
Administration/Business 0.132*** 0.112*** 0.115***
Agriculture 0.069 0.054 0.065
Arts/Science (base) (base) (base)
Community Services/Education 0.187*** 0.207*** 0.212***
Dentistry 0.226*** 0.251*** 0.215***
Engineering/Technology 0.174*** 0.161*** 0.153***
Health Sciences 0.202*** 0.207*** 0.192***
Law 0.231*** 0.272*** 0.249***
Medicine 0.164*** 0.179*** 0.161***
Institution
Dalhousie University 0.150*** 0.094***
Memorial University of Newfoundland 0.076*** 0.015
Mount Allison University 0.076* 0.097**
St. Francis Xavier University 0.122*** 0.095***
Acadia University 0.079** 0.047
University of New Brunswick 0.112*** 0.041
Saint Mary’s University 0.008 0.036
University of Prince Edward Island 0.113*** 0.081**
Mount St. Vincent University 0.074** 0.046
Université de Moncton 0.138*** 0.018
Cape Breton University -0.069** -0.028
St. Thomas University 0.021 0.018
Colleges 0.096*** 0.112***
Unranked Universities (base) (base)
Constant -0.132*** -0.137*** -0.106*** -0.143***
Number of observations 5,690 5,690 5,690 5,690
R2 0.0253 0.0718 0.1120 0.1214
***: significant at 1%
**: significant at 5%
*: significant at 10%
differences in the rate of return across institutions are confounded by other systematic differ-
ences in the characteristics and choices of individuals attending these institutions. Comparing
the estimated institution coefficients across these columns, we see that many of the institution
differences become smaller (and statistically insignificant) in column (4), suggesting that some
of the institutional differences in rates of return are due to differential selection into institutions:
higher-return students tend to attend institutions associated with higher returns. Highlighting
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the importance of student selection, the variance of institution effects across all borrowers drops
by 55% from column (1) to column (4).22 After controlling for other characteristics, students
attending a few of the highest ranked institutions from the Atlantic provinces (Dalhousie Uni-
versity, Mount Allison University, St. Francis Xavier University) still generate returns that are
9–10% higher than the typical unranked university. Interestingly, these returns are still slightly
lower than the returns generated by two-year college students (11.2%). Because column (4)
includes student debt levels, the high rates of return at colleges relative to most universities is
not simply explained by their lower debt loads. College students generate a high return when
compared with other similar university students who borrow the same amount.
The specification in column (2) includes field of study indicators only, showing significant
differences in average returns across fields (relative to Arts/Science majors). While these es-
timates provide no new information relative to the average returns reported in Table 2.5, this
specification facilitates a comparison with the estimates in column (4), which simultaneously
controls for all other factors. Additionally, the R2 in column (2) immediately reveals the impor-
tance of college major in predicting rates of return: differences across majors explain 7.2% of
all variation in realized rates of return, nearly three times as much variation across institutions.
Unlike with the institution indicators, estimated effects of college majors are quite stable after
controlling for loan amounts and borrower characteristics (column (3)), as well as institution
dummies (column (4)). The variance of college major effects declines by only 5% from col-
umn (1) to column (4), so differences in returns across majors are not driven by differences in
the selection of students. Focusing on column (4), we see that nearly every major (except Agri-
culture) provides a significantly higher return than Arts/Science, with a few differences (law,
dentistry, and community/education) greater than 20 percentage points. The high return majors
are not particularly surprising, since these fields are associated with high post-school earnings
in Canada (Frenette and Frank, 2016). It is notable, however, that the differences in returns are
much greater than those across institutions, which are almost all less than 10 percentage points.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.6 show that other borrower characteristics are also impor-
tant determinants of returns on student loans. Not surprisingly, the amount of student debt has
22Specifically, when giving each borrower their institution effect in column (1) (i.e. their average institution
return), the variance of these effects is 0.0029. Using the institution effects in column (4), the variance of these
effects drops to 0.0013.
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a negative effect on the estimated rate of return, all else equal. For every additional $10,000 in
loan amount, the return is expected to decrease by 5.3 percentage points. The insignificance
of the additional spline coefficients indicates that additional loan amounts have a roughly lin-
ear effect on rates of return. Other individual characteristics are also important, including
dependency status and year in undergraduate study. Students that are single parents have sig-
nificantly lower returns than dependent students (by about 20 percentage points). Returns are
similar across dependent, single independent, and married students. Year in study has impor-
tant effects, with higher rates of return for those who have been in school longer. Those who
receive their last undergraduate loan in the fourth year or higher generate returns that are 12-
16% higher than those in the first year of post-secondary schooling. These differences likely
reflect the fact that those further along in school when they receive their last student loan are
more likely to graduate and receive their undergraduate degree. Returns differ little by gender,
age, or home province. Altogether, student debt, demographic characteristics, field of study,
and institution effects explain 12.1% of the variation in rates of return.
Table 2.7 reports similar regression results for our PSIS-linked sample, where we now in-
clude immigration status and the PSIS field of study grouping. Since the effects of student debt,
demographic characteristics, and institutions are quite similar to those of Table 2.6, we do not
discuss them again. One advantage of the PSIS is our ability to estimate returns for immigrants
separately from citizens. We find 10% lower rates of returns for the very small fraction of
immigrants in our sample. A more important advantage is the more detailed PSIS fields of
study categorization, especially in regards to Arts/Science. Focusing on column (4), we see
that most majors generate higher returns than humanities (the reference group). The highest
return majors include law, education, health-related fields, and engineering-related fields, while
the lowest include humanities, visual and performing arts, and communications technologies.
The difference between majors is substantial with the gap between the highest (law) and lowest
(visual arts) return majors more than 35 percentage points. As in Table 2.6, these differences
are much greater than the differences across institutions. Choices about major are a much more
important determinant of student loan repayment than the choice of institution. Altogether,
the improved measure of major choice (and measure of immigration) in the PSIS means that
returns are better predicted in Table 2.7, with the R2 increasing to 0.139.
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Table 2.7: Regression of Rate of Return on Characteristics (Linked Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loan amt (in $10,000) -0.075*** -0.074***
(Loan amt - 10,000) × 1(amt > $10,000) 0.025 0.022
(Loan amt - 20,000) × 1(amt > $20,000) -0.021 -0.016
(Loan amt - 30,000) × 1(amt > $30,000) 0.038 0.034
Gender
Female (base) (base)
Male -0.021** -0.021**
Immigration status
Canadian citizen (base) (base)
Permanent resident -0.100** -0.102**
Dependency category
Married/Common law -0.050* -0.050*
Single parent -0.221*** -0.205***
Single independent -0.004 -0.003
Dependent (base) (base)
Age
18 (base) (base)
19 -0.011 -0.009
20 -0.017 -0.014
21 0.000 0.001
22 0.023 0.025
23 0.026 0.026
24 0.016 0.015
25 0.025 0.021
26 0.006 0.004
27 0.052 0.048
28 -0.001 -0.004
29 0.016 0.018
30 0.050 0.043
Year in study
1 (base) (base)
2 0.038** 0.034*
3 0.056*** 0.054***
4 0.136*** 0.130***
5 0.121*** 0.118***
6 0.168*** 0.175***
Issue province
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New Brunswick (base) (base)
Newfoundland and Labrador -0.023* 0.001
Nova Scotia -0.016 -0.027*
Prince Edward Island 0.045** 0.039
Field of study (PSIS categories)
Education 0.258*** 0.281*** 0.284***
Visual and Performing Arts, and Communications -0.044 -0.058* -0.053
Humanities (base) (base) (base)
Social and Behavioural Sciences 0.068*** 0.047*** 0.043***
Business, Management and Public Administration 0.163*** 0.149*** 0.157***
Physical and Life Sciences, and Technologies 0.130*** 0.127*** 0.120***
Mathematics, Computer and Information Sciences 0.208*** 0.195*** 0.193***
Architecture, Engineering and Related Technologies 0.231*** 0.216*** 0.203***
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Conservation 0.170*** 0.155*** 0.172***
Health and Related Fields 0.248*** 0.245*** 0.235***
Law 0.293*** 0.332*** 0.308***
Other 0.059*** 0.076*** 0.067***
Institution
Dalhousie University 0.146*** 0.079***
Memorial University of Newfoundland 0.064** -0.004
Mount Allison University 0.066 0.106**
St. Francis Xavier University 0.112*** 0.071**
Acadia University 0.053 0.018
University of New Brunswick 0.101*** 0.022
Saint Mary’s University -0.011 0.031
University of Prince Edward Island 0.107*** 0.031
Mount St. Vincent University 0.057* 0.062*
Université de Moncton 0.130*** 0.018
Cape Breton University -0.087** -0.063*
St. Thomas University 0.001 0.022
Colleges 0.077** 0.090**
Unranked Universities (base) (base)
Constant -0.121*** -0.190*** -0.149*** -0.173***
Number of observations 5,130 5,130 5,130 5,130
R2 0.0285 0.0863 0.1296 0.1394
***: significant at 1%
**: significant at 5%
*: significant at 10%
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To further investigate the roles played by fields of study and institutions, we calculate the
fraction of the total variance of predicted returns that can be explained by each. Table 2.8
reports the results from this decomposition exercise. Column (1) is based on the estimates from
column (4) of Table 2.6, while column (2) is based on the analogous column (4) specification in
Table 2.7. Looking at column (1) of Table 2.8, which uses the CSLP field of study categories,
the total variance of predicted returns is 0.0137. Column (2) shows that the improved PSIS
field of study categories yields a higher variance in predicted returns of 0.0157. In both cases,
the field of study indicators explain about two-thirds of the variance in predicted returns.23
By contrast, institution differences explain less than 10% of the variance. To further examine
whether there is any difference between college and university students, we conduct a similar
exercise for university students only. The results are shown in columns (3) and (4). The basic
patterns remain the same with institution differences explaining slightly less of the variation in
returns across borrowers.
Table 2.8: Variance of Predicted Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CSLP PSIS CSLP PSIS
Full Full University University
Total variance of predicted returns 0.0137 0.0157 0.0144 0.0164
Percent explained by field 61.3% 67.5% 61.1% 67.1%
Percent explained by institution 9.4% 8.9% 7.6% 6.7%
We now turn to a comparison of predicted and realized rates of return. Figure 2.1 plots
the kernel density of realized and predicted returns from the most generous specification using
the full sample (i.e. column (4) in Table 2.6).24 Not surprisingly, realized returns are more
disbursed than predicted returns. Both returns are bimodal; however, realized returns are more
negatively skewed with a sizeable mode at returns around -70%, reflecting significant losses
23To calculate the variance of predicted returns explained by field (institution), we assign each borrower their
estimated field (institution) effect from column (4) of Table 2.6 or 2.7 (or the analogous specification for university
students only), then calculate the variance of these effects.
24We use the Epanechnikov kernel and the “optimal” bandwidth, which is the width that would minimize the
mean integrated squared error.
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Figure 2.1: Realized vs. Predicted Return, Kernel Density
associated with bankruptcy, default, and (in some cases) RAP. The vast majority of borrow-
ers generate a positive return, however. Interestingly, very few borrowers appear to generate
the average return of -5%, highlighting that heterogeneity in returns is a central feature of the
CSLP. While the very low return outcomes are difficult to predict, we do observe both a pos-
itive and negative mode for predicted returns with the negative mode peaking around -20%.
Figure 2.2 plots the kernel density for college and university students separately. The general
shapes for these densities are similar to their overall counterparts; however, the negative mode
for predicted returns is much more pronounced for (two-year) college students despite a much
less pronounced mode around -70% for their realized returns. Due to the much stronger neg-
ative skewness of realized returns, median realized returns are positive (9.0% for university
students vs. 7.1% for college students), while median predicted returns are negative (-5.2% for
university students vs. -6.1% for college students). Recall from Table 2.5 that average returns
are also negative for both types of students, but less negative for college students (-4.9% for
university students vs. -3.5% for college students).
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Figure 2.2: Realized vs. Predicted Return by Institution Type, Kernel Density
2.5.4 Internal Rate of Return to CSLP
Thus far, our analysis assumes a CSLP discount rate of d =2.1% in calculating rates of return,
showing that the government loses about 5% on its loans (to Atlantic province undergraduates
from the 2005 cohort). While our assumed discount rate is based on the officially reported
cost of funds for CSLP, the true cost of funds is difficult to determine due to the aggregate risk
inherent in loan portfolios for any given cohort (Lucas and Moore, 2010a). We can alternatively
calculate an internal rate of return (i.e. the discount rate that would imply a zero average return)
based on loan amounts and repayments for all borrowers in our sample. Doing so, we obtain an
IRR for the 2005 cohort of Atlantic province undergraduates of 1.343%.25 This implies that if
the borrowing cost for the CSLP is less than 1.343%, the program would earn a positive return.
For a higher cost of funds, CSLP would experience a loss.
2.5.5 Cross-Subsidization and Adverse Selection
The substantial heterogeneity in predicted returns — expected returns conditional on factors
observable to the government and other potential lenders — suggests considerable ex ante
cross-subsidization. Borrowers with high predicted returns effectively subsidize those with
25In calculating the IRR for the full cohort, we weight individuals by the undergraduate loan amount.
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low predicted returns. This raises adverse selection concerns that private lenders could draw
away the pool of borrowers with high returns, leaving the government with an even more neg-
atively selected pool of borrowers and lower returns. We explore this issue by calculating how
the average (weighted) return and IRR to the CSLP (for the 2005 cohort of Atlantic province
undergraduates) would be impacted by cream-skimming by private lenders. In particular, we
calculate the average weighted return and IRR when borrowers with predicted returns above
different thresholds are excluded from the CSLP portfolio. Table 2.9 shows that the average
weighted return would fall to -6.4% if borrowers with expected returns higher than 10% are
excluded; the IRR would fall to 1.14%. If private lenders were able to siphon away all borrow-
ers with predicted return above 1%, the average weighted return would drop considerably to
-12.5%, and the IRR would drop to 0.26%. The potential for cream-skimming would seem to
be a serious concern for the viability of the CSLP.
Table 2.9: Average Return and IRR If Excluding High Expected Return Borrowers
Average weighted return Internal rate of return
Exclude predicted return > 1% -0.125 0.26%
Exclude predicted return > 3% -0.112 0.45%
Exclude predicted return > 5% -0.094 0.71%
Exclude predicted return > 10% -0.064 1.14%
2.6 Conclusion
This paper studies rates of return on government student loans in Canada using novel admin-
istrative data covering 11 years of loan repayments for most borrowers. Using a discount rate
of 2.1% (based on official cost of fund estimates), we show that the CSLP earns a -5% rate
of return on the 2005 cohort of undergraduates from Atlantic provinces. Alternatively, CSLP
earns an IRR of 1.34% on this portfolio of loans, suggesting any cost of funds above that rate
would yield losses.
We exploit rich information on personal characteristics, loan amounts, field of study, and
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institution of attendance to explain differences in the rate of return across different types of
borrowers. Our estimates imply substantial ex ante heterogeneity in the rate of return on student
loans. While demographic characteristics like dependency status, immigration status, and year
of study play some role in determining rates of return, most of the variation across borrowers
is driven by differences in field of study, which explains roughly two-thirds of the variation
in predicted returns. Differences in returns across students attending different institutions are
also important but explain less than 10% of the variation in predicted returns. Altogether,
the factors we (and the government) observe can explain as much as 14% of the variation in
realized returns.
The differences in ex ante predicted returns can be sizeable with students in some majors
generating a predicted return that is more than 30% higher than others, while students at some
institutions possess returns that are 10% higher than other institutions. Using all available ex
ante information, we find that predicted returns range from -25% to 25% for most borrow-
ers, suggesting considerable cross-subsidization in an ex ante sense. High-return borrowers
effectively subsidize low-return borrowers.
This pooling of high- and low-risk borrowers raises serious adverse selection concerns
related to potential cream-skimming from private lenders. We show that if private lenders
were to siphon away all borrowers with predicted returns above 10% (a fairly high profitability
margin), the rate of return on the remaining portfolio would drop to -6.4% while the IRR would
drop to 1.14%.
The CSLP and PSIS are rich sources of information on the experience and student loan
borrowing of Canadian postsecondary students. There are many interesting and important
questions that can be answered with these data. In this paper, we focus on only one early cohort,
but a similar analysis can be applied to other cohorts to examine whether repayment patterns
have changed over time, given documented recent trends in education costs, borrowing, and
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repayment behavior.26 Given that debt is increasing, more borrowers are on RAP, and default
rate is declining, it would be interesting to know how the return has changed for recent cohorts.
Given our interest in predicting ex ante returns and the potential for private cream-skimming,
it would also be worthwhile exploring modern “big data” analysis techniques in search of better
predictive models.
26According to Statistics Canada (https://doi.org/10.25318/3710015001-eng; https://doi.org/
10.25318/3710000301-eng), average undergraduate tuition for full-time studies rose from $4,200 in 2005–
2006 to $6,500 in 2019–2020. Average student debt owed at undergraduate graduation increased from $19,600
in 2005 to $23,000 in 2015 (Statistics Canada: https://doi.org/10.25318/3710003601-eng). The number
of borrowers on RAP has almost doubled from its introduction in 2010–2011 to 2016–2017 (Human Resources
and Skills Development Canada, 2012; Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018), while the three-
year default rate has declined gradually from 17% in 2005–2006 to 9% in 2015–2016 (Employment and Social
Development Canada, 2016, 2017, 2018).
Chapter 3
College Enrollment, Parental Transfers,
and Student Loans
3.1 Introduction
Borrowing for post-secondary education in the U.S. has been increasing in the past few decades.
According to Bricker et al. (2015), the total outstanding student loan balance was $1.27 tril-
lion by the end of 2015, surpassing auto loans and credit cards to become the largest form of
consumer debt outside of mortgages. At the same time, the student loan non-repayment rate
remains high. The national three-year cohort default rate was 10.8% in 2015.1
Besides student loans, family transfers are also an important source of funding for higher
education. There is evidence that parents not only pay for their children’s tuition but also some-
times provide support when children have difficulty repaying student loans (Lochner et al.,
2018). Many parents make post-college transfers to their children (Brown et al., 2012), es-
pecially when their post-school earnings are low. Parental transfers, including the provision
of co-residency, can be a valuable insurance channel against labor market risk (Kaplan, 2012;
McGarry, 2016).
Another recent economic trend that has important implications for higher education financ-
ing is the increasing labor market uncertainty in the U.S. over the past few decades (Moffitt and
Gottschalk, 2012; Lochner and Shin, 2014). Negative shocks to college graduates over the first
1The three-year national cohort default rate is the percentage of federal student loan borrowers who enter
repayment within the cohort fiscal year (begins on October 1st of a year and ends on September 30th of the
following year) and default within the three-year period that begins on October 1st of the same fiscal year. Source:
Department of Education, https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html.
36
3.1. Introduction 37
few years in the labor market can lead to difficulties in repaying student loans. Increasing labor
market risk, along with high debt levels, high default rates, and the need for parental assistance,
indicates that youth may be inadequately insured through the current repayment scheme. This
may affect their educational choices in the first place, especially those with limited parental
resources.
Given these economic trends, some researchers and policy makers suggested that student
loan repayment schemes should provide more insurance against labor market risk through more
accessible income-based repayment (IBR) plans. Although some forms of assistance are cur-
rently available to borrowers, the participation rate is quite low. Under the current system,
borrowers can choose between traditional repayment plans and IBR plans.2 Borrowers may ap-
ply for loan deferment or forbearance that allows them to temporarily stop making payments if
they experience financial hardship.3 If borrowers do not apply for deferment or forbearance and
fail to make payments, they are considered to be in default.4 Though borrowers can suspend
loan repayment during hardship through deferment or forbearance, many eligible borrowers
in delinquency do not (Cunningham and Kienzl, 2011). Also, among Direct Loan borrowers
in active repayment in 2014, only about 20% were enrolled in an IBR plan (Government Ac-
countability Office, 2015). Dynarski and Kreisman (2013) point out that costs such as detailed
paperwork associated with applying for forbearance, deferment, or IBR may prevent borrow-
ers, especially those in distress, from using repayment assistance. Based on evidence from a
randomized field experiment, Mueller and Yannelis (2019) find that the IBR plan take-up rate
increased significantly when non-monetary costs were reduced. The take-up rate increased by
34 percentage points when borrowers received pre-populated applications for electronic signa-
ture. The current low take-up rate of repayment assistance has led to policy proposals that IBR
schemes should be more accessible to provide insurance against labor market risk.
2The traditional repayment plans include the Standard Repayment Plan, Graduated Repayment Plan, and
Extended Repayment Plan. Under traditional repayment plans, payments are based on debt, that is, the larger
the debt is, the higher the payments are in each period. The IBR plans include the Revised Pay As You Earn
Repayment Plan, Pay As You Earn Repayment Plan, Income-Based Repayment Plan, and Income-Contingent
Repayment Plan.
3The main difference between deferment and forbearance is that borrowers may not be responsible for paying
the interest that accrues on certain types of loans during the deferment period.
4For Federal Stafford Loans, borrowers are considered to be in default if they do not make their scheduled
student loan payments for a period of at least 270 days.
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There are, however, several concerns regarding the implementation of a more accessible
IBR, including the effect on government revenue. Lochner et al. (2018) find that eliminating the
non-monetary costs of applying for IBR assistance (i.e., moving to an automatic IBR scheme)
could lead to a sizable revenue loss for the government. On the one hand, borrowers who
are currently in forbearance or default may begin to repay under IBR, which could increase
government revenue. However, given their low earnings, the repayment amounts would be
small or even zero. On the other hand, borrowers with low post-college earnings who currently
make full payments with parental help or personal savings may pay less under IBR, leading
to revenue losses. The analysis from Lochner et al. (2018) suggests that the loss of revenue
exceeds the gain, at least for the first five years of repayment.
Given the revenue loss under IBR, the government may increase the interest rates of stu-
dent loans to balance the budget, raising the costs of post-secondary education for many who
currently repay their loans in full. This may discourage some youth from attending college
and result in undesirable distributional effects on welfare. The impact of IBR on education
is unclear, however, given that more insurance could also lead to higher enrollment. Another
concern about IBR is the moral hazard issue — IBR is essentially an income tax, which may
discourage labor supply.
To study the effects of IBR and address these concerns, a structural approach is needed.
In this paper, I develop a dynamic life-cycle model that allows endogenous transfers from
parents to children, together with children’s education, borrowing, repayment, and labor supply
decisions. Labor market risks, including the uncertainty of getting a job and shocks to wages,
are considered in the model to examine the effects on labor supply when more insurance is
provided by IBR.
The model is estimated using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97),
which has detailed information about youth’s family backgrounds, education, college financ-
ing, employment, and parental transfers. My estimated model suggests that students from
low-income families borrow more and are more likely to default when IBR is not available.
Also, low-income families are more likely to pay the sign-up cost and to enroll in IBR in coun-
terfactual simulations, indicating that they need the insurance provided by IBR the most. IBR
crowds out savings and parental transfers as it provides more insurance to borrowers. The re-
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sponse of the labor supply to IBR is negligible, so the problem of moral hazard is less likely
to be a matter of concern. Under IBR with sign-up costs, students borrow more and repay less
so that the interest rates of student loans must increase to keep the program self-sustaining.
Yet even after interest rates increase, college enrollment is still higher than the baseline. When
removing the sign-up cost while keeping the budget fixed, college enrollment increases further.
This cost-free and budget-neutral IBR is welfare-improving, and welfare increases more for
relatively poor and high-ability families.
In related literature, some studies conclude that optimal student loan repayment policy
should be income-contingent (Gary-Bobo and Trannoy, 2014; Findeisen and Sachs, 2016;
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2016). A few papers model detailed repayment plans and quan-
tify the effects of alternative student loan policies on college enrollment, borrowing behavior
and default rates (Ionescu, 2009, 2011; Ji, 2018). Unfortunately, none of these studies examine
the role of student loan repayment policies when considering endogenous parental transfers.
Abbott et al. (2019) examine the equilibrium effects of alternative financial aid policies with
endogenous parental transfers, but they do not model detailed student loan repayment plans,
nor do they consider changes to the current debt-based repayment structure.
Lochner et al. (2018) find that parental support and personal savings substantially reduce
student loan repayment problems in Canada. The authors also study the effects of removing
the non-monetary costs of IBR when considering endogenous parental transfers in a theoretical
context. However, they do not incorporate endogenous labor supply, college enrollment, or
borrowing and they are unable to calculate the welfare implications of switching to universal
IBR. Therefore, given the importance of parental support and increasing labor market risks,
my paper contributes to the literature by incorporating endogenous parental transfers and labor
market risks to empirically examine the effects of IBR.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 provide details of the model. Section
3.4 discusses the data and descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 outlines the estimation strategy and
results. Section 3.6 examines the effects of implementing IBR schemes. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Model
3.2.1 Overview
The basic unit in the model is a family, which consists of a parent (p) and a youth (y). They
make joint decisions with full commitment and one-sided altruism — only parents are altruistic
towards their children. Since there is no strategic behavior by assumption, the problem is
equivalent to the parent making all family decisions. The decision period begins when the
youth graduates from high school. Every period non-negative transfers from the parent to the
youth are endogenously decided within the family. Student loan borrowing and repayment
decisions are modeled if the youth goes to college. Labor market risks faced by the youth,
including the risk of getting a job offer and permanent and transitory wage shocks, are also
incorporated.
Time is finite and discrete (t = 0, 1, 2, ...,T ). A model period corresponds to one year. At
t = 0, after knowing their idiosyncratic taste shocks for college, the family decides whether the
youth goes to college and which type of college to attend (2-year or 4-year). If the youth goes
to a 2-year or 4-year college, he is committed to 2 or 4 years of schooling before entering the
post-school labor market, so dropout is not allowed. Students can finance education through
government grants and loans, parental transfers, and working during college. After schooling
is completed, shocks related to job offers, wages, and labor supply preferences are realized
at the beginning of each period. The family makes decisions on youth labor supply, student
loan repayment, parental transfers, and other assets. All shocks are assumed to be distributed
independently over time and from each other.
3.2.2 Preferences
Parents have time-separable preferences, and they are potentially altruistic toward their chil-
dren. The per-period utility of a parent derived from her own consumption is:
upt = f
p(cpt ) =
(cpt )1−γ
1 − γ
,
3.2. Model 41
where cpt is the parent’s consumption. Parents’ labor supply is assumed to be inelastic: they
work full-time until the last period of the model.
Youth’s preferences are also time-separable and are defined over consumption, labor supply,
college enrollment, and student loan borrowing and repayment status. The per-period utility of
a youth is:
uyt =
(cyt )1−γ
1 − γ
+ vt(ht, st, εvt ) + zt(Xt, ε
z
0) + f
b(dt, st) + f d(Rt,Dt),
where cyt is the youth’s consumption, vt(ht, st, εvt ) is the utility of working, zt(Xt, ε
z
0) is the non-
pecuniary taste for attending college, f b(dt, st) is the utility cost of borrowing from student
loans during college, and f d(Rt,Dt) is the utility cost of defaulting.
Youth’s labor supply is discrete: ht ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}. st ∈ {NC,C,U} represents youth’s en-
rollment status at t: not in college, in 2-year college, or in 4-year college. Because schooling
choice is a one-time choice at t = 0, the enrollment status st only depends on the initial school-
ing choice s0 and time t:
st =

C, if s0 = C and t ≤ 2;
U, if s0 = U and t ≤ 4;
NC, otherwise.
vt(ht, st, εvt ) depends on youth’s work intensity, college enrollment, and stochastic shocks:
vt(ht, st, εvt ) = (αv1 + ε
v1
t ) · 1(ht = 0.5) + (αv2 + ε
v2
t ) · 1(ht = 1)
+ αv3 · 1(ht = 0.5) · 1(st = C) + αv4 · 1(ht = 1) · 1(st = C)
+ αv5 · 1(ht = 0.5) · 1(st = U) + αv6 · 1(ht = 1) · 1(st = U),
(3.1)
where 1(·) is an indicator function, which equals 1 if the condition holds or 0 otherwise. Youth
can work part-time (ht = 0.5), full-time (ht = 1), or stay unemployed (ht = 0). Labor supply
shocks εvit are assumed to be distributed normally: ε
vi
t ∼ N(0, σ
2
vi) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The non-pecuniary taste for attending college zt(Xt, εz0) depends on a vector of deterministic
state variables including st, youth’s AFQT which is a test score that measures cognitive ability,
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and parent’s income I p, i.e., Xt = (st, AFQT, I p), and idiosyncratic shocks:
zt(Xt, εz0) = (αz1 + αz2AFQT + αz3 log(I
p) + εz10 ) · 1(st = C)
+ (αz4 + αz5AFQT + αz6 log(I p) + εz20 ) · 1(st = U).
(3.2)
The preference shocks εzi0 allow for heterogeneity in college attendance among youth with
similar observed characteristics. They are assumed to be distributed normally: εzi0 ∼ N(0, σ
2
zi)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. It is crucial to have the non-pecuniary cost to capture the college entry patterns
observed in the data.
The utility cost of borrowing from student loans f b(dt, st) reflects the cost associated with
applying for student loans and debt aversion. This cost depends on whether youth are borrow-
ing from student loans and which type of college they are in:
f b(dt, st) = αb1 · 1(dt > 0) · 1(st = C) + αb2 · 1(dt > 0) · 1(st = U), (3.3)
where dt is the youth’s student loan borrowing amount during period t.
The utility cost of defaulting f d(Rt,Dt) has the following functional form:
f d(Rt,Dt) = αd · 1(Rt = 0) · 1(Dt > 0), (3.4)
where Rt is the student loan repayment at t and Dt is the amount owed on student loan at t.
The family’s expected life-time utility at t = 0 is given by:
E0
{ T∑
t=0
βt(upt + ηu
y
t ) + β
T+1(V pT+1 + ηV
y
T+1)
}
,
where η > 0 is the altruism factor. V pT+1 is the parent’s terminal value function (derived from
the parent’s consumption only), and VyT+1 is the youth’s terminal value function.
3.2.3 Budget Constraints
The family’s budget constraints can be divided into two groups: one for the parent and one
for the youth. For the youth, budget constraints are slightly different during school and after
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school.
During college, the youth’s consumption satisfies:
cyt + x
y
t+1 + (COA − gr) = (1 + r f )x
y
t + w
c
t (ht) + Tt + dt. (3.5)
Youth can work and receive wage income wct (ht) during college, get parental transfers Tt, bor-
row from government student loans, and borrow or save on the private market at rate r f . They
have to pay a net price of COA − gr for college, which is the cost of attending college (COA)
minus the amount of grants and scholarships (gr).
There is an upper limit on how much can be borrowed from government student loans:
0 ≤ dt ≤ d̄t. (3.6)
Student loan borrowing limits d̄t depend on which year of college they are in, as shown in Table
3.1, and are set by the government. The balance of the loan Dt evolves according to:
Dt+1 = Dt + (1 + q · rd)dt, (3.7)
with D0 = 0, where I assume there is no repayment during school. If parental income is less
than the sample median (q = 0), students are eligible for subsidized loans, and interest does
not accumulate during college. Otherwise (q = 1), interest starts to accumulate in college at
rate rd.
Parental transfers have to be non-negative:
Tt ≥ 0. (3.8)
The endogenous parental transfers make the model capable of studying the response of parental
transfers to policy changes.
xyt reflects assets other than government student loans, and r f is the interest rate on those
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assets. Youth can borrow from the private market, but there is a borrowing limit:
xyt+1 ≥ −x̄
y
t . (3.9)
For periods not in college, the youth’s consumption satisfies:
cyt + x
y
t+1 = (1 + r f )x
y
t + wt(ht) + Tt − Rt. (3.10)
The student loan repayment amount Rt is equal to 0 if youth do not go to college, go to college
without taking student loans, or have already paid off their student loans. Debt balance evolves
according to:
Dt+1 = (1 + rd)Dt − Rt. (3.11)
Wage income wt(ht) depends on labor supply choices. Details on repayment plans, borrowing
limits, and wage functions are discussed in the following subsections.
For parents, the budget constraint remains the same in all periods:
cpt + Tt = I
P. (3.12)
Parental income I p is assumed to be the same over time, due to data availability. It is also
assumed that parents cannot borrow or save. This assumption is not innocuous but necessary
because otherwise, an additional continuous state variable would be added and increase the
computation complexity. The key implication of this assumption is that it affects the timing of
when parents make transfers. Parents are assumed to have a constant income every period, and
they do not face any labor market uncertainties themselves. If β(1 + r f ) is equal to 1, the only
incentive for them to save is to insure against youth’s labor market shocks and make transfers
when youth are borrowing constrained (Altonji et al., 1997). If parents are assumed not to
be able to save, they make transfers to youth even when youth are not borrowing constrained
such that youth can save and insure against labor market risks by themselves. As a result, this
assumption makes transfers more costly in terms of lifetime utility compared to the case in
which parents can save. The alternative would be assuming that parents can save but youth
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cannot, which would overestimate the value of any alternative insurance channel (e.g., student
loan repayment plan) since youth would be unable to self-insure through savings (Kaplan,
2012). As one of this paper’s main goals is to evaluate the insurance provided by alternative
repayment plans, it is crucial to assume that youth can save.
3.2.4 College Costs
The cost of attending college COA includes tuition, fees, and room and board. This cost
depends on the state of residence and type of college (2-year or 4-year). Grants gr depend on
AFQT and parental income for 4-year college students:
gru = αug1 + α
u
g2 · AFQT + α
u
g3I
p. (3.13)
Because grants are not highly correlated with AFQT for 2-year college students in my data, I
assume that grants for 2-year college students depend only on parental income:
grc = αcg1 + α
c
g2I
p. (3.14)
3.2.5 Labor Market
Because labor market risks are crucial to consider when evaluating the insurance mechanism,
the model considers the labor market risks faced by youth, including wage shocks and uncer-
tainty on getting a job. When youth are in college, it is assumed that jobs are always available.
However, the wage is stochastic:
wct (ht) = exp(w̄
c + εct )
[
1(ht = 1) + αcolp · 1(ht = 0.5)
]
, (3.15)
where εct ∼ N(0, σ
2
c). If youth work part-time, their wages will be a fraction (α
col
p ) of full-time
wages.
For a high school graduate or college graduate, in each period, the youth receives a job
offer with some probability, which depends on his human capital and whether he worked in the
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last period:
Pr( jt = 1) = Φ(α j1 + α j2Ψt + α j31(ht−1 = 0)), (3.16)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. jt is a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the youth gets a job offer or not: jt ∈ {0, 1}. If the youth receives no offer, he
becomes unemployed and ht = 0. If he receives a job offer, the wage is also known to him,
and he can either accept it (ht > 0) or reject it and remain unemployed (ht = 0).5 The wage
function is:
wt(ht) = w
f
t
[
1(ht = 1) + 1(ht = 0.5) ·
(
αncp · 1(s0 = NC)
+ αcp · 1(s0 = C) + α
u
p · 1(s0 = U)
)]
+ b · 1(ht = 0).
w ft is the full-time wage rate. If youth work part-time, their wages will be a proportion of full-
time wages. The ratio is αncp , α
c
p, and α
u
p for high school graduates, 2-year college graduates, and
4-year college graduates, respectively. If youth do not work, they get unemployment benefit b.
The full-time wage rate w ft is a function of human capital Ψt and stochastic shocks:
w ft = exp(Ψt + νt + ε
w
t ). (3.17)
νt is the permanent shock which evolves according to νt+1 = νt + ξt where ξt is distributed
normally: ξt ∼ N(0, σ2ξ). ε
w
t is the transitory wage shock and is also distributed normally:
εwt ∼ N(0, σ
2
w).
Human capital, Ψt, is a function of youth’s AFQT, education, and work experience:
Ψt = αψ1 + αψ2 · AFQT + αψ3 · 1(s0 = C) + αψ4 · 1(s0 = U) + αψ5 · Ht, (3.18)
where work experience at period t, Ht, sums over the experience in all previous working years:
Ht = Ht−1 + ht−1 with H0 = 0.
5All youth are assumed to be not working at t = 0, i.e., h0 = 0.
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3.2.6 Student Loans
Student Loan Borrowing Limits
There are limits on the amount of student loans that youth can borrow in college, which are set
according to the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program. There are two main types
of loans under the FFEL program for students: subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford loans.6
The government covers the interest on subsidized loans when borrowers are in college, but
interest on unsubsidized loans accumulates when students are in college. The loan limits for
the Stafford loan program were constant in nominal terms from 1993 to 2007 (Table 3.1).7
Table 3.1: Stafford Loans Limits for Dependent Students
Subsidized Unsubsidized Total
First year 2,625 2,625 2,625
Second year 3,500 3,500 3,500
Third year 5,500 5,500 5,500
Fourth year 5,500 5,500 5,500
Universities use a formula to calculate each student’s expected family contribution (EFC)
and use that to determine whether the student is eligible for subsidized loans. Students who
have a cost of schooling greater than their EFC are eligible for subsidized loans. The EFC is
calculated from parental income and assets, student’s income and assets, and the number of
other children from the family attending college. For simplicity, I assume that students whose
parents’ income is below the median are eligible for subsidized loans.
6Another type of loan under the FFEL program is the Parent Loan for Undergraduate Students (PLUS), but it
is mainly for parents.
7The limits are different for dependent and independent students. Most traditional college students are de-
pendent students, even if they are paying their own way through college or no longer have a relationship with
their parents. To simplify the problem, I assume all youth are dependent students and eligible for the limits for
dependent students as shown in Table 3.1.
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Student Loan Repayment
In the baseline model, borrowers have the option of paying the standard debt-based payment
amount or defaulting: Rt ∈ {Rdt ,R
de f
t }. The debt-based payment amount Rdt is equal to the debt
balance Dt amortized over the remaining repayment period (T dt ) at rate rd:
Rdt = Dt
[
rd(1 + rd)T
d
t
(1 + rd)T
d
t − 1
]
.
If a borrower chooses to default, he does not make any payment during that period (Rde ft = 0),
but there is a utility cost ( f d(Rt,Dt) defined in Equation (3.4)) to represent the punishments
associated with default such as wage garnishment and exclusion from borrowing in the private
market. The remaining repayment period T dt evolves according to: T
d
t+1 = max{0,T
d
t − 1},
regardless of which repayment plan is chosen at t.
Given the high default rate, it is crucial to allow borrowers to default in the model. De-
fault also offers borrowers the option of delaying payments when they have difficulty repaying,
although it may be costly due to the utility cost. Theoretically, those with a higher debt-to-
income ratio and limited resources, including parental transfers and savings, are more likely to
default because they have no other better options. The introduction of IBR could be particu-
larly beneficial to this group of borrowers, as IBR could be a better insurance option with lower
costs. As a result, the default rate may be lower after IBR is introduced. To examine the em-
pirical effects, in Section 3.6, I introduce a stylized IBR plan as the third option for borrowers
with more details provided in that section.
3.2.7 Private Financial Market
Youth can also borrow and save on the private financial market. They face the following bor-
rowing constraint: xyt+1 ≥ −x̄
y
t . The borrowing limit x̄
y
t is a function of human capital and age
at t:
x̄yt = exp{α
y
x1 + α
y
x2Ψt + α
y
x3aget}. (3.19)
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3.2.8 Terminal Value Function
Because the model focuses on college entrance, early labor market outcomes, and student
loan repayment, I do not extend the model horizon until the end of the youth’s life cycle.
Instead, I assume T is earlier and use terminal value functions to represent utility afterwards.
Assumptions for the terminal value functions are similar to those in Kaplan (2012). I assume
that (i) the parent’s life ends at t = T , and (ii) after t = T all youth work full-time with no
uncertainty about their wages. Given these assumptions, the terminal value functions have a
closed-form solution.8
Because parents’ life ends at T , V pT+1 = 0. I assume that youth finish high school and are 18
years old at t = 1. I solve the model for T = 25 periods, which is long enough to cover college
enrollment and student loan repayment. Youth work full-time after T until age 68.9 For youth,
the state variables at T +1 are human capital ΨT+1 and assets x
y
T+1. From T +1 to the end of the
life cycle, youth receive a constant stream of income every year: wT+1 = exp(ΨT+1). Assuming
that they can smooth consumption, the terminal value function for youth is given by:
VyT+1 =
(αyT1x
y
T+1 + α
y
T2wT+1)
(1−γ)
1 − γ
,
where αyT1 =
(1 − βTy
1 − β
) 1
1−γ
·
r f
1 − ( 11+r f )
Ty
and αyT2 =
(1 − βTy
1 − β
) 1
1−γ
. The number of years between
the last period of the model and the end of life is Ty = 26.
3.3 Model in Recursive Form
This section describes the problem in the form of Bellman equations. Each subsection lists the
state variables and choices of the family at each stage.
8An alternative approach would be to parameterize the terminal value function as a function of the state vari-
ables and estimate the parameters along with other structural parameters. However, to identify these parameters,
it is necessary to have data on state variables in later periods (especially youth’s assets). The NLSY97 does not
have this information due to the relatively short life span it has covered.
9I assume that life ends at age 68. Because the average age that mothers gave birth is 26 in the NLSY97, the
model covers parents from ages 44 to 68. This assumption makes the length of life the same for youth and parents.
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3.3.1 College Choices
The family’s expected value function for state Ω0 = (AFQT, S tate, I p, x
y
0) at t = 0 is:
V0(Ω0) = E
[
V0(Ω0, εz0)
]
. (3.20)
The expectation is taken over the taste shocks for college εz0. After the taste shocks are realized,
the family makes the college attendance choice s0. Value function V0(Ω0, εz0) is the maximum
of the expected value functions of the three educational choices:
V0(Ω0, εz0) = max{E[V1(Ω1|s0 = NC)],E[V1(Ω1|s0 = C)],E[V1(Ω1|s0 = U)]},
where E[V1(Ω1|s0 = NC)], E[V1(Ω1|s0 = C)], and E[V1(Ω1|s0 = U)] are the expected value
of not attending college, attending 2-year college, and attending 4-year college, respectively.
Details about the state variables, choices, and shocks in each case are discussed below.
3.3.2 In College
If the youth is attending college (s0 ∈ {C,U}), the family’s value function is:
Vt(Ωt) = max
θt
{
upt + ηu
y
t + βE [Vt+1(Ωt+1)|Ωt, θt]
}
, (3.21)
subject to (3.5), (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), and (3.12).
The state variables at this stage are: Ωt = (I p,Ψt, x
y
t ,Dt,COA−gr, s0, ε
z
0, ε
v
t , ε
c
t ). Choices in-
clude parental transfers, labor supply, assets, and student loan borrowing, i.e., θt = (Tt, ht, x
y
t+1, dt).
The expectation in equation (3.21) is taken over labor supply preference shocks εvt and wage
shocks in college εct , except in the last period of school where Vt+1 is the value function after
school, which is defined in the next subsection.
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3.3.3 Post-College/No College
After the youth graduates from college with student loans, the family’s value function is:
Vt(Ωt) = max
θt
{
upt + ηu
y
t + βE [Vt+1(Ωt+1)|Ωt, θt]
}
, (3.22)
subject to (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), and ht = 0 if jt = 0.
The state variables at this stage are: Ωt = (I p,Ψt, x
y
t , ht−1,Dt,T
d
t , s0, νt−1, jt, εt). The vector
of shocks εt includes labor supply preference shocks and wage shocks (permanent and tran-
sitory): εt = (εvt , ξt, ε
w
t ). Choices include parental transfers, labor supply, assets, and student
loan repayment, i.e., θt = (Tt, ht, x
y
t+1,Rt). If the youth does not get a job offer ( jt = 0), there is
no labor supply choice: ht = 0. The expectation in equation (3.22) is taken over labor supply
preference shocks, wage shocks, and the job offer realization.
If the child does not go to college (s0 = NC), goes to college but does not borrow from
student loans, or pays off student loans, Dt = 0 and T dt = 0, so Rt = 0 is chosen.
3.4 Data and Summary Statistics
The data used in this paper are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97),
which is a longitudinal survey that follows a nationally representative sample of 8,984 youth
who were 12 to 16 years old as of December 31, 1996. The cohort was first interviewed in 1997
and was followed annually until 2011. Since 2011, the interviews have been conducted bien-
nially. The sample I use covers survey years 1997–2011 and 2013. The NLSY97 has detailed
information about youth’s family backgrounds, education, college financing, employment, and
parental transfers.
For the analysis in this paper, I use the cross-sectional sample, which is representative of
people living in the U.S. during the initial survey. I restrict the sample only to males whose
highest education is high school, 2-year college, or 4-year college (the definition of education
groups is explained in detail below). Males who have ever served in the military are excluded,
as are those with missing data on key variables such as the Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT), parental income, or state of residence at high school graduation. The final sample
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size is 1,069. Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics for my sample. Monetary values, in-
cluding assets, income, and transfers, are all adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) using
2004 as the base year. I use a simulated minimum-distance method in estimating the model.
Key moments include statistics on education distribution, labor supply, student loans, wages,
parental transfers, asset distribution, and default rates. Because NLSY97 does not cover certain
aspects, such as student loan repayment and defaults, some moments come from external data
sources. Details of the sample and the construction of key variables and moments are explained
as follows.
Table 3.2: Selected Statistics by Education
All HS 2-year 4-year
Sample size 1,069 400 229 440
Average AFQT 52.76 34.33 48.57 71.70
Average parental income* 64,620 46,384 59,396 83,916
Average youth assets at 18* 5,444 4,870 4,100 6,666
% with parental monetary transfers at 18 48.74 37.25 49.34 58.86
Average parental monetary transfers at 18 if >0* 2,856 952 1,888 4,373
% live with parents at 18 92.80 89.26 92.58 96.10
% with parental monetary transfers at 25 22.08 12.75 25.33 28.86
Average parental monetary transfers at 25 if >0* 1,502 977 1,080 1,906
% live with parents at 25 28.06 28.25 36.24 23.64
% with college loans 37.55 64.32
Average annual college loans if >0* 1,517 2,134
Average annual college grants if >0* 2,687 6,285
* Measured in 2004 dollar
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3.4.1 College Enrollment
There are three education categories in the model: high school graduates, 2-year college grad-
uates, and 4-year college graduates. In my sample, high school graduates are those whose
highest degree is high school and never enrolled in college. 2-year college graduates are those
whose highest degree is an associate’s degree. Also included in the 2-year graduate category
are high school graduates who enrolled in 2-year college for no less than 24 months.10 4-year
college graduates are those whose highest degree is a bachelor’s degree.11 As shown in Table
3.2, high school, 2-year college, and 4-year college graduates account for 37%, 21%, and 41%
of the sample, respectively. The average cognitive ability measured by AFQT is increasing in
education.
Two issues that are not considered in the model are delayed post-secondary entry and taking
additional years to graduate from a two- or four-year college. I do not model the exact timing
that youth enter college. As long as youth enter college at some point in time, they are included
when calculating the relevant moments. In my sample, only around 10% of college graduates
delay by one year or more and 5% delay by two years or more.
Some two- or four-year college graduates stay enrolled in college for longer than two or
four years; however, I do not model extended stays in college. Moments calculated by year after
school (e.g., labor supply, log wages, and parental transfers) refer to the year after graduation
from (or last year of) college. The extended stay in college also affects the calculation of
moments related to student loans and grants, which is explained in detail in the next subsection.
3.4.2 College Loans and Grants
The NLSY97 asks questions about each college and term in which a youth was enrolled. Stu-
dents were asked about the total amount of loans from the government or other sources for each
school attended and each term since the date of the last interview. I sum the number of loans
borrowed when they were in college, then divide it by the months they spent in college and
10Some 2-year college graduates attended 4-year college. Those who enrolled in 4-year college for more than
24 months are excluded from the 2-year graduate category.
11Those who enrolled in 4-year college for more than 24 months but did not get a bachelor’s degree are dropped
because they are different from a 2-year college or 4-year college graduate defined here in terms of cognitive
ability, parental income, and labor market outcomes. This excludes about 160 individuals (15% of the sample).
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multiply by 12 to get an average annual student loan amount.12 This calculation is done sepa-
rately for 2-year and 4-year colleges, if students attended both. Since this amount may include
private student loans, which are not modeled, I calculate the average annual amount of loans
(if positive) that are capped by the annual government limits. According to Table 3.2, 38% of
the 2-year college graduates take out student loans when enrolled in a 2-year college, and the
average annual amount borrowed, if positive, is $1,517. 64% of the 4-year college graduates
take out student loans, and the average annual amount borrowed, if positive, is $2,134.
Youth were also asked about the total amount of grants for each school attended and each
term since the date of the last interview. I calculate annual grants using the same approach
(i.e., I sum the grants when they were in college, then divide it by the months they spent in
college and multiply by 12), separately for 2-year and 4-year colleges. The statistics on grants
are reported in Table 3.2. The average annual grants, if positive, are $2,687 for 2-year college
graduates and $6,285 for 4-year college graduates.
3.4.3 Parental Income and Parental Transfers
In the survey year 1997, parents reported gross household income in the past year if the youth
was not independent.13 This gross household income variable is used to construct parental
income in 1996. In addition, parents reported their own income and their spouse’s or partner’s
income in the past year from survey years 1998 to 2001. I sum the income of the parent and
his or her spouse or partner and use that as the parental income of a youth. Therefore, there are
at most five years (1996–2000) of observations of parents’ incomes. I take the average income
of the parents over the years available and use it as the parental income of the youth. Table 3.2
shows that average parental income is increasing in children’s education.
There are two forms of parental transfers in the data: monetary and co-residency. Monetary
transfers from parents are reported in both the income and college sections of the data. In the
income section, each youth was asked whether he or she received money from parents and
12The NLSY97 provides monthly enrollment status. For a typical college student who enrolled in the academic
year but took a break during the summer, the enrollment status would still be “enrolled” for the summer months.
Therefore, the number of months he spent at college would include those summer months.
13NLSY97 youth were considered independent if they have had a child, were enrolled in a 4-year college, were
no longer enrolled in school, were not living with any parents or parent-figures, or had ever been married or were
in a marriage-like relationship at the time of the survey.
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how much was received during the previous year for survey years 1997–2003. Since survey
year 2004, the exact transfer amount has not been asked, and only a categorical amount is
available.14 The midpoint for each category is taken as the amount of transfers.15
In the college section, each youth was asked about whether he got aid from family or friends
and the total amount of gifts or loans from parents and other relatives for each school and each
term attended since the date of the last interview. I sum the total gifts or loans from parents
to construct yearly parental transfers in college. I use the sum of the transfers reported in the
income section and in the college section as the annual monetary transfers from parents.
Another form of parental transfer is co-residency, which is an important form of insurance
and support that parents provide to children (Kaplan, 2012). Youth were asked about the re-
lationship of people who live in the household to the youth as of the survey date. If students
were living with parent-figures (including biological, step, adoptive, and foster parents), they
are defined as co-resident with parents. Co-residency is not modeled explicitly in the model
but is assigned a monetary value and included in total parental transfers.16
Table 3.2 shows that 49% of the sample receive monetary transfers from parents at age 18,
which declines to 22% at age 25. Parents also provide room and board for their children. At
age 18, 93% of the youth live with their parents, while 28% of them live with parents at age
25.
3.4.4 Youth Assets
In the first three survey rounds, if students were age 18 or if they met one of the other indepen-
dence criteria, they were asked questions about various kinds of assets. Using this information,
I construct the net worth of youth at age 18. Net worth includes housing and property val-
ues, automobiles, checking and savings accounts, bonds, stocks, life insurance, pension value,
business wealth, student loan debt, and categories for other assets and debts.17
From round 4 onward, in the first interview after they turned ages 20, 25, 30, and 35,
14The transfer categories are: 1–500; 501–1,000; 1,001–2,500; 2,501–5,000; 5,001–7,500; 7,501–10,000; and
more than 10,000.
15For the category that “more than 10,000”, the transfer amount is assumed to be 10,001.
16The value of co-residency is assumed to be $7,800 per year ($650 per month), as reflected in Johnson (2013)
and Kaplan (2012).
17The measure of assets is the same as in Johnson (2013).
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respondents were again asked questions about their assets. NLSY97 creates the net worth of
the respondents at ages 20, 25, and 30, which I use as the moments to be matched.
3.4.5 Youth Labor Supply
To construct moments related to the labor supply, I use the weekly employment data to deter-
mine whether a respondent was working and whether the employment was part-time or full-
time during the year. NLSY97 reports the total number of hours worked by a respondent at any
job during a given week, starting from the week when the respondent turned 14. I calculate
the average weekly working hours by summing the working hours each year and dividing it by
the number of weeks covered in that year. If the average weekly hours are fewer than 10, the
respondent is categorized as not working. If the average weekly hours are no less than 10 but
less than 30 hours, the respondent is categorized as working part-time. If the average weekly
hours are equal to or more than 30 hours, the respondent is categorized as working full-time.
3.4.6 Geographic Information
In the model, tuition varies by the state of residence of the youth, which is also one of the
initial conditions. NLSY97 has geographic information on which state the respondent lived in
as of the survey year. I use the state respondents lived in when they received their high school
degrees. If that is missing, I use the state they were in at age 18. I follow Johnson (2013) in
grouping states into four categories by their average tuition levels. I use data from the Digest
of Education Statistics on average public and private tuition by state between 1998 and 2004,
as 95% of the sample received their high school degrees during that period. I sort the states
based on average tuition weighted by enrollment and then divide the states into four categories
so each category has approximately the same total population.18 Next, I calculate the average
tuition for 2- and 4-year colleges within each category. Details on the grouping of states and
the average tuition are in Appendix B.1.
18The population of each state is from the 2001 intercensal data.
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3.4.7 External Moments
Two sets of external moments are used: tuition elasticities and the default rate. To identify the
variances of college preference shocks, I fit four external moments, which are the education
elasticities of tuition — changes in 2- or 4-year college enrollment when 2- or 4-year tuition
increases by $1,000, including both self- and cross-elasticities. The elasticity moments are
from Kane (1995), with tuition changes adjusted by CPI. The numbers are close to the estimates
found in previous literature (Deming and Dynarski, 2010).
In that NLSY97 does not have information on student loan repayment, I fit one additional
external moment, which is the average two-year cohort default rate for undergraduate borrow-
ers between 1997 and 2011 from Yannelis (2015).19
3.5 Estimation
3.5.1 Estimation Strategy
Some parameters are fixed exogenously, while the remaining parameters are estimated using
simulated minimum-distance.
Externally Calibrated Parameters
Table 3.3 shows the values of parameters that are exogenously determined. The risk aversion
parameter γ is set to 2, and the annual discount factor β is 0.97, which follow standard values
in the literature. The interest rate in the private market is 5.9% for borrowing and 0.9% for
saving.20 For subsidized student loans, the interest rate is zero when borrowers are enrolled in
school. For unsubsidized loans, the interest rate is 2.29% while borrowers are in school. The
19The two-year default rate is the fraction of graduated borrowers who default within two years from the date
of entering repayment.
20Source: Johnson (2013). The borrowing rate is the average prime rate from 2001–2007 minus inflation plus
a 2% risk premium. The savings rate is the average real interest rate on one-year U.S. government bonds from
2001–2007.
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interest rate is 3.7% for both subsidized and unsubsidized loans after borrowers leave college.21
The student loan repayment parameters are based on current student loan policy. The standard
debt-based repayment period is 10 years.
Table 3.3: Exogenously Given Parameters
Description Symbol Value Source
Risk aversion parameter γ 2 Standard from literature
Discount factor β 0.97 Standard from literature
Private market interest rates r f borrow 5.9%, save 0.9% Johnson (2013)
Student loans interest rates rs 2.29% in school; 3.7% post school Average from 1998/99-2005/06
Unemployment benefit b $6000 per year Kaplan (2012)
Baseline amortized periods T d 10
Policy
Cutoff for income-based ymin 13,699
Income based repayment rate ρinc 10%
Income based repayment period Tinc 20
2-year college tuition by states COA Digest of Education Statistics
State group 1 1,396
State group 2 963
State group 3 2,006
State group 4 2,741
4-year college tuition by states
State group 1 4,900
State group 2 7,508
State group 3 8,718
State group 4 13,359
Room and board 2-year college 4,539
Room and board 4-year college 6,532
Terminal value function Own calculation
Youth assets coefficient αyT1 0.00418
Youth wage coefficient αyT2 0.05484
21Before 2006–2007, interest rates on Stafford Loans (now known as Direct Loans) were variable, with differ-
ent rates, depending on whether the borrower was in school, in the 6-month grace period after leaving school, or in
the repayment period. The interest rates are the same in school and in the grace period but 0.6% higher during the
repayment period. The average real interest rate on unsubsidized loans while in school is 2.29%, and the average
real interest rate while in repayment is 2.89% from academic years 1998–1999 to 2005–2006 (Source: Federal
Student Aid; https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/interest-rates#older-rates). In addi-
tion, most federal student loans have loan fees that are a percentage of the total loan amount. The loan fee is
deducted proportionately from each loan disbursement. The money the students receive will be less than the
amount they actually borrow, yet they are responsible for repaying the entire amount they borrowed. The loan
fee before 2005–2006 was 4%. Loan fees are essentially a form of up-front interest. If the loan has a 10-year
repayment term, a 4% fee will make the interest rate increase from 2.89% to 3.7%.
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While not working, youth can receive unemployment benefits, which are set to $6,000 per
year (Kaplan, 2012). The terminal value function parameters are also fixed. According to the
formula in Section 3.2.8, if everyone’s life ends at age 68: αyT1 = 0.00418, and α
y
T2 = 0.05484.
Internally Estimated Parameters
The remaining 44 parameters are estimated using 128 moments. These moments are sufficient
to identify all the parameters (identification is discussed in Section 3.5.2). The full list of the
moments can be found in Appendix B.2. Key moments include:
• Fraction going to 2-year college and 4-year college for the full sample and by AFQT
quartile, parental income quartile, and state group.
• Tuition elasticity of education: change in the fraction of 2- or 4-year college graduates
when the 2- or 4-year college tuition increases by 1,000 dollars.
• Labor supply by education and year after school.
• Mean of log wages of youth working full-time by education level and year after school.
• Average parental transfers across all education levels and years.
• Average youth assets at different ages.
• Average annual amount of student loans by college type.
• 2-year cohort default rate among college graduates.
The estimated parameters are displayed in Table B1. Computational details are discussed
in Appendix B.4.
3.5.2 Discussion of Identification
In this subsection, I briefly discuss the identification of internally estimated parameters. The
identification of certain parameters is more straightforward, because they are arguments of the
functions that relate observable variables to observable outcomes. These parameters include
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the grant function parameters in (3.13) and (3.14) and the log wage function parameters in
(3.18). NLSY97 provides data on grants and log wages, so the identification comes from the
observed data pattern. In addition, other parameters related to wages, including the mean and
variance of log wages during college (w̄c and σ2c), the variance of permanent and transitory
shocks (σ2ξ and σ
2
w), and the ratio of part-time wages to full-time wages, can be identified from
the relevant wage statistics.
For the remaining parameters, I provide intuitive arguments below on how some of the
moments can help to identify them. The altruism factor η can be identified from the average
level of parental transfers. Conditional on parents’ income and youth’s income and assets, the
optimal transfer is directly influenced by the weight that parents place on their children’s utility.
The parameters related to preference for college (Equation (3.2)) can be identified with
data on college enrollment. Conditional on labor market outcomes and monetary costs of
college, the heterogeneity in the education distribution across groups by observables, such
as AFQT, parental income, and state of residence, is helpful in identifying the coefficients
of observables in (3.2). The external tuition elasticities help identify the variances of college
preference shocks (σ2z1 and σ
2
z2). The variance of preference shocks determines how responsive
college enrollments are to the changes in tuition costs. Therefore, the elasticity moments are
useful sources of identification for the variances of the preference shocks.
Identification of parameters related to labor supply preference (Equation (3.1)) is similar.
Data on labor supply by education can help identify the coefficients in (3.1). The variances of
preference shocks (σ2v1 and σ
2
v2) affect the degree of change in the labor supply as a response
to wage changes. Therefore, preference shock variances can be identified from data on labor
supply by year as wages generally change over time. Employment transitions, i.e., the proba-
bility of working conditional on not working in the previous period and the probability of not
working conditional on working in the previous period, help identify the job offer probability
parameters in (3.16).
The argument for the identification of the remaining parameters is as follows. The fraction
of borrowing and the average amount of borrowing are the keys to identifying the utility cost of
borrowing in college (αb1 and αb2 in (3.3)). The default rate can be used to identify the utility
cost of default (αd in (3.4)). The key moments for identifying the borrowing limit parameters
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in (3.19) are the asset accumulation patterns of youth by age.22
3.5.3 Parameter Estimates and Model Fit
The parameter estimates and standard errors are reported in Table B1. Overall, the parameter
estimates are reasonable. The estimated value for the altruism factor η is 0.05.23 Results from
the estimation show that the preference for college attendance is increasing both in AFQT and
parental income. Grants are decreasing with family income at 2-year colleges, while in 4-year
colleges, grants are increasing in AFQT and decreasing with family income. Wages increase
with AFQT, education, and experience. The probability of receiving a job offer is rising in
the human capital of the youth, but is much lower if the youth did not work in the previous
period. Borrowing limits increase in human capital and age. Signs of the estimated utility cost
of borrowing and default are as expected.
Overall, the model fits the data patterns well. The actual data and simulated data on 2- and
4-year college enrollment of the full sample and by subgroup are shown in Table 3.4. Simu-
lated data closely match the pattern that college enrollment increases with ability and parental
income. Table 3.5 shows the fit of tuition elasticities. The model generates the expected signs
of elasticities, and the magnitudes are close.
The fit of average full-time log wages by education is shown in Figure 3.1, which indicates
average full-time log wages by year after school for high school graduates, 2-year college
graduates, and 4-year college graduates, respectively. Due to the length of NLSY97, I only
match 10 years after school for high school graduates, 8 years after school for 2-year college
graduates, and 6 years after school for 4-year college graduates. Beyond that, the sample sizes
decrease, so I do not use moments from later years. The model fits the pattern of wages well.
Statistics on actual and simulated labor supply and employment transitions by education are
shown in Table 3.6. The table summarizes the average fraction not working, working part-time,
and working full-time over the years after school for different education groups. Simulated
moments are quite closely aligned with actual labor supply and employment transitions.
22Similar to Johnson (2013).
23This is close to the estimate in Kaplan (2012), which is 0.04.
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Table 3.4: Model Fit - Education
HS grad 2-year college 4-year college
Data Model Data Model Data Model
All 0.37 0.37 0.21 0.22 0.41 0.41
AFQT quartile 1 0.68 0.68 0.23 0.24 0.09 0.08
AFQT quartile 2 0.47 0.45 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.27
AFQT quartile 3 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.50 0.54
AFQT quartile 4 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.78 0.76
Family income quartile 1 0.57 0.64 0.25 0.16 0.18 0.20
Family income quartile 2 0.41 0.40 0.24 0.24 0.35 0.36
Family income quartile 3 0.37 0.26 0.20 0.25 0.42 0.49
Family income quartile 4 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.69 0.60
Tuition state group 1 0.39 0.38 0.26 0.21 0.35 0.41
Tuition state group 2 0.35 0.34 0.22 0.24 0.44 0.42
Tuition state group 3 0.38 0.35 0.14 0.22 0.48 0.43
Tuition state group 4 0.38 0.41 0.21 0.21 0.41 0.39
Table 3.5: Model Fit - Tuition Elasticity of Education (Change in Enrollment if Tuition In-
creases by $1,000)
Data Model
2-year enrollment to 2-year tuition -0.034 -0.020
4-year enrollment to 2-year tuition 0.013 0.010
2-year enrollment to 4-year tuition 0.004 0.002
4-year enrollment to 4-year tuition -0.009 -0.006
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Figure 3.1: Full-time Log Wage
Table 3.6: Model Fit - Labor Supply and Transition
HS grad 2-year grad 4-year grad
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Fraction not work 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Fraction part-time work 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.14
Fraction full-time work 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.81
Prob. not work to work 0.68 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.78
Prob. work to not work 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Table 3.7 shows the fit of parental transfers. The targeted moment is the average parental
transfers across all periods. The rest of the table contains moments that are not targeted in
the estimation, including the percentage of youth receiving parental transfers and the average
amount of parental transfers by youth education. The model does well in matching the average
transfer levels, except that it underestimates the transfers for high school graduates. This is
probably due to the model assumption of a homogeneous altruism factor. With a homogeneous
altruism factor, high-income parents tend to make more transfers to their children, but in the
data, transfers are relatively flat with parental income, indicating that there may be heterogene-
ity in parental altruism, as discussed in Kaplan (2012) and Park (2016). As parental income is
highly correlated with children’s education levels, the model with a homogeneous altruism fac-
tor tends to underestimate the average transfers of high school graduates and to overestimate
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the average transfers of 4-year college graduates.24 Another possible explanation is that the
value of co-residency is assumed to be the same for all groups, but this value could be lower
for youth with lower-income parents. Thus, the data moment overstates the value of parental
transfers for these youth. However, without further evidence, it cannot be identified whether the
data pattern is driven by the former (heterogeneous altruism factor), the latter (heterogeneous
value of co-residency), or both.
Table 3.7: Model Fit - Parental Transfers
Data Model
Targeted Moment
Average transfers 3,862 3,796
Untargeted Moments
Fraction get transfers by education
HS grad 0.14 0.11
2-year student 0.52 0.78
4-year student 0.73 0.84
2-year grad 0.14 0.13
4-year grad 0.22 0.14
Average transfers by education
HS grad 2,752 1,104
2-year student 6,988 7,676
4-year student 10,779 13,955
2-year grad 2,186 1,521
4-year grad 1,553 1,958
The model also fits well along other dimensions. Table 3.8 shows the fit of the model for
student loan borrowing and default. The average two-year cohort default rate for undergraduate
borrowers is 9.26% between 1997 and 2011 (Yannelis, 2015). The model generates a slightly
24Kaplan (2012) discusses some ways to fix this problem, including allowing for a different curvature of utility
for the two generations, adding an iceberg cost of transferring resources from the parent to the youth, or allowing
for a negative correlation between altruism and parental income.
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higher two-year default rate than the data. Table 3.9 shows the simulated average assets at
different ages, which match the actual data closely.
Table 3.8: Model Fit - College
Panel A: In College
2-year college 4-year college
Data Model Data Model
Fraction not work 0.12 0.11 0.29 0.30
Fraction part-time work 0.43 0.42 0.50 0.50
Fraction full-time work 0.45 0.47 0.20 0.20
Avg. annual loans 867 913 2,005 2,020
Panel B: Student Loans Repayment
Data Model
Two-year default rate 9.26 11.07
Table 3.9: Model Fit - Assets
Data Model
Average assets at age 20 15,400 10,394
Average assets at age 25 30,725 33,699
Average assets at age 30 67,100 73,231
3.6 Introducing Income-based Repayment Plans
In this section, I use the estimated model to examine the effects of an IBR plan on various out-
comes, including repayment, parental transfers, labor supply, college enrollment, and welfare.
The IBR plan that I study in this section is similar to the current Pay As You Earn (PAYE)
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plan, which was not available when my sample started repaying their loans.25 Annual income-
contingent repayment is 10% of the discretionary income, but not more than the amount under
the 10-year standard debt-based repayment plan. Discretionary income is equal to the bor-
rower’s income minus $13,699, which is 150% of the poverty guideline for a single-person
family.26 If discretionary income is negative, the borrower pays nothing. The payment period
is 20 years. After this period, any remaining debt is forgiven. In practice, PAYE enrollment
is not automatic: borrowers must apply for enrollment and report their income and family size
every year to recalculate payments. Costs associated with understanding the regulations and
filling out detailed paperwork may prevent distressed borrowers from using these forms of re-
payment assistance (Dynarski and Kreisman, 2013). Partly due to these non-monetary costs,
the IBR enrollment rate was only 20% in 2014 (Government Accountability Office, 2015).
I conduct three policy experiments. First, I consider introducing IBR unexpectedly after
youth graduate from college. This allows me to examine the effects of IBR, conditional on
college enrollment and student loan borrowing, on post-college decisions and outcomes such
as repayment, default, parental transfers, and labor supply. Second, I study the equilibrium
effects of implementing a budget-neutral IBR with sign-up costs to match the current IBR
sign-up rate. This can reveal which group of borrowers are most likely to be enrolled in IBR
when sign-up costs are incurred and what the impacts are on college enrollment, student loan
borrowing, and default rates. Finally, I remove the non-monetary sign-up cost while keeping
the budget fixed. This is an ideal situation where everyone is automatically enrolled in IBR.
It allows me to further examine the effects of eliminating sign-up costs on college enrollment
and welfare.
3.6.1 Unexpected IBR
The first policy experiment is to introduce the IBR plan unexpectedly after youth graduate
from college, so they do not know the existence of the plan before making decisions on college
25Besides PAYE, there are other IBR plans that are currently available. They differ in the calculation of pay-
ments and the time frames. See https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans for
details on repayment plans.
26The poverty guidelines for the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia for a single-person family
was $12,140 in 2018, and 150% of that amount is $18,210, which is equivalent to around $13,699 in 2004 dollars.
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enrollment and student loan borrowing. Borrowers are free to choose IBR at the first year
of repayment and, once they have chosen IBR, they have to commit to it for the remaining
repayment periods. If they do not choose IBR in the first year, they can only choose between
debt-based repayment and default for the rest of the repayment periods. This policy experiment
allows me to examine the effects of IBR on post-college decisions and outcomes, conditional
on college enrollment and student loan borrowing.
One interesting question is what percentage of borrowers choose IBR if it is introduced
without any sign-up costs. My simulation shows that under this policy, the sign-up rates for
IBR are 99.14% for 2-year college borrowers and 97.06% for 4-year college borrowers (97.50%
for all borrowers), which are significantly higher than the recent 20% sign-up rate. This means
that for most borrowers, IBR is better than debt-based repayment and default because of the
insurance and potential debt write-off it provides. In the baseline, there are only two options
for repayment: debt-based payment or default. Table 3.10 summarizes the characteristics of
borrowers in the first year of repayment by their repayment status and college type. The table
shows that those with high debt, low incomes, low levels of parental transfers, and little savings
are more likely to default in the baseline. After the introduction of IBR, those who default in
the baseline switch to IBR because they pay very little due to low incomes, benefit from the
additional insurance and debt relief under IBR, and no longer suffer the cost of default. Now,
compare IBR to the debt-based repayment plan. If the non-monetary cost of IBR is zero, IBR
is at least as good as debt-based repayment in a static setting. What makes IBR more attractive
is that it provides potentially reduced payments, insurance, and debt write-off. One drawback
of IBR is its longer repayment period, during which more interest accrues compared to the
standard repayment case. But the high sign-up rate indicates that the cost of accumulated
interest is outweighed by the benefits. Hence, if the non-monetary cost of IBR is zero or
negligible, almost everyone chooses IBR and no one defaults.
The post-college decisions and outcomes that I focus on include repayment, default rates,
parental transfers, and labor supply. To examine whether there is heterogeneity in response
to the policy across borrowers from different families, I report the effects in the first year after
graduation by parental income quartile in Table 3.11. In the baseline, youth from richer families
tend to borrow less on average, except that youth from the highest parental income quartile
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Table 3.10: Characteristics of Borrowers in First Year of Repayment (Baseline)
2-year graduate 4-year graduate All
Non-defaulter Defaulter Non-defaulter Defaulter Non-defaulter Defaulter
Fraction 94.8% 5.2% 88.9% 11.1% 90.2% 9.8%
Average debt 4,018 5,503 8,843 13,632 7,765 12,713
Average wage 26,028 9,997 33,060 13,230 31,489 12,864
Average debt-based/wage 2.4% 8.1% 4.5% 15.7% 4.0% 14.8%
Average asset 10,132 -556 19,796 -439 17,637 -452
Average parental income 49,735 27,114 82,481 44,302 75,164 42,358
Average parental transfers 1,089 723 3,483 2,273 2,948 2,098
borrow more on average than youth from the third parental income quartile. That is because
a higher fraction of quartile four borrowers attend a 4-year college compared to quartile three
borrowers.
Moving from the baseline to the unexpected IBR, the average repayment during the first
year does not change much for the lowest parental income quartile borrowers, but changes
the most for the highest quartile borrowers — their average repayment decreases by $301
during the first year. Looking at 2-year graduates and 4-year graduates separately (Table 3.12),
I find that for 4-year graduates from low-income families, their average repayment actually
increases by $70. This is because, under the debt-based repayment plan, a sizable fraction of
borrowers from low-income families default at an early stage. After IBR is introduced, they
start to repay small amounts. On the contrary, borrowers from high-income families receive the
largest reduction in repayment, on average, because they rarely default in the baseline while
often paying a lower income-based amount under the IBR. As shown in Table 3.11, 23% of the
borrowers from the lowest income quartile default, while only 1% of the borrowers from the
highest quartile default in the baseline. After IBR is introduced, the default rate is reduced to
zero for all quartiles.
Table 3.11 also shows that introducing IBR crowds out parental transfers, especially for
high-income families. On average, parental transfers fall by $582 during the first year for the
highest income group. For low-income families, average parental transfers do not change since
transfers are negligible prior to the policy change.
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Table 3.11: Effects of Unexpected IBR on College Graduates with Student Loans in First Year
of Repayment by Parental Income Quartile
Parental Income Quartile
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Average debt 11,334 8,736 6,342 7,651
Average repayment Baseline 963 902 667 904
Unexpected IBR 961 767 557 603
Change -2 -136 -109 -301
Default rate Baseline 23% 11% 8% 1%
Unexpected IBR 0% 0% 0% 0%
Change -23% -11% -8% -1%
Average parental transfers Baseline 9 196 972 8,432
Unexpected IBR 9 195 939 7,849
Change 0 -1 -33 -582
Average youth wage Baseline 30,515 31,288 29,540 27,960
Unexpected IBR 30,382 31,176 29,490 27,907
Change -133 -112 -50 -53
Fraction work full-time Baseline 87.37% 84.94% 80.93% 74.39%
Unexpected IBR 86.73% 84.34% 80.58% 74.07%
Change -0.64% -0.60% -0.35% -0.32%
Average youth asset Baseline 14,014 11,678 6,794 28,404
Unexpected IBR 13,486 11,387 6,644 27,724
Change -528 -292 -150 -680
Average youth consumption Baseline 17,834 19,833 22,277 29,073
Unexpected IBR 18,231 20,146 22,453 29,418
Change 397 314 176 345
Average parent consumption Baseline 24,096 44,862 68,059 117,081
Unexpected IBR 24,096 44,863 68,092 117,664
Change 0 1 33 582
Fraction that has debt write-off Unexpected IBR 10.01% 6.88% 7.00% 7.13%
Average debt write-off if positive Unexpected IBR 6,041 4,606 3,464 5,076
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Table 3.12: Effects of Unexpected IBR on College Graduates with Student Loans by College
Type and Parental Income Quartile
Parental Income Quartile
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2-year college graduates
Average debt 5,290 3,466 3,375 3,234
Average first year repayment Baseline 571 394 406 393
Unexpected IBR 469 312 286 276
Change -102 -82 -120 -117
Average fraction has debt write-off Unexpected IBR 9.54% 6.06% 7.88% 6.94%
Average debt write-off if positive Unexpected IBR 2,666 1,603 1,868 1,664
4-year college graduates
Average debt 15,645 10,486 7,068 7,988
Average first year repayment Baseline 1,242 1,071 731 943
Unexpected IBR 1,312 918 624 628
Change 70 -153 -107 -315
Average fraction has debt write-off Unexpected IBR 10.36% 7.15% 6.78% 7.14%
Average debt write-off if positive Unexpected IBR 8,258 5,452 3,918 5,329
One concern about IBR is moral hazard — income-based repayment is essentially an in-
come tax which may discourage labor supply if the borrower does not expect to repay the loan
fully. My simulation shows that borrowers from low-income families reduce their labor supply
the most, mainly switching from full-time to part-time work. However, the percentage that
changes the labor supply is minimal — less than 1%. Therefore, the moral hazard effect is
trivial.
Results from the simulation show that borrowers across all quartiles reduce their savings, as
IBR provides more insurance and reduces the need for self-insurance through savings. Youth
consumption increases in all groups, but the sources are different. For youth from low-income
families, increased consumption mainly comes from the reduction in assets. For high-income
family borrowers, the decline in both student loan repayments and assets leads to higher youth
consumption. However, the decrease in parental transfers offsets part of the increase. Con-
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sumption of low-income parents does not change, while high-income parents consume more
because parental transfers decline as a result of the crowding-out effects of IBR. Regarding
total household consumption, a higher-income family benefits more. Although only the results
for the first repayment year are reported here, similar patterns exist for other repayment years.
IBR has two opposing effects on the government budget. On the one hand, given that
the average repayment is lower, the government may expect a revenue loss compared to the
baseline. In addition, the government writes off the remaining debt under IBR at the end of 20
years. My simulation shows that, on average, 7.58% of borrowers receive a debt write-off and
the average write-off amount, if positive, is $4,813. The last two rows in Table 3.11 show that
borrowers from low-income families are more likely to have debt write-offs and higher write-
off amounts. On the other hand, it is also possible for the government to collect more, given that
the repayment period is longer — 20 years compared to 10 years in the baseline. Therefore,
the impact on the government budget is ambiguous without further quantitative evidence.
To quantify the effects on the government budget, I calculate the government’s internal rate
of return (IRR), which is the interest rate at which the present value of the total student loan
borrowing amounts equals the present value of the total repayment amounts.27 The IRR is
3.38% in the baseline, and it is reduced to 3.20% after IBR is introduced unexpectedly, which
means a loss of revenue for the government. Thus, the IBR raises the cost of the student loan
program, and the government would have to raise the interest rate or subsidize the program to
keep the budget constant.
3.6.2 IBR with Sign-up Cost
Next, I consider the case when agents know that IBR is available before making college en-
rollment decisions. As shown in Section 3.6.1, the IBR sign-up rates are very high — nearly
100% when introduced at no cost. However, the IBR plan enrollment rate was only 20% in
2014 (Government Accountability Office, 2015), indicating that there are nontrivial costs asso-
ciated with enrollment in IBR plans. Therefore, in this subsection, I apply a non-monetary cost
27Another option for comparison is to discount the cash flows from and to the government over the life of
student loans using a certain rate, such as the Treasury rate. However, Lucas and Moore (2010b) point out
that using Treasury rates without risk adjustment for discounting tends to underestimate the cost of student loan
programs compared to discounting at market rates. Therefore, instead of using Treasury rates, I calculate the IRR.
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to match the 20% IBR enrollment rate. As the previous subsection demonstrated, IBR results
in revenue losses to the government, so I increase interest rates to keep the IRR the same as the
baseline. In sum, the policy experiment examined in this subsection is a budget-neutral IBR
with sign-up costs, known to the agents prior to college entrance.
The IBR sign-up cost is modeled as a one-time utility cost to be paid by the borrower at
the first repayment period after enrolling in IBR. Table 3.13 summarizes the characteristics of
borrowers by their repayment plan in the first year of payment. Compared to those paying
the debt-based amount, those paying the reduced amount (IBR or default) have a higher debt-
to-wage ratio and lower parental transfers. This finding is consistent with the prediction in
Lochner et al. (2018), which uses a theoretical model where the non-monetary costs are mod-
erate. While 4% of borrowers are still choosing default, it is much lower than the default rate in
the baseline. Compared to the defaulters, those in IBR have significantly lower parental trans-
fers. This is mainly because those with little parental support benefit more from the reduced
payments and insurance provided by IBR than other borrowers.
Table 3.13: Features of Borrowers under IBR with Utility Cost by Repayment Status
Debt-based IBR Default
Fraction 76% 20% 4%
Average debt 6,750 16,226 9,466
Average parental income 85,416 32,734 58,674
Average parental transfers 4,316 171 4,093
Average wage 29,589 32,367 8,913
Average debt-based repayment to wage ratio 4.0% 9.0% 14.8%
Intuitively, IBR provides more insurance against labor market shocks. Thus, it encourages
youth to go to college and borrow more from student loans. In the meantime, however, the
interest rate on student loans must increase to keep the budget constant, which increases the
cost of post-secondary education and discourages some youth from attending college and bor-
rowing. Column (2) of Table 3.14 summarizes the aggregate effects on college enrollment and
student loan borrowing. To equate the IRR, the interest rate needs to increase by 0.11 percent-
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Table 3.14: Effects of IBR on Education and Borrowing
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline IBR + sign-up cost IBR
+ balance budget + balance budget
Internal Rate of Return 3.38% 3.38% 3.38%
Student Loans Interest Rate
In School 2.29% 2.40% 2.53%
In Repayment 3.70% 3.81% 3.94%
Education
Frac. HS grad 36.9% 36.1% 35.1%
Frac. 2-year grad 21.9% 22.1% 22.8%
Frac. 4-year grad 41.2% 41.8% 42.1%
Student loans
Avg. loans, 2-year 913 1,174 1,594
Avg. loans, 4-year 2,020 2,322 2,642
age points, which means that the interest rates of student loans increase from 2.29% to 2.40% in
school and from 3.70% to 3.81% in repayment. My simulation also shows that college enroll-
ment increases — 2-year enrollment increases by 0.2 percentage points and 4-year enrollment
increases by 0.6 percentage points. Average borrowing also increases for both 2-year and 4-
year college students. In practice, IBR with utility costs might be more feasible compared to
the case where sign-up costs are eliminated entirely (discussed in the next subsection) given
that the costs may reflect a stigma associated with underpaying, which cannot be completely
eliminated.
3.6.3 Equilibrium Effects of IBR
Now consider removing the non-monetary cost of IBR while keeping the budget constant.
Since IBR without any sign-up costs encourages more borrowers to enroll (as shown in Sec-
tion 3.6.1), the interest rates must increase to keep the student loan program financially self-
sustaining. As shown in column (3) of Table 3.14, compared to the baseline, the interest rate
needs to increase by 0.24 percentage points to equalize the IRR.
74 Chapter 3. College Enrollment, Parental Transfers, and Student Loans
A comparison of columns (2) and (3) shows that the elimination of IBR sign-up costs fur-
ther encourages youth to attend college. Two-year college enrollment increases by 0.7 percent-
age points and 4-year college enrollment increases by 0.3 percentage points. Taken together,
moving from the baseline to this cost-free, budget-neutral IBR increases both 2- and 4-year
enrollment by 0.9 percentage points. Removing non-monetary costs also encourages college
students to borrow more from student loans.
To examine the distributional effects, I report changes in college enrollment by parental
income and AFQT quartile in Table 3.15. The enrollment of the low parental income group
increases the most. For the lowest parental income group, 2-year college enrollment increases
by 2.7 percentage points and 4-year college enrollment increases by 1.3 percentage points. The
low AFQT group gains more in 2-year college enrollment, while changes in 4-year college
enrollment are similar across different AFQT quartiles. In terms of overall college enrollment
(2- and 4-year), low parental income and low AFQT youth benefit the most.
Table 3.15: Effects of IBR on Education by College Type
2-year Enrollment 4-year Enrollment
Baseline IBR Change Baseline IBR Change
+ balance budget + balance budget
Full Sample 21.9% 22.8% 0.9% 41.2% 42.1% 0.9%
By Parental Income Quartile
Income Q1 16.0% 18.7% 2.7% 20.3% 21.6% 1.3%
Income Q2 24.3% 25.1% 0.8% 35.9% 37.5% 1.6%
Income Q3 25.0% 25.2% 0.2% 49.4% 49.6% 0.2%
Income Q4 22.4% 22.2% -0.1% 59.7% 59.9% 0.3%
By AFQT Quartile
AFQT Q1 24.0% 26.2% 2.2% 8.1% 8.8% 0.7%
AFQT Q2 28.1% 29.0% 0.9% 27.3% 28.2% 0.9%
AFQT Q3 22.1% 22.5% 0.4% 53.6% 54.6% 1.0%
AFQT Q4 13.3% 13.4% 0.0% 76.4% 77.1% 0.7%
To examine the impact of different IBR policies on welfare, I calculate changes in welfare
overall, by parental income, and by AFQT quartile. The results are shown in Table 3.16. The
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welfare measurement is the fraction of consumption that households are willing to give up to
live under the new policy so that the expected lifetime utility is the same as in the baseline.
When IBR is introduced with sign-up costs (column (1)), households are willing to give up
0.04% of their consumption, which means that the policy is welfare-improving. All parental
income groups benefit from the policy, but the quartile two families benefit the most. As shown
in Section 3.6.2, borrowers from low-income families are more likely to pay the non-monetary
cost and enroll in IBR. In addition, the college enrollment rate increases the most for low-
income families. When the sign-up cost is removed (column (2)), welfare increases further —
average households are willing to give up 0.08% of their consumption. Compared to column
(1), the elimination of the sign-up cost increases the welfare of families across all quartiles.
In both policy experiments, the magnitude of welfare improvement is increasing with youth’s
ability.
In sum, my policy experiments show that IBR reduces average payments and crowds out
parental transfers. The response of the labor supply to IBR is minimal therefore the prob-
lem of moral hazard is less likely to be a matter of concern. When IBR is implemented with
sign-up costs, those with fewer parental resources are more likely to participate in IBR. Un-
der IBR with sign-up costs, students borrow more and repay less so that the interest rates of
student loans have to increase to keep the program self-sustaining. Yet, even after interest
rates increase, college enrollment is still higher than the baseline. When removing the sign-up
costs while keeping the budget fixed, college enrollment increases further. This cost-free and
budget-neutral IBR is welfare-improving, and welfare increases more for relatively poor and
high-ability families. For different families, the source of welfare improvement is different.
Low-income families benefit from higher college enrollment, less default, more debt write-
offs, higher youth consumption, and more insurance, while high-income families benefit from
reduced payments and increased total household consumption when their post-school earnings
are low.
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Table 3.16: Effects of IBR on Welfare
Change of Consumption
(1) (2)
IBR + sign-up cost IBR
+ balance budget + balance budget
Aggregate -0.04% -0.08%
By Parental Income Quartile
Income Q1 -0.03% -0.04%
Income Q2 -0.13% -0.25%
Income Q3 -0.04% -0.10%
Income Q4 -0.07% -0.10%
By AFQT Quartile
AFQT Q1 -0.02% -0.04%
AFQT Q2 -0.03% -0.07%
AFQT Q3 -0.07% -0.13%
AFQT Q4 -0.17% -0.21%
Note: The welfare measurement is the fraction of consumption that households are willing to
give up to live under the new policy so that the expected lifetime utility is the same as in the
baseline.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic life-cycle model to study the effects of introducing an IBR plan
with endogenous parents-to-children transfers, together with children’s education, borrowing,
repayment, and labor supply decisions. My estimated model suggests that students from low-
income families borrow more and are more likely to default. They are also more likely to pay
the sign-up cost to enroll in an IBR in counterfactual simulations, indicating that they need
the insurance provided by IBR the most. IBR crowds out savings and parental transfers as it
provides more insurance to borrowers. Regarding the moral hazard issue, my simulation shows
that the labor supply response is trivial after IBR is introduced.
IBR encourages youth to borrow more and repay less, leading to government revenue
losses. Therefore, the interest rates of student loans must increase to keep the program self-
sufficient. My simulation shows that a budget-neutral IBR without sign-up costs increases
college enrollment rates and improves welfare with relatively poor families benefiting more.
As college tuition and student borrowing have increased dramatically in recent decades,
along with increasing labor market risk (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2016), the repayment
problem has become more prominent. With continually rising tuition, resources such as savings
and parental transfers play more important roles. This framework is promising in studying
optimal student loan policies when considering the insurance roles played by these resources.
In addition, countries such as Canada have also introduced more generous repayment plans
(e.g., Repayment Assistance Plan), so this framework is useful in studying the effects of those
policies in an international context. One possible extension of the model is to add dropout
risk during college (Chatterjee and Ionescu, 2012), since a large fraction of students do not
get a degree but have student loans when they leave college. This additional risk may amplify
the role of parental resources and affect the educational choices of those with little parental
assistance. Introducing IBR provides insurance that would, therefore, benefit poor families
more. However, IBR could also lead to a larger government budget deficit, given that dropouts
may have more difficulties in repaying their loans.
Chapter 4
Returns to Skill and the Evolution of
Skills for Older Men
4.1 Introduction
Despite decades of research on the topic, there remains considerable interest in better under-
standing growing inequality in the U.S. and many other developed countries. An important
focus of much of this research has been on the extent to which growing wage inequality is the
result of rising returns to skill (often attributed to skill-biased technological change) vs. growth
in the variance of skills across workers. Due to a lack of direct measures of skill, researchers
are typically forced to make (strong) assumptions about the evolution of skill distributions or
returns, with little external validation or evidence regarding those assumptions.
This paper establishes nonparametric identification of the returns to skills and cross-sectional
distribution of skills over time given the availability of repeated cross-section data on wages
and at least two skill measurements every period, with at least one continuous skill measure
repeated each period. With longitudinal data, we show that it is also possible to identify the dy-
namics of skills (i.e. the distribution of skills in period t conditional on skills in period t−1). Our
constructive identification strategy suggests a multi-stage estimation approach, which simpli-
fies considerably if one of the repeated measurements is known to be linear in skills, something
that is straightforward to verify. We use these methods and longitudinal data from the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) to estimate the evolution of skill returns and distributions, as well
as the dynamics of skills, for men in the U.S. from 1996–2016.
Several distinct literatures in economics aim to distinguish interpersonal differences in
78
4.1. Introduction 79
skills from the market-level returns to those skills. For example, the primary objective of many
empirical studies on discrimination is to determine the extent to which race or gender differ-
ences in wages, as well as the evolution of those gaps over time, can be explained by group
differences in skill levels.1 Similarly, researchers often attempt to decompose differences in the
wage returns to schooling across countries (Leuven et al., 2004; Hanushek and Zhang, 2009)
or over time (Heckman et al., 1998; Bowlus and Robinson, 2012) into differences in worker
skill levels (deriving from, e.g., heterogeneous school quality or home environments) and in
the wage returns to those skills. Related research has framed the rapid rise in residual wage
inequality (i.e., inequality within narrowly defined demographic groups) over the past several
decades as a combination of changes in the distribution of unmeasured skills and in their labor
market returns (e.g., Juhn et al., 1989; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Lemieux, 2006; Autor et al.,
2008; Lochner et al., 2020).
Skill measurement is a critical challenge in all of these literatures. In most cases (e.g. stud-
ies using Census data or data from the Current Population Surveys (CPS)), only a crude proxy
or correlate of skill is available (e.g., educational attainment, per-pupil spending when young,
age), especially when researchers are interested in studying inequality across long time periods.
In these cases, skills are often equated with available measures like education or labor market
experience. Other studies explicitly aim to estimate the role of unmeasured skills. To this end,
Juhn et al. (1989) assume that the distribution of these skills remained constant over the period
they study, attributing all growth in the variance of log wage residuals to an increase in the
return to unobserved skill. Lemieux (2006) instead assumes that the variance of skills within
narrowly defined observable groups (e.g., within age-education-race categories) remained un-
changed over time, allowing for changes in the distribution of skills through changes in the
composition of the workforce (by age, education, and race). He finds that a sizeable fraction
of the growth in residual inequality can be traced to changes in the distribution of skills caused
by the aging and growing education of the population. Using longitudinal data on wages from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Lochner et al. (2020) relax the assumption of in-
variant within-group distributions, assuming instead that variation in skill growth among older
1There are vast literatures on race and gender wage differentials surveyed in Altonji et al. (2012). Among the
most closely related studies on race, see Card and Lemieux (1996); Neal and Johnson (1996), and Chay and Lee
(2000). See Blau and Kahn (1997, 2017) for closely related studies on gender wage gaps.
80 Chapter 4. Returns to Skill and the Evolution of Skills for OlderMen
workers is idiosyncratic. Their estimates suggest declining returns to unobserved skill over
the late 1980s and 1990s, while the growth in residual wage inequality is instead explained by
growth in the variance of skills (due to growing variation in skill growth). Clearly, assumptions
about the evolution of skill distributions have important implications for the conclusions one
draws about driving forces underlying rising wage inequality.2
In some cases, researchers have used more specialized data sets like the National Longitu-
dinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY), which contain cognitive test scores as direct measures of skill.
Using the 1979 Cohort of the NLSY, Neal and Johnson (1996) demonstrate that differences in
adolescent cognitive achievement (as measured by the Armed Forces Qualifying Test, AFQT)
can, by themselves, explain the sizeable differences in wages between young black and white
men in the U.S.3 Several studies have also used the NLSY cohorts to study the evolution of
inequality since the 1980s. For example, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) argue that the U.S.
has become more meritocratic based on sharply increasing wage returns to AFQT. Others have
used AFQT measures in an effort to disentangle whether the growing differences in earnings
by educational attainment reflect rising returns to schooling or rising returns to cognitive abil-
ity (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001; Taber, 2001; Castex and Dechter, 2014).4 Deming (2017)
exploits other non-cognitive measures in the NLSY, estimating that the returns to social skills
have risen since the 1980s.
It is noteworthy that commonly used data sources with direct skill measures do not typically
contain the same measures over time for the same individuals. For example, cohorts of the
NLSY contain AFQT scores measured only once, during adolescence. Thus, studies using the
NLSY estimate the effects of adolescent cognitive achievement, rather than contemporaneous
skills, on wages later in life. Given the practical challenge of sorting out age and time effects
2In related research, Card and Lemieux (1996) and Chay and Lee (2000) use CPS data to study the extent to
which changes in skill gaps and the returns to skill can explain the evolution of black – white wage differentials.
Card and Lemieux (1996) consider a single skill model (composed of both observed and unobserved components)
with restrictions on the evolution of skills over time, while Chay and Lee (2000) consider a model with differ-
ently priced observed and unobserved skills, placing restrictions on the distribution of unobserved skills within
observable groups over time.
3To study differential returns to cognitive achievement across countries at a point in time, Leuven et al. (2004)
and Hanushek and Zhang (2009) use international data from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) while
Hanushek et al. (2015) exploits data from an expanded set of countries from the Programme for International
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC).
4In related work, Altonji et al. (2012) study changes in the distribution of skills (overall and by race and
gender) for two NLSY cohorts using AFQT scores, education, and other individual and family characteristics.
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from only a few birth-year cohorts, studies following individuals over time from one of the
NLSY cohorts cannot determine whether growing wage inequality is driven by differential
lifecycle growth in skills by AFQT or rising returns to skill (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001).
Grogger and Eide (1995) and Murnane et al. (1995) address this issue by exploiting data
on cognitive achievement and wages from two separate cohorts (National Longitudinal Study
of the High School Class of 1972 (NELS72) and High School and Beyond (HSB)). Comparing
the earnings of individuals at the same ages (roughly age 24), their estimates suggest that both
the returns to schooling and cognitive skill rose between 1978 and 1986. However, a limitation
of both studies is that the cognitive tests (taken during the last year of high school), while
similar, were not the same across the two surveys. Thus, any differences in their mapping to
true cognitive skills would be reflected in the estimated returns to skill over time. Castex and
Dechter (2014) improve upon these studies by comparing the wages of men over ages 18-28
from the 1979 and 1997 Cohorts of the NLSY (born roughly 20 years apart), who took the same
AFQT test during adolescence. Their estimates suggest that the returns to adolescent cognitive
achievement declined while the returns to schooling increased between the 1980s and 2000s.5
They also find that log wage differences by AFQT were quite similar upon labor market entry
across the two cohorts, with log wage gaps by AFQT increasing with experience for the 1979
Cohort but not the 1997 Cohort. Thus, the difference in estimated returns to AFQT across
cohorts only appeared after individuals had spent several years in the labor market.
While this cross-cohort approach to estimating changes in the returns to skills over time re-
quires weaker assumptions than studies following a single cohort over time, it is not assumption-
free. Because most respondents took the AFQT during adolescence, one can only interpret
changes in wage returns to cognitive skills at older ages as changes in the returns to skill over
time if the evolution of skills between the age of the test and the age at which wages are com-
5In related work, Deming (2017) uses the 1979 and 1997 Cohorts of the NLSY to estimate changes in the
wage returns to social skills over time. Because the same measures of social skills are not available for both
NLSY cohorts, Deming (2017) works with normalized measures of social skills (measured during adolescence),
effectively assuming identical distributions (and measurement quality) across the cohorts. Thus, the rising returns
to social skills he estimates could also reflect greater variation in social skills (or more precise measurements) for
the more recent cohort. Edin et al. (2017) exploit administrative data in Sweden that contain consistent cognitive
and non-cognitive measures collected for men entering the military at ages 18-19 for cohorts born between 1951
and 1975. They estimate that the return to non-cognitive skill roughly doubled from 1992 to 2013, while the
return to cognitive skill rose in the 1990s but fell in the 2000s.
82 Chapter 4. Returns to Skill and the Evolution of Skills for OlderMen
pared was the same across cohorts.6 This would be violated if, for example, variation in early
lifecycle skill growth changed. Indeed, the finding that log wage gaps by AFQT evolved dif-
ferently with work experience for the two NLSY cohorts suggests that early skill growth may
have differed between them. Alternatively, the returns to cognitive skill may have evolved dif-
ferently in the 1980s vs. 2000s, which cannot be easily distinguished from differential lifecycle
skill growth patterns for the two cohorts.
Despite any limitations, these cohort comparison studies provide some of the most con-
vincing evidence on changes in the returns to cognitive skills over time. Yet, they only offer, at
best, a few snapshots for the U.S.: Grogger and Eide (1995) and Murnane et al. (1995) find that
the returns to cognitive ability rose between 1978 and 1986, while Castex and Dechter (2014)
estimate that the returns declined between the 1980s and 2000s. These studies do not tell us
anything about the 1960s and early 1970s or the most recent decade. Nor do they inform us as
to when the sizeable decline in estimated returns occurred between the 1980s and 2000s. Yet,
these are periods of considerable debate in the literature on log wage residual inequality and
the evolution of returns to skill (Juhn et al., 1989; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Lemieux, 2006;
Autor et al., 2008; Lochner et al., 2020).
Although we cannot comment on earlier time periods, we use biennial data from 1996-2016
HRS to estimate the evolution of returns to skill and skill distributions over this more recent
period. Unlike previous studies, our data contain measures of wages and scores from the same
cognitive tests repeated every other year. As a result, our approach requires no assumptions
on skill distributions nor their dynamics. Instead, our key identification assumption is that the
measurement function for at least one continuous repeated test (taken at ages 52+) is identical
over time (i.e., the mapping between skills and expected individual test scores is time invariant).
We further show that our use of panel data enables us to identify the lifecycle dynamics of skills
under very general conditions.
Our estimates suggest that the returns to (cognitive) skill were relatively stable over the late
6The same caveat applies to studies by Grogger and Eide (1995) and Murnane et al. (1995), who use data from
NELS72 and HSB, and to Edin et al. (2017), who use administrative data from Sweden. Additionally, the fact that
NLSY respondents took the AFQT test at different ages across the cohorts requires adjustments based on implicit
assumptions regarding rank stability of cognitive scores across testing ages. Of course, test scores measured at
age 22 for the oldest in the 1979 Cohort are likely to be much more strongly related to cognitive skills at ages
18-28 than are test scores measured at age 12 for the youngest in the 1997 Cohort.
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1990s and early 2000s but rose significantly after the Great Recession. While these estimates
are noisy, they are roughly consistent with the patterns estimated by Lochner et al. (2020) using
data from the PSID.
Our results also intersect with a broader literature studying cognitive skills late in life; al-
though, this literature typically estimates latent skills (or factors) derived only from cognitive
tests without linking (or anchoring) those skills to wages. By incorporating wages in our anal-
ysis, we are able to describe how skills, measured in log wage units, evolve for individuals ages
52-70. We document considerable variation in skills among individuals in their early- to mid-
50s across cohorts (with much higher skills among those from earlier birth cohorts), but these
differences are largely dissipated by the time individuals reach their early 60s as earlier cohorts
experienced much faster declines in skill than did later cohorts. Indeed, there is little evidence
of skill depreciation prior to age 63 (when last observed) among the cohort born 1954-1959.
Consistent with several studies using the HRS and similar data in other countries, we show
that late-life cognitive performance differs significantly across education groups (Cagney and
Lauderdale, 2002; Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2012) and racial groups (Zsembik and Peek, 2001;
Karlamangla et al., 2009; Castora-Binkley et al., 2015). Our estimates suggest that, among
older workers, cognitive skill differences are quite similar across ages and explain roughly
one-third of the education gaps and nearly half of the race gaps in log wages.7
Prior research has also shown that retirement is negatively correlated with cognition (Adam
et al., 2007); although, self-selection into retirement has posed challenges in estimating the
causal relationship between retirement and cognition.8 We make no effort to attribute causality;
instead, we simply show lifecycle skill profiles from ages 52-70 for workers choosing to retire
at different ages. Our results suggest that age 55 skill levels are increasing in retirement age,
with those retiring at age 65 or older possessing roughly 15% more skills than those retiring
7See Card (1999) and Heckman et al. (2006) for comprehensive surveys of wage differences by education.
Neal and Johnson (1996) show that adolescent skill gaps can explain much of the early-career differences in
wages by race.
8Several studies use exogenous policy variation, such as eligible retirement ages and pension policies, as
instruments to identify the causal effects, producing mixed findings. Some of these studies estimate significant
negative effects of retirement on cognition (Rohwedder and Willis, 2010; Bonsang et al., 2012; Mazzonna and
Peracchi, 2012, 2017), while others find no causal effect (Coe and Zamarro, 2011; Coe et al., 2012). Still others
estimate heterogeneous effects across different occupations (Mazzonna and Peracchi, 2017) or across individuals
retiring early vs. at the statutory age (Celidoni et al., 2017).
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prior to age 55. We see no evidence of sharp declines in cognitive skills surrounding retirement
ages, with skills relatively constant through age 60 for those retiring prior to age 55 and skills
declining almost linearly from ages 52 to 70 for those retiring over ages 55-64. To the extent
that retirement does lead to cognitive decline, our results suggest that its impacts are relatively
small or largely offset by other lifecycle forces.
Finally, we show that skills are quite persistent, with individual fixed effects accounting
for more than a third of all skill variation at age 60. Year-to-year skill innovations are also
persistent with an autocorrelation of 0.93.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes our model of skill dynamics, the
relationship between skills and wages, and other skill measurement functions. We discuss
identification and estimation of skill returns, measurement functions, skill distributions, and the
dynamics of skills. Section 4.3 describes the HRS data we use in estimation, while Section 4.4
presents our estimation results. We offer concluding thoughts in Section 4.5.
4.2 Methodology
In this section, we provide a general model of the evolution of skills and log wages. Since
we focus on older workers (ages 50+), we assume skills evolve exogenously, reflecting growth
and/or depreciation. With panel data on both log wages and test-based measures of skills,
we describe identification and estimation of the distribution of skills and their dynamics, the
evolution of skill return functions over time, and the mapping between skills and their test-
based measurements.
4.2.1 Model
Let ln Wi,a,t be the log wage for individual i at age a in year t and Ti, j,a,t reflect skill test score
measure j = 1, . . . , J. We consider the following specification for log wages and skill mea-
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sures:
ln Wi,a,t = γt + λtθi,a,t + εi,a,t,
Ti,1,a,t = τ1(θi,a,t) + ηi,1,a,t,
Ti, j,a,t = G j(τ j(θi,a,t) + ηi, j,a,t), for j = 2, . . . , J,
(4.1)
where θi,a,t denotes unobserved skill, λt denotes “return” to skill in period t, εi,a,t and ηi, j,a,t are
idiosyncratic non-skill shocks to wages and test measurement errors, respectively, and τ j(·) is
a strictly increasing, age- and time-invariant measurement function that maps unobserved skill
to cognitive measure j combined with a weakly increasing function G j(·) for j = 2, . . . , J.
Notice that the model allows ordered discrete measures for j = 2, . . . , J if Ti,1,a,t is continu-
ous. Observations are i.i.d. over individual i for any ( j, a, t). For any individual i, we assume
that (θi,a,t, εi,a,t, ηi, j,a,t) are mutually independent for all test measures j and that each of these
variables is also independent of past and future realizations of the other two variables. The
idiosyncratic measurement error ηi, j,a,t is independent over j and t. Since a and t move together
for each individual, ηi, j,a,t is also independent over a, but it need not be identically distributed
over ages or time. We normalize λt∗ = 1 for some year t∗, which effectively measures skills in
year t∗ log wage units. We also normalize E(εi,a,t) = E(ηi, j,a,t) = 0 for all ( j, a, t). Identification
requires no assumptions about the serial dependence structure for log wage shocks εi,a,t.
Let αa,t ≡ E(θi,a,t) and θ̄i,a,t := θi,a,t −αa,t be the de-meaned skill value. Then, we can rewrite
log wages as follows:
ln Wi,a,t = γt + λt(θi,a,t − αa,t + αa,t) + εi,a,t
= γt + λtαa,t + λtθ̄i,a,t + εi,a,t
≡ γ̃a,t + λtθ̄i,a,t + εi,a,t,
where γ̃a,t := γt + λtαa,t. Regressing log wages on interactions of age and time dummies yields
consistent estimates of γ̃a,t and log wage residuals wi,a,t := λtθ̄i,a,t + εi,a,t. We work with these
residuals below to discuss identification and estimation of returns to skill, λt, and the evolution
of skill distributions.
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4.2.2 Identification
Since the continuous measurement function τ1(·) is assumed to be time invariant, observing this
same measurement along with at least one other measurement and log wage residuals in multi-
ple periods, we can identify the returns to skill each period, nonparametric (age/cohort-specific)
distributions of skills each period, and the dynamics of skills. (We also obtain nonparametric
identification for the measurement function τ1(·) and the corresponding error distributions fη1,a,t
for all t.) The identification of skill dynamics is considered both under a general Markov struc-
ture and under the AR(1) structure with a fixed effect term. Notice that the latter requires
identification of each component separately while the former focuses only on the conditional
density of θi,a,t given θi,a−1,t−1. We are careful to note which features of our model can be
identified with repeated cross-section data alone and which require panel data.
Returns to Skill, Cross-Sectional Skill Distributions, and Measurements
We begin by discussing identification of returns to skill, cross-sectional skill distributions, test
measurement functions, and the distribution of test score measurement errors.
Consider a normalized age and time pair (a∗, t∗), where λt∗ = 1 and αa∗,t∗ = 0. Let c∗ =
t∗ − a∗ be the corresponding cohort. Applying Theorem 1 in Hu and Schennach (2008), we can
identify the distributions Fθa∗ ,t∗ (·), Fεa∗ ,t∗ (·), and Fη1,a∗ ,t∗ (·), as well as the measurement function
τ1(·) from the joint density of (wi,a∗,t∗ ,Ti,1,a∗,t∗ , ...,Ti,J,a∗,t∗) for J ≥ 2.9 Appendix C.1 provides
details of the regularity conditions and the identification result.
Now, we consider an arbitrary age and time pair (a, t) , (a∗, t∗), rewriting the model as
wi,a,t = θ̃i,a,t + εi,a,t,
Ti,1,a,t = τ̃1,a,t(θ̃i,a,t) + ηi,1,a,t
Ti, j,a,t = G j
(
τ̃ j,a,t(θ̃i,a,t) + ηi, j,a,t
)
for j = 2, . . . , J,
(4.2)
where θ̃i,a,t := λtθ̄i,a,t = λt(θi,a,t − αa,t) and τ̃ j,a,t(x) := τ j(x/λt + αa,t). Notice that E(θ̃i,a,t) = 0.
Using the same arguments as above, we can identify Fθ̃i,a,t(·), Fεi,a,t(·), Fηi,1,a,t(·), and τ̃1,a,t(·) from
9We make no effort to separately identify τ j(·) from G j(·) for j = 2, ..., J, which may require additional
assumptions for discrete measures and is not necessary given a single repeated continuous measure Ti,1,a,t.
4.2. Methodology 87
the joint density of (wi,a,t,Ti,1,a,t, ...,Ti,J,a,t).
Knowledge of τ1(·) from (a∗, t∗) and τ̃1,a,t(·) from any other (a, t) identifies λt and αa,t.10 To
see this, consider two points θ1 and θ2 on the support of θ such that θ1 < θ2. Since τ1(·) is strictly
increasing, θ1 < θ2 implies that τ̃1,a,t(θ1) < τ̃1,a,t(θ2). By definition, τ̃1,a,t(θ1) = τ1(θ1/λt + αa,t)
and τ̃1,a,t(θ2) = τ1(θ2/λt + αa,t). Solving this system of equations identifies
λt =
θ1 − θ2
τ−11
(
τ̃1,a,t(θ1)
)
− τ−11
(
τ̃1,a,t(θ2)
)
αa,t =
θ2τ
−1
1
(
τ̃1,a,t(θ1)
)
− θ1τ
−1
1
(
τ̃1,a,t(θ2)
)
θ2 − θ1
.
Having identified λt, αa,t, and Fθ̃i,a,t(·), we can then identify Fθi,a,t(θ) = Fθ̃i,a,t(λt(θ − αa,t)).
We emphasize that none of the identification results thus far require panel data. Identifica-
tion of the returns to skills and cross-sectional distributions of skills over time can be achieved
with repeated cross-section data. While we have explicitly considered the case with J ≥ 2
repeated measures each period, it is clear that only a single continuous measurement must be
repeated every period. Other measurements can differ from period to period.11
Skill Processes: General Approach
Without any additional assumptions on θi,a,t and εi,a,t, we can identify their serial dependence
structure with panel data on our continuous measure Ti,1,a,t (given what we have already identi-
fied in Section 4.2.2). To see this, consider two time periods at (a∗, t∗) and (a, t). For example,
a = a∗ + 1 and t = t∗ + 1. Let ϕηi,1,a∗ ,t∗ ,ηi,1,a,t(x1, x2) := E[exp(−i(x1ηi,1,a∗,t∗ + x2ηi,1,a,t))] be a
characteristic function of (ηi,1,a∗,t∗ , ηi,1,a,t) and define characteristic functions for other random
10Note that identification of λt and αa,t further identifies time effects in log wage equations, γt, from γ̃a,t.
11Even more generally, as long as each period of data contains at least two independent measures, identification
can be achieved with overlapping periods that contain a repeated continuous measurement (e.g., one continuous
measurement over periods 1 and 2 with a different continuous measurement over periods 2 and 3, etc.). The same
continuous measurement need not be available over the entire sample period.
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variables similarly. Note that
ϕTi,1,a∗ ,t∗ ,Ti,1,a,t(x1, x2) = ϕτ1(θi,a∗ ,t∗ ),τ1(θi,a,t)(x1, x2) · ϕηi,1,a∗ ,t∗ ,ηi,1,a,t(x1, x2)
ϕτ1(θi,a∗ ,t∗ ),τ1(θi,a,t)(x1, x2) =
ϕTi,1,a∗ ,t∗ ,Ti,1,a,t(x1, x2)
ϕηi,1,a∗ ,t∗ ,ηi,1,a,t(x1, x2)
=
ϕTi,1,a∗ ,t∗ ,Ti,1,a,t(x1, x2)
ϕηi,1,a∗ ,t∗ (x1)ϕηi,1,a,t(x2)
,
where the last equality holds by the time-independence of ηi,1,a,t distributions. Since we know
all distributions on the right hand side, we can identify the joint distribution of (τ1(θi,a∗,t∗), τ1(θi,a,t)).
Then, the joint distribution of (θi,a∗,t∗ , θi,a,t) is identified by
Fθi,a∗ ,t∗ ,θi,a,t(x1, x2) = P(θi,a∗,t∗ ≤ x1, θi,a,t ≤ x2)
= P(τ1(θi,a∗,t∗) ≤ τ1(x1), τ1(θi,a,t) ≤ τ1(x2)),
where the final expression is identified since we know both τ1(·) and ϕτ1(θi,a∗ ,t∗ ),τ1(θi,a,t)(·, ·). There-
fore, we can construct the conditional density fθi,a,t |θi,a∗ ,t∗ from the joint distribution and identify
the serial dependence of θi,a,t. Similarly, we can identify the joint distribution of (εi,a∗,t∗ , εi,a,t)
by noting that
ϕεi,a∗ ,t∗ ,εi,a,t(x1, x2) =
ϕwi,a∗ ,t∗ ,wi,a,t(x1, x2)
ϕθi,a∗ ,t∗ ,̃θi,a,t(x1, x2)
=
ϕwi,a∗ ,t∗ ,wi,a,t(x1, x2)
ϕθi,a∗ ,t∗ ,θi,a,t(x1, λtx2) × exp(−iαa,tλtx2)
,
where we already know αa,t, λt, and the two joint distributions on the right hand side. The
serial dependence of (εi,a,∗,t∗ , εi,a,t) follows immediately.
Skill Process: AR(1) and Fixed Effect
We now consider the identification problem for the skill process when skills are decomposed
into the following three components: (i) a systematic lifecycle skill growth component, which
can differ freely across cohorts, αa,t; (ii) an individual fixed effect ψi; and (iii) an AR(1) com-
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ponent φi,a,t. Thus, the skill process can be written as follows:
θi,a,t = αa,t + ψi + φi,a,t,
φi,a,t = ρφi,a−1,t−1 + νi,a,t,
(4.3)
where νi,a,t is independent over t. We further assume that ψi is independent of φi,a,t and νi,a,t
for all (a, t). We normalize E(ψi) = E(νi,a,t) = E(φi,a,t) = 0 for all (a, t), which implies αa,t =
E(θi,a,t) as before. We normalize αa∗,t∗ = 0 for some (a∗, t∗).12
Notice that we have already identified the returns to skills and age/cohort- and time-specific
skill distributions using only repeated cross-sections of log wages and skill measures (see Sec-
tion 4.2.2). To identify the basic components in equation (4.3), we need panel data from (at
least) three periods, t, t + 1, and t + 2.
First, we can use similar arguments as in Section 4.2.2 to identify the joint distribution of(
θi,a,t, θi,a+1,t+1, θi,a+2,t+2
)
. Then, we can construct the following moment conditions from equa-
tion (4.3):
Var(θi,a,t) = Var(ψi) + Var(φi,a,t)
Cov(θi,a,t, θi,a+1,t+1) = Var(ψi) + ρVar(φi,a,t)
Cov(θi,a,t, θi,a+2,t+2) = Var(ψi) + ρ2Var(φi,a,t).
Solving this system of equations, we can identify ρ as
ρ = 1 −
Var(θi,a,t) −Cov(θi,a,t, θi,a+2,t+2)
Var(θi,a,t) −Cov(θi,a,t, θi,a+1,t+1)
,
where moments on the right hand side are identified from the joint density of
(
θi,a,t, θi,a+1,t+1, θi,a+2,t+2
)
.
Next, we can identify cohort- and time-specific distributions for skill shocks and cohort-
specific distributions for the fixed effects. We fix a cohort and let t0 be the first year it is
observed. First, since we already know αa,t and the joint distribution Fθi,a+1,t+1,θi,a,t for all (a, t),
12It is not necessary to use the same t∗ here as used for normalizing λt∗ = 1; however, we do so in this section
to simplify the exposition.
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we identify the left hand side of the following two equations:
θi,a,t0 − αa,t0 = φi,a,t0 + ψi
(θi,a+1,t0+1 − αa+1,t0+1) − (θi,a,t0 − αa,t0)
ρ − 1
= φi,a,t0 +
νi,a+1,t0+1
ρ − 1
.
Since φi,a,t0 , ψi, and νi,a+1,t0+1 are mutually independent, we can identify their distributions by
applying Kotlarski’s Lemma (Kotlarski, 1967). Second, we identify the distribution of φi,a,t
sequentially for all t ≥ t0 + 1 from φi,a+1,t+1 − φi,a,t = (θi,a+1,t+1 − αa+1,t+1) − (θi,a,t − αa,t) by
applying standard deconvolution arguments, since we know the distribution of the right hand
side and that of φi,a,t0 . Finally, we identify the distribution of νi,a,t for t ≥ t0 + 1 from φi,a,t =
ρφi,a−1,t−1 + νi,a,t by applying the deconvolution arguments again.
4.2.3 Estimation
We can estimate the full model nonparametrically, e.g. the sieve maximum likelihood estimator
as in Hu and Schennach (2008). However, it is quite challenging in practice as the objective
function involves multiple integration over many unobservables.
We mitigate this computational difficulty by developing a three-step estimation procedure
based on the identification strategy outlined earlier. First, one can estimate the measure-
ment functions τ j(·) and the distribution of skills θi,a,t∗ from the cross-sectional observations
of {wi,a,t∗ ,Ti,1,a,t∗ , . . . ,Ti,J,a,t∗} for all ages a at time t∗. Second, repeated cross-sectional observa-
tions {wi,a,t,Ti,1,a,t, . . . ,Ti,J,a,t} at (a, t) , (a∗, t∗) can be used along with the estimated τ̂1(·) (from
Step 1) to estimate the skill return λt and skill distribution of θi,a,t for all (a, t). Finally, panel
data (if available), can be used to estimate the dynamics of skill distributions.
The estimation of skill dynamics (and other features of the model) becomes much simpler
when any continous measurement function τ j(·) estimated in Step 1 turns out to be linear. We
discuss this simpler estimation approach at the end of this section.
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Step 1: Estimating τ j(·) and fθa,t∗ (·)
We can estimate τ j(·) functions and the skill distributions fθa,t∗ (·) for all ages using cross-
sectional data at time t∗. Normalizing λt∗ = 1 and αa∗,t∗ ≡ E(θi,a∗,t∗) = 0, we consider a non-
parametric maximum likelihood estimation (NPMLE) approach by using flexible functional
form and distributional assumptions (e.g. polynomials for measurement functions, mixtures of
normal distributions for densities, or sieve estimation using Hermite polynomials). The com-
plexity of the underlying parameter space can be adjusted depending on the model structure
and the sample size.
Let fwa∗ ,t∗ ,T1,,a∗ ,t∗ ,...,TJ,a∗ ,t∗ be the joint density function of (wa∗,t∗,,T1,a∗,t∗ , . . . ,TJ,a∗,t∗). Since ob-
servations are i.i.d. over individuals, we drop the subscript i unless it causes any confusion.
For simplicity, we assume that G(·) is an identity function and all T j are continuous.13 The
independence assumption among (θa∗,t∗ , εa∗,t∗ , η1,a∗,t∗ , . . . , ηJ,a∗,t∗) implies that
fwa∗ ,t∗ ,T1,a∗ ,t∗ ,...,TJ,a∗ ,t∗ (w,T1, . . . ,TJ)
=
∫
Θ
fεa∗ ,t∗
(
w − θ;βεa∗ ,t∗
)
× fη1,a∗ ,t∗
(
T1 − τ1(θ;βτ1);βη1,a∗ ,t∗
)
× · · · × fηJ,a∗ ,t∗
(
TJ − τJ(θ;βτJ );βηJ,a∗ ,t∗
)
× fθa∗ ,t∗
(
θ;βθa∗ ,t∗
)
dθ,
(4.4)
where βx for a generic x denotes a vector of the parameters or the polynomial coefficients for
the unknown distribution or function. Recall that all density functions in (4.4) should satisfy
the mean zero restriction. The above density function can be used to form the log-likelihood
function. Let βa∗,t∗ ≡ ({βτ j ,βη j,a∗ ,t∗ }
J
j=1,βεa∗ ,t∗ ,βθa∗ ,t∗ ) be the stacked vector of all unknown param-
eters. It can be estimated by
β̂a∗,t∗ = arg max
βa∗ ,t∗∈B
1
|Ic∗ |
∑
i∈Ic∗
log fwa∗ ,t∗ ,T1,a∗ ,t∗ ,...,TJ,a∗ ,t∗ (wi,a∗,t∗,,Ti,1,a∗,t∗ , . . . ,Ti,J,a∗,t∗;βa∗,t∗), (4.5)
where Ic∗ is the subset of individuals who belong to cohort c∗ = t∗ − a∗ and |I| is the number
of elements in set I. Of particular interest to us are the estimates {β̂τ j}
J
j=1 and βθa∗ ,t∗ , which give
13When T j for j ≥ 2 include a discrete measure, we can replace fη j,a∗ ,t∗ with a proper discrete probability mass
function. For example, see Appendix C.2
92 Chapter 4. Returns to Skill and the Evolution of Skills for OlderMen
us the estimated measurement functions {̂τ j(·)}Jj=1 and skill distributions f̂θa∗ ,t∗ (·), respectively.
14
We can repeat the estimation procedure in (4.5) for each cohort (a, t∗) and estimate the skill
distribution fθa,t∗ of cohort c = t
∗ − a at time t∗.
We can also increase the estimation efficiency of τ̂ j(·) by including all cohorts in a single
optimization procedure. For any cohort c = a− t∗, define the cohort specific objective function:
Q(βa,t∗) ≡
1
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic
log fwa,t∗ ,T1,a,t∗ ,...,TJ,a,t∗ (wi,a,t∗,,Ti,1,a,t∗ , . . . ,Ti,J,a,t∗;βa,t∗). (4.6)
Let βt∗ ≡ {βa,t∗}a∈A be the stacked parameter vector, where A is an index set of all different
ages (cohorts) at time t∗. Then, the parameter of interest as well as some nuisance parameters
can be estimated by
β̂t∗ = arg max
βt∗∈B|A|
∑
a∈A
Q(βa,t∗)
Notice that we normalize the mean of the skill distribution only in cohort c∗, so the density
function fθa,t∗ for a , a
∗ is allowed to have a non-zero mean. This estimation approach will
be more efficient if the measurement errors {εa,t∗}a∈A and {ηa,t∗}a∈A have identical distributions
across different cohorts.
Finally, we note that if one is simply interested in determining whether any of the τ j(·)
functions is linear (or only the density of skills in period t∗ across all ages/cohorts is desired),
then the likelihood in equation (4.4) can alternatively be written in terms of fθt∗ (with parame-
ters βθt∗ ), normalizing this density to be mean zero. Indeed, this is the approach we take below
in determining that one of our measures is linear in skills.
Step 2: Estimating λt and fθa,t(·)
Now, we discuss estimation of skill returns, λt, and the skill distributions, fθa,t(·), with additional
cross-sectional data at time t , t∗. Embedding the estimated measurement function τ̂1(·) and
14Appendix C.2 provides expressions for likelihoods assuming mixtures of normal distributions for errors and
discusses the case of both discrete and continuous measurements, T j,a∗,t∗ . Details on estimation of standard errors
for β̂a∗,t∗ are also provided in Appendix C.2.
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the unknown skill return λt, we can write the density function at time t as
fwa,t ,T1,a,t ,...,TJ,a,t(w,T1, . . . ,TJ)
=
∫
Θ
fεa,t
(
w − λtθ;βεa,t
)
× fη1,a,t
(
T1 − τ̂1(θ);βη1,a,t
)
× fη2,a,t
(
T2 − τ2(θ;βτ2);βη2,a,t
)
× · · · × fηJ,a,t
(
TJ − τJ(θ;βτJ );βηJ,a,t
)
× fθa,t
(
θ;βθa,t
)
dθ.
(4.7)
Define Q(λt, β̃a,t) as in (4.6) by adding the skill return parameter λt and let β̃t ≡ {β̃a,t}a∈A,
where we drop βτ1 from each βa,t as we already plugged in the estimate from Step 1. If any
measure observed at time t∗ is repeated at time t, we can replace it with τ̂ j(·) and drop the
relevant parameters. The parameter set is further simplified when εa,t and η j,a,t are age/time-
invariant since we can plug-in the corresponding estimates from Step 1. Then, we can estimate
the skill return and other underlying parameters at time t by
(̂
λt, β̂t
)
= arg max
(λt ,β̃t)∈Λ×B̃|A|
∑
a∈A
Q(λt, β̃a,t).
Once we obtain estimates β̂θa,t for skill distributions fθa,t(·), we can estimate αa,t for all a ∈ A at
time t. In addition, we can estimate time effects in the wage equation by γ̂t = γ̃ − λ̂tα̂a,t, where
we have already estimated all the components on the right hand side.
Step 3: Estimating Skill Dynamics
We discuss estimation of skill dynamics for two different cases, both using panel data. First, for
a general Markov skill process, we can apply the same idea as above to estimate its dynamics
using any repeated continuous measure of skills. Given the estimated elements of the model,
we can write the joint density function of repeated continuous measure j at time t and t + 1 as
94 Chapter 4. Returns to Skill and the Evolution of Skills for OlderMen
follows:
fT j,a,t ,T j,a+1,t+1(Tt,Tt+1;βθa,t ,θa+1,t+1) =
"
Θ×Θ
f̂η j,a,t(Tt − τ̂ j(θt)) f̂η j,a+1,t+1(Tt+1 − τ̂ j(θt+1))
× fθa,t ,θa+1,t+1(θt, θt+1;βθa,t ,θa+1,t+1)dθtdθt+1,
(4.8)
where fθa,t ,θa+1,t+1(θt, θt+1;βθa,t ,θa+1,t+1) is the joint density function of (θa,t, θa+1,t+1). The measure j
specific objective function can be defined as
Q j(βθa,t ,θa+1,t+1) =
1
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic
log fT j,a,t ,T j,a+1,t+1(Ti, j,a,t,Ti, j,a+1,t+1;βθa,t ,θa+1,t+1).
Then, the parameters for the joint density function are estimated by
β̂θa,t ,θa+1,t+1 = arg max
βθa,t ,θa+1,t+1∈Bθ
Q j(βθa,t ,θa+1,t+1).
Once we have estimated the joint density function, the dynamics of the skill process follow
immediately from the conditional density function.
Second, if the skill process follows the AR(1) with fixed effect structure as in (4.3), the
parameters for this process can be estimated following a similar strategy as above using a
modified version of equation (4.8) that incorporates an additional time period to estimate the
joint density fθt ,θt+1,θt+2 where the parameters for this density, βθa,t ,θa+1,t+1,θa+2,t+2 include the relevant
cohort c = t − a distribution for ψi and parameters of the AR(1) process (ρ and parameters
determining distributions for φi,a,t, νa+1,t+1, and νa+2,t+2).
Estimation of Skill Distributions, Skill Dynamics, and Returns to Skill when a Linear
Measurement is Available
In our empirical context, one of the measurements, say T1,a,t, is determined to be linear in
skills from the estimation procedure described in Section 4.2.3. We use this information to
facilitate estimation of the returns to skill over time and the evolution and dynamics of skills
assuming the special case where θi,a,t follows the AR(1) plus fixed effect process described in
equation (4.3).
Using the known linear measurement Ti,1,a,t = β1,0 +β1,1θi,a,t +ηi,1,a,t, our model for log wage
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residuals and the skill measurement can be written in terms of de-meaned skills:
wi,a,t = λtθ̄i,a,t + εi,a,t,
θ̄i,a,t = ψi + φi,a,t,
φi,a,t = ρφi,a−1,t−1 + νi,a,t,
Ti,1,a,t = (β1,0 + β1,1αa,t) + β1,1θ̄i,a,t + ηi,1,a,t.
These imply the following covariances for (a, t):
Cov(wa,t,T1,a+k,t+k) = λtβ1,1
[
Var(ψ|t − a) + ρkVar(φa,t)
]
, for k ≥ 0
Cov(T1,a,t,T1,a+k,t+k) = β21,1
[
Var(ψ|t − a) + ρkVar(φa,t)
]
, for k ≥ 1
Cov(T1,a,t,wa+k,t+k) = λt+kβ1,1
[
Var(ψ|t − a) + ρkVar(φa,t)
]
, for k ≥ 1.
Assuming the distribution of skill shocks depends only on time, we define σ2νt ≡ Var(νa,t) for
all (a, t) and can write
Var(φa,t) = ρ2(t−t1)Var(φa−(t−t1),t1) +
t∑
s=t1+1
ρ2(t−s)σ2νs , ∀t ≥ t1 + 1,
where t1 is the initial period of observation. As discussed earlier, we normalize λt∗ = 1 and
αa∗,t∗ = 0. With these assumptions, the generalized methods of moments (GMM) can be used
to jointly estimate the time-varying returns to skill (λt), autocorrelation for skill shocks (ρ),
variances of initial skills by cohort (Var(ψ|t − a) for all observed cohorts), initial variances
of the persistent skill shock (Var(φa,t1) for cohorts observed in initial period t1 and Var(φa1,t)
for cohorts entering the sample at age a1 at later dates), time-varying skill shock variances
(σ2νt), and the measurement function parameters (β1,0, β1,1). Further details on estimation and
calculation of the standard errors are provided in Appendix C.3.
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4.3 HRS Data
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a national U.S. panel survey of
individuals over age 50 and their spouses.15 It consists of seven cohorts with the initial cohort
first interviewed in 1992. New cohorts of individuals were added in 1993, 1998, 2004, 2010,
and 2016.16 The survey has been fielded every two years since 1992 and it provides information
about demographics, income, and cognition, making it ideal data for the purpose of our study.
Because one of the cognitive tests (word recall) in 1992 and 1994 differs from the later years,
we use data collected from 1996 to 2016.17
The HRS records the respondent’s and spouse’s wage rates if they are working at the time
of the interview. We use the hourly wage rate, deflating nominal values to 1996 dollars using
the Consumer Price Index.18 The HRS also provides various cognitive functioning measures.
We use four measures in our estimation: word recall, serial 7’s, quantitative reasoning, and
retrieval fluency. Table 4.1 provides a brief summary of these measures. The word recall
test evaluates the memory of the respondents by reading a list of 10 words and asking them to
recall immediately (immediate recall) and after a delay of about 5 minutes (delayed recall). We
sum up the number of words the respondent recalled in the two tasks and obtain a score of 21
different values. The serial 7’s test asks the respondent to subtract 7 from the previous number,
starting with 100 for five trials. This test score is the number of trials that the respondent
answered correctly, and it has 6 different values. Quantitative reasoning consists of three simple
arithmetic questions assessing the numeracy of the respondent. We construct a test score based
on the answers and the resulting score ranges from 0 to 4. The retrieval fluency test asks the
15More precisely, the sample does include some individuals age 50. For example, someone from the original
cohort (born in 1931-1941) who was born late in 1941 may have been age 50 at the date of their first interview in
1992 if they were interviewed earlier in the calendar year.
16The HRS sample was built up over time. The initial cohort consisted of persons born between 1931 and 1941
(aged 51 to 61 at first interview in 1992). The Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD)
cohort, born before 1924 was added in 1993 and interviewed in 1993, 1995, and biennially from 1998 forward.
In 1998, two new cohorts were enrolled: the Children of the Depression (CODA) cohort, born 1924 to 1930, and
the War Baby (WB) cohort, born 1942 to 1947. Early Baby Boomer (EBB, born 1948 to 1953) cohort was added
in 2004, Mid Baby Boomer (MBB, born 1954 to 1959) cohort was added in 2010, and Late Baby Boomer (LBB,
born 1960 to 1965) cohort was added in 2016. In addition to respondents from eligible birth years, the survey
interviewed the spouses of married respondents or the partner of a respondent, regardless of age.
17The word recall test contains a list of 20 words in 1992 and 1994, while it contains only 10 words in later
years.
18https://www.bls.gov/cpi/research-series/home.htm#CPI-U-RS20Data
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respondents to name as many animals as they can in 60 seconds. The test score is the total
number of correct answers, ranging from 0 to 90. Additional details about the measures and
the construction of other key variables are provided in Appendix C.4.
Table 4.1: Description of Cognitive Measures
Meant to measure Number of values Available years
Word recall Memory 21 (0-20) 1996-2016
Serial 7’s Numeracy 6 (0-5) 1996-2016
Quantitative reasoning Numeracy 5 (0-4) 2002-2016
Retrieval fluency Fluency 91 (0-90) 2010-2016
Our sample is restricted to age-eligible (i.e. born in eligible years when first interviewed)
men. We use observations when men are ages 50-70 if their potential labor market experience
is between 30 and 50 years.19 We trim the top and bottom 1% of all wages within year by
college- vs. non-college-educated status and 10-year experience cells. In estimation, we use
non-imputed wages and cognitive measures only. The sample contains 9,848 individuals and
37,518 person-year observations.
Our sample consists of 64% white, 18% black, 13% Hispanic, and 5% other races with
an average age of 60 years. We create five education categories based on years of education:
0-11 years (less than high school graduate), 12 years (high school graduate), 13-15 years (some
college), 16 years (college graduate), and 17 or more years (above college). In our sample, 20%
had less than 12 years of schooling, 30% had 12 years of schooling, 24% had some college,
14% completed college, and 13% had more than 16 years of schooling. Table 4.2 shows the
mean and the standard deviation of the cognitive scores and log hourly wage, along with the
correlation between these variables. The correlations between test scores range from nearly
0.3 to 0.5, with the highest correlation between Serial 7’s and quantitative reasoning. Retrieval
fluency has the lowest correlation with log wages (0.214), while quantitative reasoning has the
highest (0.303).
19Potential experience is defined as age minus 6 minus years of schooling.
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Table 4.2: Mean, standard deviation (S.D.), and correlations of cognitive scores and log wages
Number of obs Mean S.D. Correlations
Word recall 35,747 10.31 3.14 1.000
Serial 7’s 35,859 3.94 1.45 0.311 1.000
Quantitative reasoning 11,789 2.07 1.25 0.365 0.494 1.000
Retrieval fluency 6,800 18.46 7.20 0.295 0.285 0.335 1.000
Log hourly wage 20,796 2.73 0.69 0.225 0.220 0.303 0.214 1.000
4.4 Estimation Results
4.4.1 Cross-Sectional Results for Measurement Functions
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, we use data from a single year, t∗ = 2010, to estimate measure-
ment functions τ j(·), as well as Fθt∗ (·), Fεt∗ (·), and Fη j,t∗ (·). We use data from 2010, because this
is the only year that all four cognitive measures we consider were recorded for every respon-
dent.20 We further restrict the sample to have non-missing wages and at least one non-missing
cognitive measure in 2010. The sample size for this 2010 analysis is 1,980.
We estimate the parameters by maximum likelihood as described in Section 4.2.3, normal-
izing λt∗ = 1. We treat word recall (T1) and retrieval fluency (T2) as continuous measures,
assuming both τ1(·) and τ2(·) are polynomial functions. In practice, we use likelihood ratio
tests to determine the polynomial degree for each measure. We treat the serial 7’s (T3) and
quantitative reasoning (T4) scores as discrete measurements generated from ordered probits
with latent index functions τ j(θi,t) + ηi, j,t.21
We estimate the model for three cases. In Case 1, we assume that log wage shocks εt,
continuous measurement errors (η1, η2), and unobserved skills θt are all normally distributed.
Case 2 assumes that skill θt is distributed as a mixture of two normal distributions, while εt
and (η1, η2) are all normally distributed. Finally, Case 3 is the most general, assuming both
20In other waves, either one or more of the cognitive tests were not administered or some of the testes were
only administered to new interviewees and/or re-interviewees ages 65 or older.
21For each of the discrete measures, we have K j = 5 or 6 choices, and we estimate linear terms (intercept terms
are normalized to zero) for the τ j(·) functions along with K j − 1 cutoff parameters. See Appendix C.2 for details.
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skill θt and wage shocks εt are distributed as mixtures of two normal distributions, while the
measurement errors (η1, η2) are normally distributed. While we assume the distributions of
measurement errors are time invariant, we allow the distributions for skills and log wage shocks
to vary freely over time.
For each case, we estimate different specifications by increasing the degree of polynomials
for τ1 and τ2, starting from a linear specification until the model cannot be improved further,
as determined by likelihood ratio tests. Then, the “best” specifications from each of the three
cases are compared to determine the “best” overall specification, again using the likelihood
ratio test. Table 4.3 reports the log-likelihood associated with several specifications and the
three cases, along with likelihood ratio test statistics and p-values. Based on the likelihood
ratio tests, the “best” overall specification allows both θt and εt to be distributed as mixtures
of normal distributions. Furthermore, τ1(·) (word recall) is linear in skill, while τ2(·) (retrieval
fluency) is a polynomial of degree 7 in skill. Table 4.4 reports parameter estimates and standard
errors for this preferred specification.
4.4.2 Results for Skill Distributions, Skill Dynamics, and Returns to Skill
The fact that word recall scores are linear in skill is convenient and enables us to use the
relatively simple approach described in Section 4.2.3 to estimate the returns to skill over time,
evolution of skill distributions over time, and the dynamics of skills. To do so, we use the
panel nature of the HRS from 1996-2016 (11 biennial surveys), further restricting the sample
to include men ages 52-65. There are very few observations outside of that age range for the
years we examine.
Since we only observe wages for those who are working at the time of the survey, there are
natural concerns about the implications of selection for any covariance moments that include
log wage residuals. (Fortunately, test scores are available regardless of work status.) To explore
the potential implications of selection, we consider four different sampling schemes for this
analysis:
1. “Full” Sample: This includes covariances for log wage residuals and/or test scores when-
ever they are available. Therefore, covariances using log wage residuals are only calcu-
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Table 4.3: First Step Estimation (Selected Specifications)
Model τ1(·) τ2(·) Log-likelihood Compared p-value
A. Both εt and θt are normal
1 linear linear -18546.93
2 linear 7th -18500.87 2 vs. 1 0.0000
3 linear 8th -18500.46 3 vs. 2 0.3615
4 quadratic 7th -18498.71 4 vs. 2 0.0374
5 cubic 7th -18497.37 5 vs. 4 0.1021
6 quadratic 8th -18498.15 6 vs. 4 0.2914
B. εt is normal. θt is mixture of two normals.
7 linear linear -18535.97
8 linear 7th -18487.42 8 vs. 7 0.0000
9 linear 8th -18486.80 9 vs. 8 0.2680
10 quadratic 7th -18487.25 10 vs. 8 0.5652
C. Both εt and θt are mixture of two normals
11 linear linear -18504.07
12 linear 7th -18455.07 12 vs. 11 0.0000
13 linear 8th -18454.50 13 vs. 12 0.2871
14 quadratic 7th -18454.92 14 vs. 12 0.5891
Comparing A vs. B vs. C
8 vs. 4 0.0000
12 vs. 8 0.0000
Note: η1 and η2 are normally distributed.
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Table 4.4: First Step Estimation (Selected Specifications)
Description Symbol Value Standard Error
Skill Function
Word recall
β1,0 10.38 0.06
β1,1 5.50 0.49
σ2η1 6.57 0.26
Retrieval fluency
β2,0 18.02 0.56
β2,1 16.94 4.51
β2,2 38.30 35.75
β2,3 -58.50 73.66
β2,4 -312.69 296.94
β2,5 62.05 314.11
β2,6 728.30 693.87
β2,7 426.80 513.29
σ2η2 36.43 1.66
Serial 7’s
β3,1 3.60 0.34
χ3,1 -2.77 0.11
χ3,2 -1.95 0.14
χ3,3 -1.40 0.15
χ3,4 -0.78 0.15
χ3,5 -0.05 0.15
Quantitative reasoning
β4,1 4.63 0.45
χ4,1 -1.90 0.09
χ4,2 -0.70 0.12
χ4,3 0.53 0.13
χ4,4 1.52 0.14
Skill
pθt ,1 0.87 0.17
pθt ,2 0.13 0.17
µθt ,1 0.06 0.05
µθt ,2 -0.42 0.63
σ2θt ,1 0.04 0.01
σ2θt ,2 0.04 0.06
Wage shocks
pεt ,1 0.12 0.07
pεt ,2 0.88 0.07
µεt ,1 0.41 0.13
µεt ,2 -0.05 0.04
σ2εt ,1 0.83 0.28
σ2εt ,2 0.27 0.02
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lated for workers, while covariances based only on test scores are calculated for both
workers and non-workers.
2. “Worker” Sample: This eliminates covariances for test score measures unless an individ-
ual is working in both periods.
3. “Wage 50-60” Sample: This only includes covariances with log wage residuals for years
when the worker is ages 50-60.
4. “Exp 30-40” Sample: This only includes covariances with log wage residuals for years
when the worker has 30-40 years of potential experience.
The “Full” Sample raises the most concern about selection due to early retirement. For ex-
ample, if some (e.g. lower skill) workers retire early when they experience a low wage shock,
εt, while other workers (e.g. higher skill) do not, this can distort the covariance between log
wage residuals and test score measures. Yet, the covariance between test scores is unaffected
by this sort of selection. The “Worker” Sample does not address the selection problems, but it
would provide more direct estimates that apply to the selected sample of workers. The “Wage
50-60” and “Exp 30-40” Samples address concerns about selective retirement to the extent that
the vast majority of men are still working throughout their 50s or prior to reaching 40 years
of potential experience (e.g. age 58 for a high school graduate). Even those retiring “early”
typically work during these years.
Using data available for even-numbered years, we use the GMM approach of Section 4.2.3
(with identity weighting matrix) to estimate β1,1 (for word recall), returns to skill λt, and the
evolution of skill distributions. Because we allow for age/cohort variation in the distribution
of “initial” φa,t skill shocks, we assume a cohort-invariant distribution of skill fixed effects (i.e.
Var(ψ|c) = Var(ψ) for all cohorts c). Regarding the skill distributions, we estimate the two-
year autocorrelation for persistent skills ρ2, variance of fixed effects Var(ψ), variances of skill
shocks σ2νt , and variances of “initial” φa,t skill shocks when individuals enter the sample.
22
22We estimate λt for t = 1996 to 2016, normalizing λt∗ = 1 for t∗ = 2010. We estimate σ2νt for years t = 1998 to
2016, normalizing σ2ν1996 = 0. We estimate variances of initial AR(1) skill shocks for men first observed in 1996,
Var(φa,1996) for ages a = 52 to 65, as well as for men first observed at ages 52 and 53 in other years, i.e. Var(φ52,t)
and Var(φ53,t) for t = 1998 to 2016.
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Table 4.5 reports the estimates and standard errors for β1,1, ρ2, and Var(ψ) for all four
samples. The estimates are fairly similar across samples; although, the estimated β1,1 mapping
skills into word recall scores ranges from 9.0 for the “Worker” Sample to 11.8 for the “Exp
30-40” Sample. Of greater interest are the skill fixed effects variance estimates, which range
from 0.014 to 0.025. Based on the “Full” Sample estimates, these suggest that variation in
these permanent skill differences accounts for 38% of the variation in skills and 5% of the
variation in log wages at age 60 in 2002. Our estimates for ρ2, which reflect the dynamics of
skill shocks, are also similar across samples at 0.86 to 0.87. These imply values for ρ of about
0.93, within the typical range of autocorrelations for log earnings innovations in the earnings
dynamics literature (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011).
Table 4.5: GMM Estimation Results (Selected Parameters)
Parameter Full Worker Wage 50-60 Exp 30-40
β1,1 9.936 9.032 9.834 11.844
(0.743) (0.724) (0.802) (1.169)
ρ2 0.861 0.867 0.861 0.861
(0.037) (0.050) (0.037) (0.037)
Var(ψ) 0.021 0.025 0.021 0.014
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005)
The estimated time patterns for σ2νt are shown in Figure 4.1, while estimates for Var(φa,t)
are shown in Figure 4.2 (estimates for all ages in 1996) and Figure 4.3 (estimates for ages 52
and 53 for years 1998-2016). These estimates suggest considerable stability in the process for
persistent skill shocks over time and across cohorts.
Finally, Figure 4.4 plots estimated returns to skill, λt, over time for all samples, along with
their 95% confidence intervals. Estimated profiles for all four samples suggest relative stability
in skill returns until the Great Recession, after which they appear to rise steadily through the
end of our sample period. Point estimates for the “Full” Sample suggest that the returns to
skill rose from a low of 0.82 in 2008 to a high of 1.21 in 2016.23 The qualitative pattern of
23Using a Wald test, we reject that the return does not change from 2008 to 2016 at 1% significance level.
104 Chapter 4. Returns to Skill and the Evolution of Skills for OlderMen
-.0
05
0
.0
05
.0
1
.0
15
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Year
Full Worker
Wage 50-60 Exp 30-40
Note: Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for the Full sample.
Figure 4.1: Estimated Skill Shocks σ2νt ≡ Var(νt) by Year
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Figure 4.2: Estimated Var(φa,t) by Age for t = 1996
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Figure 4.3: Estimated Var(φa,t) by Year
relatively stable returns to skill in the late 1990s and early 2000s, followed by a rise after 2008,
is consistent with the estimates of Lochner et al. (2020); however, standard errors for λ̂t are
large, making it is difficult to say how much returns actually rose after 2008, or to evaluate
year-to-year changes in returns, with any confidence.
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Figure 4.4: Estimated Return to Skill (λt) by Year
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4.4.3 Average Skill Profiles
We now explore average skill profiles by age and time for various subpopulations of interest.
Because we observe cognitive test scores for individuals whether they work or not, we can
examine the evolution of skills through and after retirement. Indeed, we report average lifecycle
skill profiles over ages 50-70. We begin by showing profiles for different birth cohorts in
the HRS, then consider different skill profiles by education and race. Finally, we explore
differences in skill profiles for workers who retire at different ages.
Since Ti,1,a,t = β1,0 + β1,1θi,a,t + ηi,1,a,t for word recall, we can write
θi,a,t =
Ti,1,a,t − β1,0
β1,1
−
ηi,1,a,t
β1,1
,
where ηi,1,a,t is mean zero. Linearity of the test score function implies that actual skills are
simply a re-scaled measure of test scores plus idiosyncratic noise. While test score measures
only allow us to obtain very noisy estimates for any specific individual’s skill level, we can
obtain much more precise estimates of average skill levels.
Since we normalize α54,1996 = 0, we have β1,0 = E(T1,54,1996), which can easily be es-
timated using the sample mean for word recall scores among individuals age 54 in 1996:
β̂1,0 = T̄1,54,1996. Using this along with our estimate of β̂1,1 from Table 4.5, we estimate av-
erage skills as
α̂a,t =
T̄1,a,t − β̂1,0
β̂1,1
, (4.9)
where T̄1,a,t reflects average T1,a,t for all individuals age a in year t. We can similarly obtain
estimates for average skills (by age and time) conditional on any personal characteristics as
long as those characteristics are independent of cognitive achievement measurement errors. In
this case, we would simply use average word recall scores for the subpopulation of interest in
equation (4.9). It is also worth noting that we can calculate average skills for ages outside the
range we used in estimation, assuming that the measurement function mapping skills to test
scores is age-invariant.
We begin by estimating average skills by age and time, α̂a,t. Recall that skills are measured
in log wage units (as of 2010), so differences in skill translate roughly into percentage differ-
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ences. Rather than show all of these estimates, we first regress α̂a,t on age and year indicators
(weighting by the number of observations in each age-year cell) to explore the extent to which
these vary with age and time. In Figure 4.5, panel (a) plots the regression coefficients on age
indicators for all four estimation samples, while panel (b) plots the regression coefficients on
year dummies. The age patterns suggest relative stability, except for a roughly 3 percentage
point jump up in average skills from age 52 (our base group in the regression) to age 53 and a
similar sized drop between ages 61 and 63. Panel (b) shows relative stability in average skills
over time with a sharp drop between 2008 and 2010 with the introduction of the Mid-Baby
Boomer cohort.
Because cohorts may differ in their skills, the introduction of new cohorts to the HRS
sample can produce jumps up and down in average skills like those seen Figure 4.5. We
next look at the age profiles (ages 52-70) for different cohorts, which should be representative
of average skills for those cohorts. Because each of these cohorts faced different educational,
social, and economic conditions throughout their lives, one might expect to observe differences
in their accumulated skills as of age 52 and beyond. Indeed, we see sizeable differences as
documented in Figure 4.6. From age 52 to 62, average skill levels are highest for men born
during World War II (WWII) and earlier, followed by the Early Baby Boomer cohorts (born
1948-1953), and then subsequent cohorts. At age 55, cohorts born before the War had average
skill levels that were about 11 percentage points higher than men born between 1954 and 1959.
By age 60, this gap had shrunk to about 3 percentage points, disappearing by age 63. Beyond
age 63, cohort differences are small, even reversing with the earliest cohort exhibiting a much
more rapid decline in skills with age compared to the War Babies and Early Baby Boomers.
While average skill levels began to decline with age for men in their mid-50s for the cohorts
born before, during, and immediately after WWII (by 8-13 percentage points), skill profiles
remained relatively flat for the Mid-Baby Boomer cohorts (born 1954-59) throughout their
late-50s and early-60s. Unfortunately, few men from the most recent cohort (born 1960-65)
are observed beyond age 55, so it is difficult to say whether the apparent flattening of lifecycle
skill profiles among men ages 55+ will continue.
Next, we explore whether lifecycle skill profiles among older workers differ systematically
by education or race. To remove the influence of any cohort differences, we regress θ̂i,a,t =
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Figure 4.5: α̂a,t Regression Coefficients
(Ti,1,a,t− β̂1,0)/β̂1,1 on HRS cohort indicators and interactions between annual age indicators and
educational attainment indicators (less than high school, high school graduate, some college,
college graduate, post-graduate) or race indicators (white vs. non-white).
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Figure 4.6: Average Skill Profiles by Cohort
Not surprisingly, Figure 4.7 shows sizeable and statistically significant differences in skills
across education groups, with college graduates possessing about 15-20% higher skill levels
than high school graduates over ages 56-70.24 High school dropouts have 10-17% lower skill
levels than high school graduates. What is, perhaps, most noteworthy about this figure is
the apparent parallelism in skills, even through typical retirement and post-retirement ages.
Skills are systematically declining beyond age 55 with similar rates of decline for all education
groups.25
Figure 4.8 shows the estimated average skill profiles by race. Consistent with lower wages
among non-whites, we see that average skill levels are about 10-20 percentage points lower for
non-white men over ages 52-57. (These gaps are statistically significant at all ages.) As with
education, we see similar lifecycle profiles for both whites and non-whites.26
24F-tests for equality of skills across any education comparison at any age from 52 to 70 yield p-values less
than 0.05 for all but four comparisons.
25Using F-tests for equality of average changes in skill (from age a to a + 1 for all available a shown in the
figure) across education groups, we cannot reject parallelism in age profiles (at 5% significance level) for any
education comparison. We also cannot reject parallelism for any education groups over subperiods, including
ages 55-60, 60-65, and 65-70.
26Based on F-tests, we only reject parallelism over ages 52-55. We cannot reject parallelism over ages 55-60,
60-65, and 65-70.
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Figure 4.8: Estimated Average Skill Profiles by Race
Table 4.6 reports average estimated skill levels and log wage residuals, which net out age
and time effects, by race and education for individuals ages 55-60. Column 1 reports average
skills for the full sample, while column 2 reports average skills for the sample of workers
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(i.e. respondents reporting wages during the same periods). Average skill levels by education
and race are larger for the sample of workers, but the differences are modest and vary little
across education and race groups. This suggests that selection into retirement has quite modest
effects on average skill levels in the workforce. As already evident in Figures 4.7 and 4.8, the
average skill gap between college and high school graduates is quite similar to the skill gap
between whites and non-whites, about 15%. Column (3) shows that the corresponding gaps in
average log wage residuals (also at ages 55-60) are much larger — college graduates have 44%
higher wages than high school graduates, while the race gap in wages is about 35%. Thus,
the cognitive skills captured by our measures explain an important share of education and race
wage gaps, but other factors also play an important role.
Table 4.6: Average Estimated Skill and Log Wage Residuals by Education/Race (Ages 55-60)
Estimated Skill Estimated Skill Log Wage Residual
(Full) (Workers) (Workers)
A. By Education
Less than HS -0.287 -0.241 -0.414
(0.006) (0.008) (0.015)
HS grad -0.147 -0.121 -0.186
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Some college -0.085 -0.053 -0.035
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012)
College grad 0.002 0.022 0.249
(0.007) (0.007) (0.017)
Above college 0.083 0.089 0.483
(0.006) (0.007) (0.017)
B. By Race
White -0.051 -0.022 0.105
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Non-white -0.203 -0.160 -0.244
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
Num. of obs. 14,047 9,064 9,064
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
The results presented so far suggest a systematic decline in skills for men that begins when
they are in their mid-50s (or earlier). Is this explained by a gradual increase in rates of retire-
ment with sharp declines in skills for those who retire, or does it reflect more gradual declines
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for all workers regardless of when they decide to retire? The patterns presented in Figure 4.9
favor the latter explanation. Panel (a) shows lifecycle average skill profiles separately for work-
ers who retire at ages 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, and 65+, while panel (b) removes cohort effects by
regressing θ̂i,a,t on cohort indicators and interactions of age indicators with retirement age in-
dicators (as with education and race above). In neither case do we see evidence of steep drops
over the ages when individuals retire or in the time immediately following retirement. Still,
the skill levels and lifecycle patterns notably differ for those who retire early and those who
retire late compared to those retiring between ages 55 and 64. Those who retire before age
55 have much lower skill levels in their 50s compared to those who retire later; however, their
skills continue to grow until age 61, while the skills of men retiring at ages 55-64 decline over
most of these ages. Differences between very early retirees and those retiring at ages 55-64 are
largely eliminated by age 60.
Those who retire at ages 65 or older possess the highest skill levels; however, their lifecycle
profile over ages 52-70 looks more like that of very early retirees than those retiring in their
late 50s and early 60s. These late retirees experience modest skill growth until their mid-50s,
stable skill levels to about age 60, and strong declines thereafter. By age 65, about half of the
difference in skills between them and those retiring over ages 55-64 is eliminated.
These patterns imply a complex relationship between retirement and skills. There is clear
evidence that those with high skills in their mid-50s choose to retire late while those with low
skills (a difference of more than 10 percentage points) choose to retire quite early. But, there is
little evidence to suggest that retirement itself is strongly associated with a decline in skills.27
Among those retiring very young, skills continue to increase for years after they retire, several
years after they have already started declining for those retiring in their late 50s or early 60s.
Over the same ages, skills are also increasing or stable for men who retire after age 65.
27Both Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and Bonsang et al. (2012) estimate significant negative causal effects of
retirement on cognition using the HRS; however, Coe et al. (2012) does not.
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Figure 4.9: Average Skill Profiles by Retirement Age
4.5 Conclusions
With multiple skill measures and wages each period, we have shown that if at least one mea-
sure is continuous and repeated, it is possible to nonparametrically identify the evolution of
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skill prices and cross-sectional skill distributions over time without any assumptions on the
distributions or dynamics of skills. With panel data, the same measurements and wages can
identify skill dynamics as well. Our constructive identification analysis motivates a very gen-
eral multi-step estimation approach. We also show that if any of the continuous measurements
is found to be linear in skills (in the first estimation step), a simple GMM approach can be used
to estimate skill returns, the means and variances of skill distributions over time, and a flexible
dynamic process for skills with a fixed effect and AR(1) stochastic process.
Using data from the 1996-2016 HRS, we estimate the evolution of skill returns, skill dis-
tributions, and skill dynamics for American men ages 52+ over that period. We first show that
one of the repeated continuous test measures we observe is linear in skills and then use our
simpler GMM estimation approach. Our estimates suggest that the returns to (cognitive) skills
were fairly stable from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s, but then began to rise signifi-
cantly after the Great Recession. This pattern is broadly consistent with that of Lochner et al.
(2020).
We document considerable differences in average skill levels and lifecycle profiles across
cohorts. More recent cohorts of men had significantly lower average skill levels in their mid-
50s than did earlier cohorts when they were the same ages. However, earlier cohorts experi-
enced much faster declines in skill with age, such that the earlier skill differences had largely
disappeared by the time cohorts had reached their 60s. For the latest cohort we observe (men
born in 1954–1959), we see no discernable decline in average skills prior to age 63 when they
are last observed. Distinguishing individuals by education and race, we find that average skills
are monotonically increasing in education and are higher for whites than non-whites. These ed-
ucation and race gaps are quite similar across ages and explain about one-third of the education
differences and nearly half of the race differences in log wages.
We also consider the interaction of skills and retirement, showing that those who retire at
older ages have substantially higher skills in their mid-50s. While skills generally decline with
age for men, at least after reaching age 60, we see no sharp declines around the time men retire.
To the extent that retirement does lead to cognitive decline, our results suggest that the effects
are relatively modest or largely offset by other lifecycle forces.
Finally, we show that individual fixed effects account for more than a third of all skill
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variation at age 60. Year-to-year fluctuations are also persistent (though not a random walk)
with an autocorrelation of 0.93.
In future work with the HRS data, we plan to test the validity of previous assumptions in
the literature regarding the evolution of skill differences or skill growth over the lifeycle. If
some of these assumptions are shown to be valid, it would provide additional credibility to
previous studies and further justification for those assumptions when using other data sources
without direct skill measures. We can also make more use of additional test measures (even
those that are non-linear in skills), using our GMM approach to obtain more precise estimates
of skill returns and skill distributions over time. In addition to measuring differences in average
skill levels over time, it is straightforward to estimate changes in the distributions of skills. For
example, we can estimate the distributions of skills for workers choosing to retire at different
ages to better understand selection into retirement. Finally, it is possible to allow log wage
equations to differ by education and/or race, accounting for the fact that other factors or skills
(besides those measured by the cognitive tests in HRS) might play an important role in wage
determination.
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A.1 Details on Field of Study
The following tables list the detailed areas of study for the CSLP and PSIS field of study
categories.
Table A1: CSLP Field of Study Classification
Field of Study Area of Study
Administration/Business Business Administration; Accounting; Commerce; Communications;
Court Reporter; Hotel Administration; Hospitality; Marketing; Media
Resources; Municipal Government; Public Relations; Realty Appraisal;
Stenography; Programming; Systems Analysis
Agriculture Agriculture; Veterinary Medicine; Environmental Sciences; Forestry;
Horticulture; Dairy Farming; Fish and Wildlife
Arts/Science Archaeology; Astronomy; Biology; Chemistry; Ecology; Economics;
Fine Arts; Geography; Geology; History; Linguistics; Material Science;
Mathematics; Philosophy; Physics; Psychology; Sociology; Statistics;
Physiology; Library Science; Theatre; Visual Arts; Crafts; Interpreting
Journalism
Community Service/Education Community Services; Counselling; Social Work; Rehabilitation; Visit-
ing Bookmaker; Outdoor Recreation
Dentistry Dentistry; Dental Technology; Dental Nursing
Engineering/Technology Engineering; Electronics; Instrumentation; Kinetics; Pilot Training; Ar-
chitecture; Urban/Regional; Planning; Navigation; Marine Engineer-
ing; Waste Technology
Health Sciences Dietetics; Home Economics; Chiropractice; Chiropody; Podiatry; Reg-
istered Nursing; Registered Assistant Nurse; Optometry; Pharmacy;
Laboratory Techonology; X-Ray Technology; Audiology; Speech Ther-
apy; Medical Secretary; Food Products; BIO-Medical Sciences; Envi-
ronmental Food; Medical Radiography
Law Law; Bar Admission; Para-Legal Studies; Criminology
125
126 Chapter A. Chapter 2 Appendix
Table A2: PSIS Field of Study Classification
Field of Study Area of Study
Education Education
Visual and Performing Arts, and Commu-
nications Technologies
Communications Technologies/Technicians and Support Services; Vi-
sual and Performing Arts
Humanities Aboriginal and Foreign Languages, Literatures and Linguistics; English
Language and Literature/Letters; Liberal Arts and Sciences, General
Studies and Humanities; Medieval and Renaissance Studies; Holocaust
and Related Studies; Classical and Ancient Studies; Maritime Studies;
Philosophy and Religious Studies; Theology and Religious Vocations;
History; French Language and Literature/Letters
Social and Behavioural Sciences Area, Ethnic, Cultural, Gender, and Group Studies; Communica-
tion, Journalism and Related Programs; Family and Consumer Sci-
ences/Human Sciences; Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution; Biopsy-
chology; Gerontology; Museology/Museum Studies; Science, Technol-
ogy and Society; Behavioural Sciences; International/Global Studies;
Intercultural/Multicultural and Diversity Studies; Cognitive Science;
Cultural Studies/Critical Theory and Analysis; Dispute Resolution; Hu-
man Computer Interaction; Sustainability Studies; Psychology; Social
Sciences
Business, Management and Public Admin-
istration
Accounting and Computer Science; Public Administration and Social
Service Professions; Business, Management, Marketing and Related
Support Services
Physical and Life Sciences, and Technolo-
gies
Biological and Biomedical Sciences; Biological and Physical Sciences;
Natural Sciences; Nutrition Sciences; Human Biology; Marine Sci-
ences; Physical Sciences; Science Technologies/Technicians
Mathematics, Computer and Information
Sciences
Computer and Information Sciences and Support Services; Library Sci-
ence; Mathematics and Statistics; Systems Science and Theory; Mathe-
matics and Computer Science; Computational Science
Architecture, Engineering and Related
Technologies
Architecture and Related Services; Engineering; Engineering Tech-
nologies and Engineering-Related Fields; Historic Preservation and
Conservation; Construction Trades; Mechanic and Repair Technolo-
gies/Technicians; Precision Production
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Con-
servation
Agriculture, Agriculture Operations and Related Sciences; Natural Re-
sources and Conservation
Health and Related Fields Parks, Recreation, Leisure and Fitness Studies; Health Professions and
Related Programs; Dental, Medical and Veterinary Residency Programs
Law Legal Professions and Studies
Other Pre-Technology Education/Pre-Industrial Arts Programs; Multidisci-
plinary/Interdisciplinary Studies, Other
Appendix B
Chapter 3 Appendix
B.1 State Group
Table B1: State Grouping by Tuition
Group States 2-year 4-year
Annual tuition Annual tuition
1 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ok-
lahoma, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.
1,396 4,900
2 Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Nebraska, North
Carolina, South Dakota, and Washington.
963 7,508
3 Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
2,006 8,718
4 Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Vermont.
2,741 13,359
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B.2 Moments
The moments used are listed below:
• Fraction of high school graduates, 2-year college graduates, and 4-year college gradu-
ates.
• Fraction of high school graduates, 2-year college graduates, and 4-year college graduates
by AFQT quartile, parental income quartile, and state of residence group.
• Tuition elasticity of education: change in the fraction of 2-year college or 4-year college
graduates when 2-year college or 4-year college increases tuition by 1,000 dollars.
• Fraction of youth working full-time, part-time, and not working while enrolled in 2-year
and 4-year colleges.
• Fraction of youth working full-time, part-time, and not working after finishing school by
education level (high school, 2-year college, and 4-year college).
• The probability of working conditional on not working in the previous year and the
probability of not working conditional on working in the previous year by education
level.
• Mean and variance of log wages of college students working full-time.
• Mean of log wages of college students working part-time.
• Mean of log wages of youth working full time by education level and year after school.
• Mean of variance of log wages of youth working full time across all years and education
levels.
• Mean of covariance of log wages of youth working full time at two consecutive periods
across all years and education levels.
• Coefficients of regressing log wages on AFQT, education, cumulative work years, and
interaction of part-time work status and education.
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• Average parental transfers across all education levels and all years.
• Average youth assets at age 20, 25, and 30.
• Average youth assets if negative at age 20, 25, and 30.
• Average annual amount of student loans by college type.
• 2-year cohort default rate among college graduates.
• Coefficients of regressing 2-year college grants on parental income.
• Coefficients of regression 4-year college grants on AFQT and parental income.
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B.3 Parameter Estimates
Table B1: Estimated Parameters
Description Symbol Value Standard Error
Altruism factor η 0.0517 0.0008
Utility function:
Work preferences:
Preference for working part-time αv1 -0.1015 0.0023
Preference for working full-time αv2 -0.0084 0.0017
Work part-time while attending 2-year college αv3 0.0426 0.0085
Work full-time while attending 2-year college αv4 -0.0797 0.0070
Work part-time while attending 4-year college αv5 0.0348 0.0047
Work full-time while attending 4-year college αv6 -0.1413 0.0043
Variance of shocks for part-time working σ2v1 0.0176 0.0002
Variance of shocks for full-time working σ2v2 2.82E-05 7.32E-07
Preference for college attendance:
2-year college:
Intercept αz1 -0.1566 0.0244
AFQT αz2 0.0010 0.0004
Log parent income αz3 0.0149 0.0017
Variance of shocks σ2z1 0.0151 0.0074
4-year college:
Intercept αz4 -1.2212 0.0113
AFQT αz5 0.0107 0.0004
Log parent income αz6 0.0662 0.0020
Variance of shocks σ2z2 0.1690 0.0204
2-year college grants:
Constant αcg1 1693.49 17.14
Family income αcg2 -0.0017 0.0043
4-year college grants:
Constant αug1 4779.01 23.20
AFQT αug2 32.2306 0.1747
Family income αug3 -0.0203 0.0042
College wages:
Mean w̄c 9.2207 0.0228
Variance σ2c 0.7922 0.0029
Human capital function:
Constant αψ1 9.7308 0.0163
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AFQT αψ2 0.0029 0.0003
2-year college αψ3 0.1798 0.0149
4-year college αψ4 0.3283 0.0060
Experience αψ5 0.0701 0.0013
Job offer probability:
Constant α j1 -0.7704 0.0021
Human capital α j2 0.2525 0.0017
Not working in previous period α j3 -1.0833 0.0023
Wage:
Part-time wage ratio (college student) αcolp 0.5995 0.0047
Part-time wage ratio (hs grad) αncp 0.4993 0.0015
Part-time wage ratio (2 year grad) αcp 0.4964 0.0029
Part-time wage ratio (4 year grad) αup 0.4356 0.0040
Permanent shocks σ2ξ 0.0345 0.0002
Transitory shocks σ2w 0.1525 0.0005
Borrowing limit:
Constant αx1 2.5612 0.0033
Human capital αx2 0.2440 0.0011
Age αx3 0.1315 0.0007
Student loans:
Utility cost of borrowing in 2-year college αb1 -0.0617 0.0124
Utility cost of borrowing in 4-year college αb2 -0.0647 0.0049
Utility cost of default αd -0.0020 0.0011
B.4 Computational Details
Model solution
Given a set of parameters, the model is solved backward numerically from the terminal value
function. Since the state space includes multidimensional continuous state variables, I solve
the value function at a subset of the points in the state space for each period. The integrals taken
over the distribution of the shocks are approximated by Gauss-Hermite quadrature. I then use
multilinear interpolation to approximate the continuation values at points off the discrete grid.
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Estimation
To estimate the parameters, I use simulated methods of moments. For the minimization of the
criterion function, I use both the Simulated Annealing and the Nelder-Mead algorithms with
different starting values to ensure that a global minimum is achieved.
To get the standard errors of the estimates, I calculate the variance covariance matrix for
parameter estimates as follows:
V = (1 +
1
S
)
[
∂m(θ)′
∂θ
W∗
∂m(θ)
∂θ
]−1
,
where ∂m(θ)
∂θ
is the derivative of the vector of moments with respect to the parameter vector, S is
the number of simulations which is set to 30, and W∗ is the weighting matrix.1 The weighting
matrix is the inverse of the diagonal matrix with the variance of the corresponding moments as
the elements. Derivatives are calculated numerically.
1Gourieroux et al. (1993)
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C.1 Identification Details
In this appendix, we provide the regularity conditions for the identification result in Section
4.2.2. The result is based on Theorem 1 in Hu and Schennach (2008). For completeness of the
arguments, we rewrite all regularity conditions using notation in the current setup. Suppose
that we have two test measures, J = 2, which is the minimum requirement. The model at
(a∗, t∗) can be rewritten as follows:
wi,a∗,t∗ = θi,a∗,t∗ + εi,a∗,t∗
Ti,1,a∗,t∗ = τ1(θi,a∗,t∗) + ηi,1,a∗,t∗
Ti,2,a∗,t∗ = G2
(
τ2(θi,a∗,t∗) + ηi,2,a∗,t∗
)
.
We collect the necessary regularity conditions below:
Assumption 1 The observations (wi,a∗,t∗ ,Ti,1,a∗,t∗ ,Ti,2,a∗,t∗) generated from the model above sat-
isfy the following conditions:
i. The joint density of (θi,a∗,t∗ ,wi,a∗,t∗ ,Ti,1,a∗,t∗ ,Ti,2,a∗,t∗) is bounded, and so are all their marginal
and conditional densities. Furthermore, the joint density of (θi,a∗,t∗ ,wi,a∗,t∗ ,Ti,1,a∗,t∗) is con-
tinuous, and so are all their marginal and conditional densities.
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ii. The random variables wi,a∗,t∗ , Ti,1,a∗,t∗ , and Ti,2,a∗,t∗ are mutually independent conditional
on θi,a∗,t∗ .
iii. The conditional density functions fwi,a∗ ,t∗ |Ti,1,a∗ ,t∗ (w|t) and fθi,a∗ ,t∗ |wi,a∗ ,t∗ (θ|w) form a bounded
complete family of distributions indexed by t and w, respectively.
iv. For all θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ, the set {t2 : fTi,2,a∗ ,t∗ |θi,a∗ ,t∗ (t2|θ1) , fTi,2,a∗ ,t∗ |θi,a∗ ,t∗ (t2|θ2)} has positive proba-
bility whenever θ1 , θ2.
v. We normalize that E[wi,a∗,t∗ |θi,a∗,t∗] = θi,a∗,t∗ and that E[εi,a∗,t∗ |θi,a∗,t∗] = E[ηi,1,a∗,t∗ |θi,a∗,t∗] =
E[ηi,2,a∗,t∗ |θi,a∗,t∗] = 0.
Condition (i) is a mild restriction on the distribution and allows Ti,2,a∗,t∗ to be discrete. Con-
ditions (ii), (iv), and (v) are immediately satisfied from the model construction. For example,
the strict monotonicity of τ2(·) implies condition (iv). The completeness assumption in condi-
tion (iii) is widely used in the nonparametric identification literature and is satisfied in many
classes of distributions, e.g. the exponential family. See, Hu and Schennach (2008) for further
discussions on the completeness assumption.
Under Assumption 1, Theorem 1 in Hu and Schennach (2008) holds, and we can identify
the joint and conditional densities fT2,a∗ ,t∗ ,θa∗ ,t∗ (·, ·), fwa∗ ,t∗ |θa∗ ,t∗ (·|·), and fT1,a∗ ,t∗ , |θa∗ ,t∗ (·|·) from Equa-
tion (6) therein. The measurement function τ1(·) is the conditional mean function of T1,a∗,t∗
given θa∗,t∗ and can be identified by
τ1(θ) = E[T1,a∗,t∗ |θ] =
∫
t1 fT1,a∗ ,t∗ |θa∗ ,t∗ (t1|θ)dt1.
The marginal density fθa∗ ,t∗ (·) is identified by integrating the joint density:
fθa∗ ,t∗ (θ) =
∫
fT2,a∗ ,t∗ ,θa∗ ,t∗ (t2, θ)dt2.
Finally, the marginal densities fεa∗ ,t∗ (·) and fη1,a∗ ,t∗ (·) are identified by the standard deconvolution
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method:
ϕεa∗ ,t∗ (t) = ϕwa∗ ,t∗ (t)/ϕθa∗ ,t∗ (t)
ϕη1,a∗ ,t∗ (t) = ϕT1,a∗ ,t∗ (t)/ϕτ1(θa∗ ,t∗ )(t),
where ϕx(·) denotes the characteristic function of x.
C.2 Step 1 Estimation
Derivation of Equation (4.4):
fwa∗ ,t∗ ,T1,a∗ ,t∗ ,...,TJ,a∗ ,t∗ (w,T1, . . . ,TJ)
=
∫
Θ
fwa∗ ,t∗ ,T1,a∗ ,t∗ ,...,TJ,a∗ ,t∗ ,θa∗ ,t∗ (w,T1, . . . ,TJ, θ)dθ
=
∫
Θ
fwa∗ ,t∗ |T1,a∗ ,t∗ ,...,TJ,a∗ ,t∗ ,θa∗ ,t∗ (w|T1, . . . ,TJ, θ)
× fT1,a∗ ,t∗ |T2,a∗ ,t∗ ,...,TJ,a∗ ,t∗ ,θa∗ ,t∗ (T1|T2, . . . ,TJ, θ) × · · · × fTJ,a∗ ,t∗ |θa∗ ,t∗ (TJ |θ) fθa∗ ,t∗ (θ)dθ
=
∫
Θ
fwa∗ ,t∗ |θa∗ ,t∗ (w|θ) fT1,a∗ ,t∗ |θa∗ ,t∗ (T1|θ) × · · · × fTJ,a∗ ,t∗ |θa∗ ,t∗ (TJ |θ) fθa∗ ,t∗ (θ)dθ
=
∫
Θ
fεa∗ ,t∗ |θa∗ ,t∗ (ε|θ) fη1,a∗ ,t∗ |θa∗ ,t∗ (η1|θ) × · · · × fηJ,a∗ ,t∗ |θa∗ ,t∗ (ηJ |θ) fθa∗ ,t∗ (θ)dθ
=
∫
Θ
fεa∗ ,t∗ (w − θ;βεa∗ ,t∗ )
× fη1,a∗ ,t∗ (T1 − τ1(θ;βτ1);βη1,a∗ ,t∗ ) × · · · × fηJ,a∗ ,t∗ (TJ − τJ(θ;βτJ );βηJ,a∗ ,t∗ ) fθa∗ ,t∗ (θ;βθa∗ ,t∗ )dθ.
Consider mixtures of normal distributions for the distributions of εa∗,t∗ , η j,a∗,t∗ of continuous
measure, and θa∗,t∗:
fεa∗ ,t∗ (w − θ;βεa∗ ,t∗ ) =
∑
nε
pεa∗ ,t∗ ,nε
1√
2πσ2εa∗ ,t∗ ,nε
exp
− (w − θ − µεa∗ ,t∗ ,nε)22σ2εa∗ ,t∗ ,nε
 ,
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fη j,a∗ ,t∗ (T j − τ j(θ;βτ j);βη j,a∗ ,t∗ )
=
∑
nη j
pη j,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη j
1√
2πσ2η j,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη j
exp
− (T j − τ j(θ;βτ j) − µη j,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη j )22σ2η j,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη j
 ,
fθa∗ ,t∗ (θ;βθa∗ ,t∗ ) =
∑
nθ
pθa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ
1√
2πσ2θa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ
exp
− (θ − µθa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ)22σ2θa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ
 ,
where βx := (px,nx , µx,nx , σx,nx) and
∑
nx px,nx = 1 for x = εa∗,t∗ , η j,a∗,t∗ , and θa∗,t∗ .
1 Note that the
location restriction (i.e. E[x] = 0) implies that
∑
nx px,nxµx,nx = 0.
If the test measure T j is discrete, we assume that it is generated from an ordered probit
model. Suppose it has K j discrete values: T j ∈ {1, ...,K j}. We need to estimate K j − 1 cutoff
values for the ordered probit, i.e., χ j := (χ j,1, χ j,2, ..., χ j,K j−1). The density function is:
fη j,a∗ ,t∗ (T j − τ j(θ;βτ j); χ j) =
K j∑
k=1
1(T j = k)
[
Φ
(
χ j,k − τ j(θ;βτ j)
)
− Φ
(
χ j,k−1 − τ j(θ;βτ j)
)]
,
with χ j,0 = −∞ and χ j,K j = ∞. Φ(·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution.
Since we have 4 measures: two are continuous (T1 and T2) and two are discrete (T3 and
T4), the log-likelihood for individual i at age a∗ in year t∗ is:
`i,a∗,t∗ = log
∫ ∞
−∞

∑
nε
pεa∗ ,t∗ ,nε
1√
2πσ2εa∗ ,t∗ ,nε
exp
− (wi,a∗,t∗ − θ − µεa∗ ,t∗ ,nε)22σ2εa∗ ,t∗ ,nε


×

∑
nη1
pη1,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη1
1√
2πσ2η1,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη1
exp
− (Ti,1,a∗,t∗ − τ1(θ;βτ1) − µη1,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη1 )22σ2η1,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη1


×

∑
nη2
pη2,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη2
1√
2πσ2η2,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη2
exp
− (Ti,2,a∗,t∗ − τ2(θ;βτ2) − µη2,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη2 )22σ2η2,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη2


×
[ K3∑
k3=1
1(Ti,3,a∗,t∗ = k3)
[
Φ
(
χ3,k3 − τ3(θ;βτ3)
)
− Φ
(
χ3,k3−1 − τ3(θ;βτ3)
)] ]
1For expositional purposes, we assume that the number of distributions for each random variable mixture (i.e.
nε, nη j , and nθ) do not vary with age and time.
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×
[ K4∑
k4=1
1(Ti,4,a∗,t∗ = k4)
[
Φ
(
χ4,k4 − τ4(θ;βτ4)
)
− Φ
(
χ4,k4−1 − τ4(θ;βτ4)
)] ]
×

∑
nθ
pθa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ
1√
2πσ2θa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ
exp
− (θ − µθa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ)22σ2θa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ

 dθ
= log
∑
nε,nη1 ,nη2 ,k3,k4,nθ
pεa∗ ,t∗ ,nε pη1,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη1 pη2,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη2 pθa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ
×
1√
24π4
(
σεa∗ ,t∗ ,nεση1,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη1ση2,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη2σθa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ
)2
× 1(Ti,3,a∗,t∗ = k3) × 1(Ti,4,a∗,t∗ = k4)
×
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−
(wi,a∗,t∗ − θ − µεa∗ ,t∗ ,nε)
2
2σ2εa∗ ,t∗ ,nε
−
(Ti,1,a∗,t∗ − τ1(θ;βτ1) − µη1,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη1 )
2
2σ2η1,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη1
−
(Ti,2,a∗,t∗ − τ2(θ;βτ2) − µη2,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη2 )
2
2σ2η2,a∗ ,t∗ ,nη2
−
(θ − µθa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ)
2
2σ2θa∗ ,t∗ ,nθ
)
×
[
Φ
(
χ3,k3 − τ3(θ;βτ3)
)
− Φ
(
χ3,k3−1 − τ
3(θ;βτ3)
) ]
×
[
Φ
(
χ4,k4 − τ4(θ;βτ4)
)
− Φ
(
χ4,k4−1 − τ
4(θ;βτ4)
) ]
dθ.
βa∗,t∗ is estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function:
β̂a∗,t∗ = arg max
βa∗ ,t∗∈B
1
|Ic∗ |
∑
i∈Ic∗
`i,a∗,t∗ .
Standard Errors
Define the score of the log-likelihood for observation i as follows:
Ŝi,a∗,t∗ = Si,a∗,t∗(β̂a∗,t∗) =
∂`i,a∗,t∗(β̂a∗,t∗)
∂β>a∗,t∗
,
and the Hessian:
Ĥi,a∗,t∗ = Hi,a∗,t∗(β̂a∗,t∗) =
∂2`i,a∗,t∗(β̂a∗,t∗)
∂β>a∗,t∗∂βa∗,t∗
.
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The asymptotic variance matrix is:
V̂ML,a∗,t∗ =
∑
i∈Ic∗
Ĥi,a∗,t∗

−1 ∑
i∈Ic∗
Ŝi,a∗,t∗Ŝ>i,a∗,t∗

∑
i∈Ic∗
Ĥi,a∗,t∗

−1
.
C.3 GMM Estimation with a Linear Measure
Let Λ be a vector of parameters to be estimated in the second stage. We use the generalized
methods of moments (GMM) to estimate Λ. Suppose the total number of covariances is M
and let m = 1, ...,M be the index of the covariances. Define the theoretical covariance vector
as h(Λ) = (h1(Λ), ..., hM(Λ))>. Let di,m be the indicator of whether individual i contributes
to the mth covariance. Then we can write individual i’s contribution to the mth moment as
gm(zi,Λ) where zi includes di,m, individual i’s log wage residuals, and cognitive measures.
gm(zi,Λ) is equal to di,m times the difference between the product of corresponding de-meaned
variables and the theoretical covariance. For example, individual i’s contribution to the moment
involving covariance Cov(wa,t,T j,a+k,t+k) is gm(zi,Λ) = di,m
[
(wi,a,t − w̄a,t)(Ti, j,a+k,t+k − T̄ j,a+k,t+k) −
hm(Λ)
]
.
Let g(z,Λ) = (g1(z,Λ), ..., gM(z,Λ))>. Then the following moment condition holds at the
true parameter Λ0:
E
[
g(z,Λ0)
]
= 0.
The GMM estimator Λ̂ solves
min
Λ
 1N
N∑
i=1
g(zi,Λ)
>W  1N
N∑
i=1
g(zi,Λ)
 ,
where W is the weighting matrix.
Standard Errors
The GMM estimator Λ̂ is asymptotically normal with a variance matrix
VGMM = (G>WG)−1(G>WΩWG)(G>WG)−1/N,
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where G is the Jacobian of the vector of moments, E[∂g(z,Λ0)/∂Λ>0 ], and Ω = E[g(z,Λ0)g(z,Λ0)
>].
To calculate the asymptotic variance matrix, both expectations are replace by sample averages
and evaluated at the estimated parameters:
Ĝ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∂g(zi, Λ̂)
∂Λ>
= −W−
1
2
∂h(Λ̂)
∂Λ>
,
Ω̂ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
g(zi, Λ̂)g(zi, Λ̂)>.
We can test r linear parameter restrictions H0 : RΛ = 0 using Wald test statistic:
(RΛ̂)>(RV̂GMM R)−1(RΛ̂)
d
−→ χ2r .
C.4 Data
C.4.1 Cognitive Measures
Details on the construction of the four cognitive measures are as follows:
- Word recall. In the data, there are two separate tasks to assess respondent’s memory: one
is immediate word recall and the other is delayed word recall. During the interview, the
interviewer read a list of 10 nouns to the respondent and asked the respondent to recall as
many words as possible from the list in any order. After approximately 5 minutes of an-
swering other survey questions, the respondent was asked to recall the nouns previously
presented. We construct a single measure which is the sum of the number of nouns that
the respondent recalled in the two tasks. This measure ranges from 0 to 20.
- Serial 7’s. This test asks the respondent to subtract 7 from the prior number, beginning
with 100 for five trials. Correct subtractions are based on the prior number given, so that
even if one subtraction is incorrect subsequent trials are evaluated on the given (perhaps
wrong) answer. This test score ranges from 0 to 5.
- Quantitative reasoning. In HRS 2002, three questions were added to the core survey to
assess respondents numerical ability:
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1. “Next I would like to ask you some questions which assess how people use numbers
in everyday life. If the chance of getting a disease is 10 percent, how many people
out of 1,000 would be expected to get the disease?”
2. “If 5 people all have the winning numbers in the lottery and the prize is two million
dollars, how much will each of them get?”
3. “Let’s say you have $200 in a savings account. The account earns ten percent
interest per year. How much would you have in the account at the end of two
years?”
We construct a single measure called quantitative reasoning using the answers from these
three questions. For the first two questions, the respondent gets 1 if the answer is correct
and 0 otherwise. For the last question, the respondent gets 2 if the answer is correct. If
the respondent used 10% as a simple interest rate rather than a compound interest rate,
i.e., answered 240 instead of 242, he gets 1. The quantitative reasoning measure is the
sum of scores of all three questions and it ranges from 0 to 4.
- Retrieval fluency. This task was first incorporated in the HRS in the 2010 wave. During
this task, respondents were asked to name as many animals as they could withing a 60-
second time limit. The retrieval fluency measure is constructed as the number of total
animal answered minus the number of incorrect names. The value of this measure ranges
from 0 to 90.
C.4.2 Age
The age variable we use is the age at the end of the interview. According to the HRS, when there
are different beginning and ending interview dates, most of the interview is usually conducted
on the ending date. So it is recommended to use age at the end of interview date for respondent
age at each interview.
The interval between interviews is usually 2 years. But about 5-10% of the sample was
interviewed a year later than the wave year. For example, the normal case would be someone
at age 52 interviewed in 1998 and age 54 interviewed in 2000. But it could be the case that
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he was interviewed in 2001 for the second interview at age 55. Another case could be he was
aged 53 when interviewed in 1999 and aged 54 when interviewed in 2000. In these cases, we
assume that age at the first interview is the age at that wave year and the subsequent interviews
are two years apart. So for the first case, the wages we observe are wa=52,t=1998 and wa=55,t=2001
and we assume they are wa=52,t=1998 and wa=54,t=2000. For the second case, we observe wa=53,t=1999
and wa=54,t=2000 and we assume they are wa=53,t=1998 and wa=55,t=2000.
Another approach is to use the birth year to calculate age at each wave year. Then we
would assume that we observe wa=52,t=1998 and wa=54,t=2000 for both the first and second cases.
The results are quite similar and do not drive any particular patterns using this alternative
approach.
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